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VOLUME XII, NUMBER 4 MAY 1957

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BOOK REVIEWS

UNION SEMINARY QUARTERLY REVIEW

TO PROMOTE THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE SERVICE OF CHRIST

VOLUME XII, NUMBER 4 MAY 1957

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Editorial

When times are good, men tend to magnify man at the expense of God; when times are bad, to magnify God at the expense of man. Today, when both situations paradoxically obtain, both tendencies manifest themselves; and they are equally dangerous. That some aspects of modern religion are anthropocentric and eudaemonistic, sanctifying our prosperity and making of God an obeisant cosmic valet runing human errands, is as unfortunate as it is obvious. But that, in an insecure world, a message appropriate for the times has been sought in the 'security' of a new kind of biblicist dogmatism, is less apparent but equally perilous.

The content of such a message may be justified insofar as it constitutes an attempt to counteract current tendencies toward secularism and syncretism in the Church; but insofar as it becomes the vehicle for religious exclusivism, it is unjustifiable. In its uncompromising emphasis upon the sole authority of God's revealed Word in Scripture, in its insistence upon God's transcendence and upon the antithesis between the Word of God and the word of man, or between the Church and the world, in its claim that there is no salvation outside the Church visible and that no man who fails in this life to confess Christ Jesus can possibly enjoy eternal felicity in the next, in its excessive absorption with the corruption of man and the impossibility of any realization of the Kingdom of God in history, in its extreme eschatological perspective which seems to obviate provisionally discriminate historical judgments, and in its selfish search for personal salvation in other-worldly terms, this "neo-fundamentalism" can differ as greatly from the Gospel of Christ as the errors it seeks to combat. And only as we see its defects can we buttress our defenses against its allurements.

Firstly, it fosters a prideful exclusiveness alien to the heart of the Gospel, which is mercy and grace. There is nothing so alien to the spirit of Christ as a dogmatic arrogance and pharisaic assurance stemming from a legalistic appropriation of His "new law," and nothing so contradictory to the work of Christ as the rigorous exclusion of some from the reach of His arms. The corruption of the best is indeed productive of the worst; and it is a sorry thing when a part of the truth makes an exclusive pretension to be the whole.

But secondly, the neo-fundamentalist interpretation of the Christian faith is obscurantist and irrelevant when it turns the fate of culture and civilization over to the so-called "secularists," who frequently see more clearly than these pious folk that "whosoever seeketh to save his life shall lose it." For how can we maintain any sort of dialogue with the world, or illumine it with the light of God's revealed truth, if we posit an absolute dichotomy between them and condemn all points of contact? It does not solve the problem of redemption to cut off something from redemption's sphere, nor does it fulfill the mission of the Church to concentrate almost entirely on an ingrown circle of relationships. The integrity of an incarnational faith is at stake, for if the Word was made flesh in one supreme instance, surely the world of nature and flesh is worthy of redemption, and surely, at other lesser points, the eternal and the temporal will intersect. And to achieve such moments of intersection, knowing that whatever we achieve is not our work, but God working through us, to do this with humility and courage and dedication, this is our calling.

W.H.H. III

*My Times**

Lewis J. Sherrill

My times are in thy hand. (*Ps. 31:15*)

To an astronomer I put two questions. I asked him, "How far is it in light years to the most remote star of which we have any knowledge?" He answered, "The most remote stars we cannot see with the naked eye, but in the most powerful telescope we can see stars that are at a distance from us which is of the order of two billion light years." And I asked him a second question: "How old is the earth?" To that he replied, "We do not know. But what we can say is that nothing very important has happened to the earth for about five billion years."

Two concepts of time lurk in all such statements as these. Time is like a line, in this case a line vastly prolonged. Think, if you can, of a ray of light plunging its dreary, uneventful, headlong flight through space for two billion years without encountering any object in that limitless abyss of space! But time is also like a point, a point on the line where something happens. It is the moment when event takes place. For that ray of light which plowed so long through space, it is the instant when that ray fell into the telescope and brought a word to the man who took in the meaning of that moment of time.

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*Ed. Note: *Dr. Sherrill was planning to write an article for the May issue of the* Quarterly Review. *In place of that article, we publish this, his last sermon. It existed only in full outline form, so the editors have taken the liberty of rounding it out, wherever appropriate, striving to be true to Dr. Sherrill's style and thought, and to keep these modifications at a minimum.*

Time, then, is long, uneventful flow; and time is the instant when some event lights up the whole landscape like a flash of lightning which reveals the shape of things that had lain hidden. In the Bible there are two concepts of time very similar to these. There is a time which flows on and on, time which can be measured in days, months, years. But also there is time which is more like a point, a point on the line giving content. That point is significant because it has meaning in the relation between God and his people: "In the year that King Uzziah died, I saw the Lord." In the common life there are "times" when events become the speech in which God and man converse. Events are, so to speak, the speech in which God asks man a question. Hence it can be said as the Psalmist said, "My times are in thy hand."

I. Time As Opportunity

There is event which spells opportunity. This is the event, the hour, in which God asks a question of a man or of a people. What are some instances of time as opportunity?

Repeatedly in the Bible the birth of a child is seen as a signal event —Isaac, Moses, John the Baptist, Jesus. Of no less interest is what shows up in such passages as the eleventh chapter of Genesis, and even more notably in the fifth chapter. There we have the dull lists of the patriarchs who are reported to have lived incredible numbers of centuries—two hundred, four hundred, six hundred, eight hundred, nine hundred years—we may make what we will of stories of lifes of such length. But one thing we cannot miss seeing in those stories: in the dull time line of lives incredibly long, the event was the coming of the child. Of such and such a one it will be said, he lived such and so many years, begat a child, lived such and so many centuries more, and for the most part all that was considered worth remembering out of that lapse of time was that he was the father of sons and daughters.

The moment when the Word of God is opened to the people is a moment of event. We think of Ezra and his teaching in the assembly; of Jesus and his reading in the synagogue.

Another moment of event is when we enter upon a new responsibility. For example, such moments were the times when the people chose Samuel as leader, or when Solomon ascended his throne.

When disaster threatens, God may be asking a question of a man or of a people. Thus the prophets speak to the people to open out to them the meaning of the events which confront them—the disaster which threatens, or the horrible flood of woe which already sweeps over them. It is a commonplace that the great prophets of Israel and Judah spoke to the people in the two or three centuries when the na-

tion was collapsing, and when finally chaos swept over the land and the people. To these prophets, events had meaning, they spoke for God. Isaiah of Jerusalem understood that the Assyrian was the rod of God's anger, and the acts of the Assyrian were the acts of the indignation of God.

Above all, the event in time which casts light on all time and all events is the event of Jesus Christ—his incarnation, his life, his passion, his death, his resurrection. We could not say, as the astronomer can say, that nothing of importance has happened to the earth for five billion years. The event of Jesus Christ is a turning point in time, yes. It is the event by which all other events are illuminated, yes. But even more: this event is a question put to man—"What think ye of the Christ?" And faith in its own high moment can respond:

> In the Cross of Christ I glory,
> Towering o'er the wrecks of time:
> All the light of sacred story
> Gathers 'round its head sublime.

II. Time As Testing

If time is event in which God puts a question to man, time is also event in which man responds to God; indeed, it may be, asks God a question in return. What are some instances of time as response, and testing?

The time when the question is put to man may well enough be a time of dismay. When piety is on display it may be that a man will boast a little of the way his faith bears him up in time of trouble. Thus the good Ignatius of Antioch, on the way to martyrdom, could write to the Romans: "Suffer me to become food for the wild beast . . . May I enjoy the wild beasts that are prepared for me . . . Let the crowds of wild beasts, let tearings, breakings, and dislocations of bones . . . and let all the dreadful torments of the devil come upon me; only let me attain to Jesus Christ." The sentiments are noble, indeed. But can one quite restrain the unworthy thought that the good bishop was playing up the gallery, knowing that his piety was on display? However that may be, when Jesus faced the supreme testing of his life and of his mission, it was with no such heroics as this. And when he was upon the cross, there was no such bombast. Rather it was a cry of real anguish which broke forth: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

One of the most common of all responses to the event in time is the response of rebellion. We ask, why has this had to happen? Why has this happened to me? How could a just and loving God allow all this

to come to pass? The Psalms show us this constant question of man in trouble, and God's understanding of man's response: "I will say unto God my rock, Why go I mourning?"

Another common response is that of question. What wilt thou have me to do? This is asked in faith when man stands within the event that speaks to him, and yet bewilders him for he does not as yet know what it says to him. For how many is this a haunting question today! This is what the man of faith must ask as he stands in the face of world unrest, suffering and danger. Our Lord asked those who companied with him, "Can ye not discern the signs of the times?" To this we have to answer how often, "No, Lord, no. We cannot."

The response of obedience, however, is especially worthy of consideration. The moment when some event seems to illuminate the whole landscape is a moment, it may be, when we see that which we are called upon to do. "I was not disobedient to the heavenly vision." Especially does this matter of obedience in response to illumination speak to the young who have already begun to live out into their own dedication; and so to those who seek to do so but are not yet sure either of the light upon their way or of their own response to it.

III. Time As Fulfilment

There is time which is God's question to man; there is time which is man's response to God; and there is time which marks fulfilment. Here the event is God and man in communication, which is communion. This is the walk with God; this is God and man as friends.

There is a fulfilment which comes in the fleeting moment and marks a depth of richness in meaning which it is worth living a lifetime to have known. Words can never describe the wonder of those brief but unforgetably fulfiling moments when there is genuine communication with a loved child, or with the beloved of one's life. Words can never describe the moment of communication with God in worship, when the pillars of the temple tremble and the house of God is filled with ineffable glory, or those priceless moments with God outside the temple, when one moment may bring fulfilment into an otherwise gray life.

If there is a fulfilment which comes in the fleeting moment, there is also a fulfilment which persists day after day. This is fulfilment in assurance. In one of the great documents of Christian faith, a question is asked in the quaint language of another day: "What are the benefits which in this life do accompany or flow from justification, adoption and sanctification?"

And the answer given us: "The benefits which in this life do accompany or flow from justification, adoption and sanctification are, assurance of God's love, peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Ghost, increase of grace, and perserverance therein to the end."

These riches of grace bring daily fulfilment. But above all, there is the enjoyment of God. This it is the ultimate destiny of man to have in this life; and so in the age which is yet to come. To catch it all up in one great saying, that same ancient document affirms it is the chief end of man to glorify God and to enjoy him forever.

My times are in thy hand: what is this to say in sum? There is time which breaks in upon our dull routine and opens the door to life. There is time which frightens us because we cannot yet see its meaning, and then we cry out, My God, why! And there is time when it is as if we caught some glimpse, however fleeting, of the meaning of all things. Then it may be we can say with Stephen, "I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God."

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

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Let Us Dare To Have Solitude

Paul J. Tillich

"He went up into the hills to pray. When evening came, he was there alone." (Mt. 14:23)

He was there alone; so are we. Man is alone because he is man. In some way, every creature is alone. In majestic isolation each star runs through the darkness of the endless space. Every tree grows according to its own law, fulfilling its unique possibilities. Animals live, fight and die for themselves, caught in the limits of their bodies. Certainly, they appear as male and female in families and flocks; some of them are gregarious, but all of them are alone. Being alive means being in a body, and being in a body means being separated from all other bodies, and being separated means being alone. This is true of every creature, and it is true of man more than of any other creature. He is not only alone; he also knows that he is alone—he is aware of what he is. Therefore, he asks the question of his aloneness. He asks why he is alone, and how he can overcome his being alone; he cannot stand it. But he cannot escape it either. It is his destiny to be alone, and to be aware of it. But he revolts against his destiny—in vain, for not even God can take it away from him.

In the Paradise story, we read: "Then the Lord God said, 'It is not good that the man should be alone,' and he made a woman out of the man's body." An old myth is used which shall show that there was originally no bodily separation between man and woman. Originally, they were one. Now they are longing to be one again, but although they rec-

ognize each other as flesh from their own flesh, each of them remains alone. They look at each other, and although longing for each other, they see their strangeness. God himself makes them aware of it when he gives his order to them, when he speaks to each of them separately, when he makes them responsible for their individual guilt, when he pronounces a different curse over each of them, when he listens to their excuses and mutual accusations, and leaves them to the experience of shame in face of their nakedness. They are alone: the creation of the woman has not conquered the situation of which God said that it is not good. Man remains alone, and the creation of the woman, although it gave a helper to Adam, has only added to the one human being who is alone another human being who is equally alone; and out of them, all the others, each of whom is also alone.

Well, is that really so? we ask. Did God not do better than that? Is our aloneness not largely removed in the encounter of the sexes? Certainly it is for hours of communion and moments of love. The ecstasy of love can swallow one's own self in the union with the other self. Separation seems to be overome. But after such moments, the isolation of self from self is deeper felt than before, even to the point of repulsion. We have given too much of ourselves, and now we want to take it back. An expression of our desire to protect our aloneness is the feeling of shame. We are ashamed if our intimate self is opened, mentally as well as bodily; we try to cover our nakedness, as Adam and Eve did after they had become conscious of themselves. Man and woman remain alone even in the most intimate union. They cannot penetrate each other's innermost center. If they could, they could not be helpers to each other. They could not have human community.

And this is the answer to the question why God himself could not liberate man from his aloneness. It is man's greatness that he is centered within himself. He is separated from his world, and able to look at it. Only because this is so, he can know the world, and love it and transform it. God, making him the ruler of the earth, has to separate him and to put him into aloneness. Therefore, man can be spoken to by God and by man; therefore, men can ask questions and give answers and make decisions; therefore, man is a responsible self able to fulfill himself and able to destroy himself; therefore, he has the freedom for good and evil. Only he, who has an impenetrable center in himself, is free. Only he who is alone can claim to be a man. This is the greatness, and this is the burden, of man.

II

The wisdom of our language has grasped these two sides of man's being alone. It has created the word *loneliness* in order to emphasize the pain of being alone, and it has created the word *solitude* in order to em-

phasize the glory of being alone. In daily life, these words are not always distinguished; but we should do it consistently, thus deepening by these very words the understanding of our human predicament.

In the twenty-fifth Psalm, we read "Turn thou to me, and be gracious, for I am lonely and afflicted." The psalmist feels the pain of loneliness. We do not know the character of his loneliness, but we know about the many characters our loneliness can have. We all have experienced some of them. Most widespread is the feeling of loneliness when those who have helped us to forget that we are alone leave us, be it by separation, be it by death. This refers not only to those who are nearest to us, but also to the groups which gave us the feeling of communion, groups with which we worked, groups with which we had social contact, groups with which we had spiritual communication. For many, such loneliness has become a permanent state and a continuous source of melancholy feeling and of a profound unhappiness. The sighing of innumerable lonely people all over the world and in our nearest neighborhood fills the ears which are opened by love.

Now let's turn to those among us who are surrounded by friends and neighbors, by co-workers and co-citizens, who live in a family group and have the communion of the sexes—all that the others do not have. And we ask, Are they without the pain of loneliness? Is their aloneness covered by the great crowd within which they move? Perhaps it is our own situation; and we may be able to give an answer to this question. And this might be our answer: "I never felt so lonely as in that particular hour when I was surrounded by people, and suddenly realized my ultimate isolation; and I became silent. I retired into a corner and left the group in order to be alone with my loneliness. I wanted my external predicament to match my internal one." Don't minimize such an experience by saying that people often feel not strong enough to obtain a significant place within a group, and that their withdrawal is nothing but an expression of their weakness and demands counseling and psychiatric help. Such people certainly do exist in large numbers, and they really need help. But I am speaking of the strong ones who have their place within the crowd, and who nevertheless have this terrifying experience of ultimate loneliness. They are aware in a sudden breakthrough of man's real predicament. And don't minimize such an experience by saying that people often feel misunderstood in spite of their urgent desire to make themselves understandable, and that this gives them the feeling of loneliness in the crowd. Nobody can deny that they are such people, and that, even more, they are not altogether wrong; for who is really understood, even by himself? The mystery of a person cannot be dissolved into a neat description of his character. But those who feel always misunderstood confuse the mystery of every person

with imaginary treasures they believe they possess within themselves, demanding of the others that they recognize them—but the others don't, and so they feel lonely and withdraw. They also need help.

But I don't speak of them. I speak of people whose real treasures are great enough to express themselves and who are understood and received and who nevertheless have the terrifying experience of ultimate loneliness. They break in such moments through the surface of their average life into the depths of man's predicament. Many feel lonely because their love is rejected, although they try hard to love, and to be loved. Often, this loneliness is self-created. There are people who claim as their right what can only come to them as a gift. They withdraw into a self-chosen loneliness, taking revenge through bitterness and hostility upon those by whom they feel rejected, enjoying at the same time the pain of their loneliness. There are many such persons, and they contribute greatly to the growth of neurotic loneliness in our days. They above all need help, for they easily become the prey of a demonic force which keeps them completely secluded within themselves.

But there is also a genuine experience of rejected love. No claim was made, but hope was at work, and the hope was disappointed. The community of loce came to an end, or came never into existence. Such loneliness cuts the ties with our world; it makes manifest that we are ultimately alone, and that even love cannot take this burden from us. But he who can stand the loneliness of disappointed love without bitterness has experienced the depths of man's predicament in a most radical and most creative way.

There are two forms of loneliness which do not permit any cover or any escape: the loneliness of guilt and the loneliness of death. Nobody can take from us what we have done against our true being. We feel our hidden and open guilt as ours and ours alone. We cannot make anybody else responsible for what has happened through us. We cannot run away from our guilt; we cannot honestly cover it up. We are alone with it. And it is this loneliness which permeates all other forms of loneliness, transforming them into experiences of judgment.

This is true above all of the loneliness in which we have to die. We remain alone in anticipation of all this. No communication with others can remove this loneliness, as no presence of others in the actual hour of our dying can cover the fact that it is our death, and our death alone, that we die. In the hour of death we are cut off from the whole universe. We are deprived of all things in the encounter in which we forget our being alone. Who can stand this loneliness?

III

Loneliness can be conquered alone by those who can bear solitude. We have a natural desire for solitude because we are men. We want to feel what we are, namely, alone, not as a matter of pain and horror, but as a matter of joy and courage. There are many ways in which solitude can be sought and experienced, and every way is that of "religion," if it is true, what a philosopher he said, that religion is what a man does with his solitariness. One of these ways is a desire for the silence of nature. Here we can speak without voice to the trees and the clouds and the waves of the ocean, and they answer without words is heard in the rustling of the leaves and the moving of the clouds and the murmuring of the waves. This can be solitude. But only for a short time. Then we realize: the voices of nature have no answer to the questions of our mind. They give us power of life, but they leave us alone. Easily, our solitude in nature becomes loneliness, and we return to the world of man. Solitude can be found in the reading of a poem, the hearing of music, the seeing of a picture, the thinking of significant thoughts. We are alone, perhaps in the midst of multitudes, but we are not lonely. Solitude protects us like an armor without isolating us. But life calls us back to its empty talk, its unavoidable demands, its daily routine, its loneliness and the cover it spreads over our loneliness.

There can be no doubt: this is not only a description of man's general predicament. It is also, and emphatically so, the description of our time. Today, more than in preceding periods, man is so lonely that he cannot bear solitude. So he tries to become a part of the crowd, and everything in our day supports him. It is the sympton of our disease that everything is done by teachers and parents and the managers of public communications to deprive us more and more of the external conditions for solitude, the simplest tools of privacy. Even our houses, instead of protecting the solitude of every member of the family or the group, are built in such a way that privacy is almost excluded. And the same holds true of the forms of communal life: in school, college, office and factory never-ceasing pressure tries to kill even our desire for solitude.

But sometimes God pushes us out of the crowd into a solitude we did not desire, but which takes hold of us. As the prophet Jeremiah says, "I sat alone because thy hand was upon me." God sometimes lays hand upon us. He wants us to ask the question of truth which may isolate us from most men, and which can be asked only in solitude. He wants us to ask the question of justice, which may bring us suffering and death, and which can be asked only in solitude. He wants us to break through the ordinary ways of men which may bring disrepute and hate upon us, a break-through which can happen only

in solitude. He wants us to penetrate to the limits of our being where the mystery of life appears, and it can appear only in the moments of solitude. There are some among us who want to become creative in some realm of life. You cannot become and cannot remain creative, without solitude. One hour in conscious solitude does more for your creativity than many hours of learning how to become creative.

What is it that happens when we are in solitude? We have heard the short words in Mark about Jesus' solitude in the desert: "And he was in the wilderness forty days, tempted by Satan. And he was with the wild beasts, and the angels ministered to him." He is alone, facing earth and sky, the wild beasts around him and in him, he himself the battefield of divine and demonic forces. This is what first of all happens in our solitude: we meet ourselves, not as ourselves, but as the battlefield of creation and destruction, of God and the demons. Solitude is not easy. Who can bear it? It is not easy even for Jesus, we read and have heard. "He went up into the hills to pray. When evening came, he was there alone." When evening comes, loneliness becomes more lonely. We feel this when the single day or a period or all days of our life come towards their end. Jesus went up to pray. Is this the way to transform loneliness into solitude? and to stand solitude? We should not answer this question too easily. Most prayers have not such power. They make God into the partner of a conversation, useful to prevent the only true way to solitude. They go easily from the mouths of ministers and laymen, but they are not born out of his solitude, out of an encounter in solitude with God and man.

This certainly is not the prayer for which Jesus went up to the hills. We better remain silent, and let our soul which is always longing for solitude, sigh without words to God. And this all of us can do, in a crowded day and in a crowded room, even under most difficult external conditions. This can give us moments of solitude which nobody can take from us. In the moments of solitude, something is done to us. The center of our being, the inner self, which makes that we are alone, is elevated to the divine center and taken into it. In it, we can rest without losing ourselves.

Now we have reached the point where we can answer a question which you may have asked already, namely, how communion grows out of solitude. We have seen that we can never reach the innermost center of another being. We always are alone, each for himself. But we can reach it in a movement which rises first to God, and then returns from him to the other self. In this way, man's aloneness is not removed, but it is taken into the community with that in which the centers of all beings are resting—and so, into a community with all of them. Even love is reborn in solitude, for only in solitude those

who are alone can reach those from whom they are separated. Only the presence of the eternal can break through the walls which isolate the temporal from the temporal. In one hour of solitude, we may be nearer to those whom we love, than in many hours of communication. We take them with us to the hills of eternity. And perhaps, if we ask, what is the innermost nature of solitude, we should answer, it is the presence of the eternal on the crowded roads of the temporal. It is the experience of being alone, but not lonely, in view of the eternal presence which shines through the face of the Christ and which includes everybody and everything from which we are separated. In the poverty of solitude, all riches are present. Let us dare to have solitude. Amen.

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How can Existentialism strengthen Christian faith?

Existentialism and Religious Belief

By DAVID E. ROBERTS

Edited by **ROGER HAZELTON**

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Bultmann's Existential Approach To Theology

John Macquarrie

Bultmann's problem may be stated quite simply. It is the problem of the intelligibility of the New Testament for modern minds. There are some parts of the New Testament, certainly, with which no one has any difficulty in understanding what is meant. There are straightforward narratives, simple parables, moral injunctions which can be understood readily enough. But with many other passages, it is far otherwise. The general picture which the New Testament offers is a strange one to anyone with a contemporary outlook. What do we make of those stories of wonders and miracles, of voices from heaven and angels sent from God? How do we understand those mysterious 'principalities and powers', the demonic forces of darkness, to whom the world is said to be subject? What does it mean to speak of the death of Jesus as a ransom for many or an atoning sacrifice? Can we attach any significance to the stories of Christ's descent into the underworld where he preached to the spirits in prison, or his ascension into heaven where he is exalted at the right hand of God? And what of those pictures of the coming end, when the Son of Man will return on the clouds, and the faithful will meet him in the air? All this seems to take us into a realm of fantasy. It is as if we found ourselves in a museum, but a museum in which the exhibits are not the material possessions of a past race of men, but their ideas, their language, their outlook. These ideas are just as remote from our modern world as the objects which we might see in a museum of classical antiquities, let us say, the domestic oil-lamps of a Roman citizen, or the equipment of a Roman soldier. It is not so much that we judge the ideas to be false, as just that they seem to be no longer meaningful or relevant.

The reason for the loss of relevance is not far to seek. It lies in the fact that we to-day have a different picture of the world from that which belonged to the writers of the New Testament. Their ideas and ways of speaking are so foreign to us because they come out of a different world from our world. The world of the New Testament was essentially that of the old Babylonian cosmology. It was a compact universe in three stories, with earth in the middle, heaven above, and the underworld beneath men's feet. Events the causes of which were not understood were referred in that world to the agency of good spirits from above or evil spirits from below as the case might be. It would not be inaccurate to say that it was a mythical picture of the world. Our own picture of the world is completely different. It is true that long before the New Testament was written the Ionian philosophers had already begun to grope towards a rational rather than a mythical understanding of things, but it is only in our modern Western culture that something like a scientific picture of the world has replaced the older pictures in the minds of ordinary people. The old compact universe has vanished away. Man and his earth have been dethroned from the centre of things. We look out on vistas of space and time which make us dizzy to contemplate. When a nevent is not understood, we do not assign it to the agency of spirits, but set about looking for an explanation in terms of natural causes. It is this changed world-picture which makes the New Testament so remote. The story of Christ's ascension, for instance, was intelligible to men who entertained the old picture of the world, but it is unintelligible in the post-Copernican era.

Interpretation, Not Rejection, of Myth

Are we then to reject the mythical elements in the New Testament, and retain only the moral and religious teaching of Jesus, together with the example of his life of service and self-sacrificing death? Some such conclusion was reached by liberal theologians like Harnack at the end of the nineteenth century. But to follow this line is greatly to impoverish our understanding of the New Testament. Bultmann's conclusion is quite different. Myth is not to be rejected but interpreted, and in order to do that, we must first find the right key to the interpretation of myth. The problem is one of hermeneutics. The first step towards the solution of such a problem is to make sure that we formulate our questions properly. Many of our perplexities with the New Testament arise from the fact that we ask the wrong questions. We may, for instance, be asking the question about what

actually happened. Every question has its own presuppositions, and the presupposition of this one is that the New Testament is a record of objective historic facts. But if this presupposition happens to be a mistaken one, it need not surprise us if our way of asking the question leads us into the greatest perplexities and elicits strange and unintelligible answers from the New Testament. Actually, this particular presupposition is mistaken. The New Testament is not intended to be a record of objective facts of history. No doubt it contains references to such facts, and the scientific historian, such as Guignebert, may be able to disentangle some of these facts from the interpretations of them with which they are intertwined. But primarily the New Testament is a religious book, and if we want to elicit its true meaning, we must ask the questions which such a book is intended to answer.

Now, according to Bultmann, a religious document intends to present the reader with a possibility of existence for which he can decide. Alternatively, this may be stated: it intends to bring the reader into an understanding of his own being. Its essential meaning, therefore, lies not in any record of historical facts which it may contain, not in any world-view which it may reflect, but in that possibility of existence, that self-understanding, that way of life which it presents to the reader. We can therefore only elicit the genuine meaning and follow a sound hermeneutic method if we ask the appropriate questions, and these are the questions of our own existence. What does this mean for my existence? With what possibility of existence does it present me? Into what understanding of my own being does it bring me? Here we have the core of Bultmann's existential approach to the New Testament and to the questions of theology.

The Nature of Myth

Closely connected with this theory of interpretation is Bultmann's view of the nature of myth. A myth has usually the form of an imaginative story, but its meaning is not to be found in any literal interpretation of it as a record of actual happenings. Once again, according to Bultmann, the meaning is to be found through existential interpretation—in the self-understanding to which the myth gives expression. Psychoanalysts also have taught us to approach the question of myth in a similar way. If we ask why a self-understanding should be expressed in mythical form, there are two answers that can be given. One answer is that myth-making belongs especially to the childhood of the

race. At a period when very few, if any, abstract terms were available, a self understanding could find expression only in the form of a concrete story. The other answer is that myth has some permanent value in it, and tends to survive even in a more sophisticated age. That is because the concrete picture which the myth presents has more power to move men than an abstract presentation of the ideas behind the myth. It is not without significance that some contemporary philosophers such as Sartre find that their philosophical ideas are best presented through plays and novels, with their concrete situations in which the reader can participate.

Let us take a simple myth from the Old Testament for the purpose of illustrating Bultmann's method of interpretation. In *Genesis* we read that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." Anyone who took this myth as a literal statement of something which actually happened would miss its meaning altogether. Apart from the fact that we no longer think of the human race as having come into being is such a way, there would be no religious value in a literal interpretation. It might satisfy natural curiosity to know the circumstances of human origins, but bare knowledge of an objective fact presents no religious challenge. Again, we would be equally mistaken if we interpreted our myth as a primitive metaphysic, the view that man consists of an immaterial soul-substance and a material body-substance. Apart from the fact that such a view is only an uncertain speculation, it is once more an interpretation without any specific religious value. A detached speculation about the nature of man would have no more religious challenge in it than an objective understanding of his origin. But suppose we now seek an existential interpretation of the myth. Into what understanding of his own being does the reader? It brings him to understand himself as a being who is at once finite and free, a being who is circumscribed, tied down, limited, yet at the same time a being of possibilities, responsible for his extence. This is not a detached understanding, but an understanding of the being which is one's own. It is an understanding which one may accept, or from which one may flee. And as such, it is an understanding with religious significance.

Various questions might be raised at this point. It could be asked, for instance, how the writer himself understood the myth. Are we reading more into it than he intended? Did he not regard it simply as a literal account of human origins? Very briefly, it may be replied that a myth such as the one which we are considering belonged to a period when mythical and non-mythical ways of thinking had not yet been sorted out. There were, as has been said already, no abstract terms which could be used to express the truth of the myth in another form.

No doubt men would take the myth in its literal sense, but at the same time, like an overtone, as it were, the existential meaning is there also. The question of his own being is trying to find expression. And it may be that when the literal meaning of a myth has long since been consigned to the museum, its genuine existential significance still speaks home to us in our being.

Basically, Bultmann's problem reduces to one of translation. It is an investigation into the language of religion, and an attempt to transpose statements from the mythical form into statements which concern human existence. But how does this procedure square with our earlier point that the concrete pictorial language of myth may have more power to bring home to our understanding a truth of existence than an abstract statement of the same truth in philosophical language has? The answer to this question is that sometimes in a sophisticated age the meaning of myth is lost altogether. In our own highly technical civilization, for instance, when we are more and more preoccupied with matters of fact, the language of myth, like the language of poetry, has ceased to be meaningful for many people. Bultmann is seeking to rediscover the meaning, He is convinced that buried in the strange language of the New Testament lies a *kerygma*, as he calls it, a proclamation of a way of life for which men can decide. If we miss the kerygma, the myth is like a husk without a kernel. It is meaningless. But once the meaning has been restored and understood, we can go back to the myth with a new understanding, and may well find in its concrete imagery a more moving presentation of the essential truth which it contains than we find in the translation into existential statements with which Bultmann's procedure provides us. Although his method is called 'demythologizing', it aims rather at the interpretation than at the elimination of the mythical.

Interpretation of the New Testament

Let us now glance at some examples of the application of Bultmann's method of interpretation to the New Testament itself. The New Testament speaks of events some of which are historical, some mythical, and the two are closely interwoven. But in either case, it is the existential significance of the event which is of interest for religion and theology. The cross of Christ, for instance, is a historical event to which we can assign a fairly definite date. But to believe in the cross as a fact of history is something different from having faith in the cross in a religious sense. No doubt many people believe that as a matter of his-

torical fact Jesus was put to death under Pontius Pilate, but they may not perceive any religious significance in the event. To believe in the cross in a religious sense means to perceive in it a possibility for one's own existence, or as Bultmann puts it, to make Christ's cross one's own. Clearly this is how the New Testament writers themselves thought of the cross. They were not intending just to record a fact of history but to put forward such a possibility as Bultmann describes. Saint Paul can speak of a dying and rising with Christ. The rite of baptism was understood in the early Church in precisely this way. The descent of the convert into the waters and his coming out again symbolized his dying to the world and entering upon a new way of life—a sharing in the death and resurrection of Christ. The cross is no doubt an objective event of past history, but in the New Testament it is presented as a present possibility of existence—the possibility of turning from the world, and finding that this it at the same time the beginning of a new life.

As another example, we may take this time what appears to be a purely mythical event. The New Testament speaks of the last times, of a catastrophic end of the age, of coming judgment, and of the urgency of decision in face of the imminent end. No doubt many of the first Christians believed that they would see these things happen in their lieftime. But here again the significance of the myth lies in what it says to the individual existence. Decision, judgment, the end—these belong to the existence of the finite individual, whose being, as Heidegger expresses it, is a being-towards-death, so that he must evaluate his possibilities in the light of his coming end. This comes out clearly in such New Testament passages as Christ's parable of the rich fool, or St. Paul's words about dealing with the world as if we had no dealings with it, and the statement of the Fourth Gospel that now is the judgment of this world. What we have to do with here is not a prediction of objective events which will happen in the future, but a summons to decision now about our existence in the world.

These examples show us how it is possible to make the bewildering language of the New Testament meaningful, when we ask questions about human existence, and find the answers in terms of existential possibilities. But something more is still needed. If our questions are to be clearly formulated with a proper understanding of what is involved in them, we must have some understanding of what this existence of ours is, and we must have suitable concepts in which to express such understanding. Further, if we elicit from the New Testament answers which speak of possibilities of human existence, we must assure ourselves that there are genuine possibilities for which men can decide, lying within the horizons of existential possibility in general. Bult-

mann's whole enterprise, therefore, presupposes an understanding of human existence. How does he arrive at this?

Bultmann and Heidegger

Unlike a stone or a table, man not only is, he also understands that he is. Along with his existence, there goes the understanding of existence. His being is open to himself, or as Heidegger expresses it, in his very being he is interested in his being. This understanding of existence which belongs to existence itself can be clarified by philosophical analysis and fixed conceptually. This brings us to the relation between Bultmann and Heidegger, for in his existential analytic Heidegger has carried out precisely that conceptual clarification of the understanding of human existence which Bultmann needs for his work of interpreting existentially the religious and theological teaching of the New Testament.

Heidegger thinks that such categories as substance and accident, cause and effect, under which we understand things in the world around us when we take a detached objective view of them are inapplicable to man's own existence as being-in-the-world. He proposes to find a new set of categories, or *existentialia* as he prefers to call them, which will be appropriate to man's existence. These will describe not fixed properties but possible ways of being. We can notice here only some of the more important. The two fundamental possibilities are those of authentic and inauthentic existence. An authentic existence is one in which a man lays hold on his own possibilities of being and attains, so to speak, to the stature of his true self. This he does when he turns away from an inauthentic existence, in which the self is scattered in its immediate concern with the world of things, and its possibilities are determined for it by the collective mass of mankind. These two possibilities invite comparison with the New Testament distinction between the natural man whose horizons are limited to the earthly, and the spiritual man who through dying to the world has found his true self in a new life. Heidegger's concept of the collective depersonalized mass of mankind which deprives the individual of his true possibilities by taking away his responsibility and power of decision plays the same part as does the world in the New Testament picture, for when the New Testament writers speak of the 'world', they rarely have in mind the physical world but are thinking rather of the whole body of fallen mankind from which the individual can only be liberated by the decision of faith. Fallenness also has its place in Heidegger's scheme of existence. It rep-

resents the possibility of being lost in the concern with things and in the irresponsibility of the mass, and it is characterized by alienation from the true self which accepts responsibility for existence. The New Testament expresses these ideas in its concepts of the flesh, which represents the realm of the earthly, and of sin, which implies an alienation not only from the authentic being of man, but also from God as the source of his being. For Heidegger the way to authentic existence lies through resolvedness, in which the individual takes upon himself the responsibility for existence and projects himself on his true possibilities. The New Testament counter-part to this is faith, which is not just belief, but rather commitment or decision, the acceptance of that way of life which Bultmann expresses as 'making Christ's cross one's own'.

Enough has been said to show the close resemblance, as far as their formal structure is concerned, between Heidegger's analysis of human existence and the New Testament picture of man in the world. Heidegger provides the conceptual apparatus needed for a systematic interpretation of the New Testament view of man, and his terminology also helps to refurbish and restore meaning to such semi-mythical concepts as those of the 'world', the 'flesh', the 'spirit'.

Mention might also be made of Heidegger's view of history. Since history is concerned with man, it must be understood not in terms of categories such as cause and effect but in terms of the *existentialia*. According to Heidegger, history studies possibilities rather than facts, and it is oriented not to the past but to the future. But that is precisely how Bultmann thinks of the historical elements in the New Testament. He is not concerned, as a theologian, with objective events belonging to the past, but with the possibilities of existence disclosed in these events, which can be possibilities for men to-day.

Thus behind Bultmann's existential approach to the theology of the New Testament and of the Christian religion in general, there lies Heidegger's philosophical analysis of human existence. But we should be careful to notice that this does not mean that Bultmann is founding his theology upon Heidegger's philosophy. He uses Heidegger's existential analytic purely as a hermeneutic tool. It provides conceptual clarification for Bultmann's problems. If we are asking questions about human existence, then we must seek the clearest picture that we can find of the structure of human existence, and Bultmann believes that we find it in Heidegger's existential analytic. But it is to the New Testament itself that he goes for the answers to the concrete questions of existence. It is with the aid of Heidegger's concepts that he elicits these answers, but the content of the answers is not prejudged in any way.

Objections to Bultmann's Approach

We now have before us an outline of Bultmann's existential approach to theology, and the time has come for us to consider some of the objections which may be raised against it, and to see whether these can be met.

We may first consider some of the objections put forward from the side of orthodox Christianity. Conservative theologians would not deny that Bultmann has given the New Testament a fresh relevance, or that his demythologizing has helped towards a better understanding of the Christian view of man. But they do ask whether he has not paid too great a price for this. In translating the teaching of the New Testament into statements wihch concern possibilities of existence, has he not destroyed any objective element in Christianity? Has he not taken away those historical foundations on which Christianity has always been supposed to rest? More than that, has he not dissolved the whole Christian faith into a philosophy of existence, in which we could speak simply of possible ways of being without any reference to the New Testament at all? A century before Bultmann, Hegelian thinkers were transforming Christianity into a philosophy. Their interest was in the idea. They admitted that the idea had first to manifest itself in concrete historical happenings, but once the idea had been grasped in its purity, any particular representations of it became irrelevant. Is not Bultmann doing much the same thing, except that in place of the idea he speaks of a possibility of existence, and that instead of conceiving the essence of religion to lie in a world-view, he sees it in a way of life? But surely he could go on to speak of this way of life without reference to the symbolism of Christ and his cross, just as the Hegelians were able to do in the case of the idea?

Various replies can be made to such objections. Bultmann does not deny that there are objective facts of history at the origin of the Christian religion. Indeed, he specifically points out that Christianity differs from the myths of the Hellenistic mystery-religions in being centred on an actual figure of history, Jesus of Nazareth, who lived only a generation or so before many of the books of the New Testament were written. But we have seen already that a bare objective fact of past history has no religious significance. It only acquires such significance when it is interpreted as disclosing a possibility of existence which is present. Bultmann could reply that so far from destroying the historical events from which Christianity originated, he is exhibiting for us the true existential historicity of these events, in virtue of which it is alone possible for them to be events of religious significance.

To the more serious charge that he is dissolving Christianity into existentialist philosophy Bultmann himself returns a decided denial. That would be a possible consequence of the thorough-going application of his method of existential interpretation, and indeed, in the hands of the liberal Swiss theologian, Buri, the Christian way of life has been set out as simply a possibility of human existence which can be described in philosophical language without reference to Christ. But Bultmann thinks that this is a mistake. He thinks that there is a radical difference between a religion and a philosophy. A philosophy may set before us the concept of a way of life, but it may be that through moral weakness we will be unable to realize it. A religion, on the other hand, supplies a dynamic by which a man can realize the way of life which it sets before him. Christianity is a religion of grace. The way of life which it sets before men is God's gift, to be followed with his help. If we were to use the language of William James, we might say that philosophy will do for the healthy-minded, but if there is one sick soul in the world, it is inadequate. It is surely significant that most of the great spiritual leaders of mankind began their careers as sick souls—St. Paul, St. Augustine, Martin Luther, to mention only three. They could conceive wherein their true life lay, but they could not realize it without the dynamic of a religion of grace. And it is William James himself who asks whether it is not the sick soul who has the profounder view of the situation. Bultmann does not confound religion with philosophy, and because of that his theology must speak not only of possibilities of human existence but also of God's act of grace which sets these possibilities within man's grasp.

On the other hand, we may briefly consider some of the objections which have come from the side of philosophy. In particular, Jaspers has subjected Bultmann's theological enterprise to a searching critique. It seems to him that Bultmann's use of philosophy is quite wrong. To Jaspers, the essence of philosophy lies in its openness. The true philosopher is ready to expose himself to every current of ideas. But Jaspers can find nothing of this openness in Bultmann. There is, he complains, scarcely a breath of Platonic or Kantian thought in Bultmann. It seems that for Bultmann philosophy means the philosophy of Heidegger—or worse still, the philosophy of a single one of Heidegger's works, *Sein und Zeit*. A thinker who confines himself to a single book by a single philosopher places himself outside of philosophy altogether, in Jaspers' estimation.

This looks like a serious charge. Yet once again various replies can be made to it. A glance at Bultmann's historical writings on the origins of Christianity show that he is well-acquainted with Greek thought, including that of Plato, and when it is remembered that he was a

student while the Ritschlian theology was still in its ascendancy, it will be understood that he cannot be ignorant of Kant. Why then does he seem to make little use of these philosophers in his thinking? The answer is quite simply that Bultmann is writing for the mid-twentieth century. If he had been an apologist of the Early Church, he might have used Plato, and if he had been born a hundred years earlier than he actually was he might have used Kant, but as he is writing for men of to-day, we cannot be surprised that he goes to a contemporary philosopher whose language is current coin. Again, Jaspers seems to mistake the relations between theology and philosophy in general. It is surely no duty of the theologian to wander over the whole field of philosophy, even if he were competent to do so. A conversation between the theologian and the philosopher takes place when they find a zone of common interest in which contributions can usefully be made from both sides. Bultmann has found such a zone of common interest with Heidegger in the question of human existence. Heidegger's treatment of that subject offers him help with his own problems, and there would seem to be nothing illegitimate in the fact that he is preoccupied with Heidegger's existential analytic.

Conclusion

In the brief time available to us, we have been able only to glance at some of the leading characteristics of Bultmann's thought and the problems to which it has given rise. Already in the past few years there has sprung up a very extensive literature in which the merits and demerits of Bultmann's work are being debated. In a controversy which is still at its height, it is clearly impossible to pass any definite judgment. The aim here has simply been to put forward some of Bultmann's typical points of view, and some of the typical objections which are being offered. But certainly Bultmann's ideas have come to occupy the central place in current theological discussion. That can only be because the problems which have been raised by him are real problems, and their solution a matter of urgency if the Christian faith is to maintain its claim in the modern age. Whether or not we agree with Bultmann's own solution, we must be grateful for his initiative in facing the problems, and for his concern to let the faith of the New Testament be heard as a living issue in our own time.

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Is There a Biblical Theology?

James Muilenburg

The demand for a biblical theology is made by the Church. The Church requires a biblical theology because it lives by its faith that God has revealed himself in his Word and that this Word is contained within the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. It is the Word of God which brought the Church into existence. From earliest times the sanctuaries of ancient Israel were established because God revealed himself in these places. When Yahweh appeared to the patriarchs, he spoke his *hieros logos*. An altar was erected, and the holy place became the repository of the revealed word. It was there that it was remembered, transmitted from generation to generation, and heard again in the celebrations of the cult. The Word of God attends the on-going life of the community of faith in proclamation and teaching. Without the Bible there can be no Church, for the Church depends upon the Bible for its witness to the Word. Where the Word is proclaimed, there the Church is present.

The demand for a biblical theology is not only legitimate, but also necessary. If the biblical revelation is to be communicated to the minds of modern men, it must be presented in a manner that is both intelligible and meaningful to human existence as modern men know it. The interpreter of the Bible is not exempt from the responsibility to speak clearly and in orderly fashion to his contemporaries. He is more than an antiquarian living in a sheltered world; indeed, he must live in his own age precisely as the biblical writers lived in theirs. He is more than a historian seeking to recover an ancient past, although he must know and understand that past in order to perform his task responsibly. He is more than a phenomenologist describing the categories of thought and action or the distinctive characteristics of an

ancient religion of the Semitic Orient. He must come to that place where theological questions are raised. It is the task of the systematic theologian to meet man at this point and to interpret for him what it is that the Bible has to say in language and forms of thought drawn from his own cultural and intellectual environment.

Such a task is not alien to the biblical materials themselves. The prophets and evangelists and apostles were also deeply involved in the mentality and culture of their own times, not only of Israel and the early Christian community but also of the surrounding peoples. Because the faith in historical revelation was challenged by competing alternatives which centered in the mysteries of life and vitality and the miracle of the constantly recurring cycles of time, prophets of Israel were compelled to engage in polemic and to demonstrate the uniqueness of Israel's faith in an election-covenant Lord. The situation is not otherwise in the New Testament, for the primitive Christian faith, too, was called upon to encounter the Hellenistic religions of the Graeco-Roman world, as the terminology of the New Testament demonstrates.

The theological situation within the Old and New Testaments is by no means static or uniform. For example, the meaning of election in the age of Moses is one thing; what it meant to the Deuteronomic reformers during the decline and fall of Assyria is another; how Second Isaiah comprehends it between the decline of neo-Babylonia and the Persian age in his eschatological "drama" is still another. The aspostle Paul formulates the doctrine in the light of his faith that the Christ has come. Similarly, Augustine and Calvin and Aquinas interpret it in ways that are intelligible and meaningful for their times. The original revelatory event is there, to be sure, but each age appropriates it in part, at least, in the light of its own cultural and historical environment. The problem of how the ancient event may become contemporary and actual in the life of the Church is one that is discussed to-day by many contemporary biblical theologians. It is not a new problem. In one way or another it has occupied the thought of the biblical authors and Christian thinkers throughout history.

The Precarious Task of the Biblical Theologian

The task of the biblical theologian is a precarious one. Biblical theology has been understood in different ways in different times by different men. It is essential, therefore, that we make clear what we mean when we speak of theology and that we inquire whether the adjective "blical" can with propriety be applied to it. Now, how-

ever we may seek to define the word, the concern of theology is with systematic formulation, with form and order, with structure and unity and interior consistency. Biblical theology seeks to give a systematic statement of what the Bible contains. But our crucial problem is whether the Old and New Testaments lend themselves to such formulation. Are they not almost inevitably thrown out of focus and out of context when they are articulated into structural patterns? Is not the biblical world of faith incommensurate with the thought of modern man? Is it really possible to arrive at a common universe of discourse? If we cannot be expected to become Hebrews or Jews, how shall we become members of the community of Israel? If the reply is given that Christ has wrought a radical change in the situation, that is surely true, but the biblical categories are still there, and they are derived from Israel and must be taken seriously if they are to be understood and grasped.

The difficulties one encounters in writing a biblical theology are apparent in the many different ways in which it has been conceived. For many centuries the Bible was read in order to confirm antecedently held Church doctrine, and the result was a neatly and logically articulated system. Under the influence of the Greek theologians and their successors the religious faith of Israel and of the early Christian community was radically changed into the propositions of dogma. But with the dawn of historical consciousness it was inevitable that the Bible would be understood in a different way. Rationalism demonstrated the impossibility of changing the temporal and personal diversity of the Old and New Testaments into a compendium of doctrinal teaching without contradiction. It rejected the time-honored attempt to create a unity between the Old and New Testaments through the device of typology. It stressed the distinction between Church doctrine and biblical faith. In 1787, J. Philip Gabler wrote an epoch-making book in which he defined the task of biblical theology as the attempt "to grasp the conceptions of the individual writers in their local, temporal, and personal individuality and to give the history of these conceptions." His work had a great influence. Romanticism sought to recover the vitality and dynamic power of the religion of Israel, above all in the works of J. G. Herder and W. M. L. de Wette. Historical development now became the *schema* according to which the biblical faith was to be understood. The movement culminated in the work of the Wellhausen school. Wellhausen was influenced by his teacher, Wilhelm Vatke, an ardent Hegelian, and a number of books appeared in the characteristic Hegelian patterns of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Other works appeared which sketched an evolutionary progress of biblical religion.

It was inevitable that a change should come. While the latter part of the nineteenth century produced very few biblical theologies, in recent decades a large number of important books have appeared. Perhaps the most successful among them is Walther Eichrodt's monumental *Theologie des alten Testaments* (Leipzig, 3 vols., 1933-38). Eichrodt took as the central unifying force of Old Testament theology the covenant relationship between God and Israel. Every major division of the book was headed by a title in which the word 'covenant' appeared. Eichrodt's work is of the first importance, but it is widely held that he exaggerated the place of the covenant, especially since it is absent in substantial parts of the Old Testament. Otto Procksch's *Theologie des alten Testaments* appeared in 1950. It is actually two separate works: one on the history of Israel's religion (*Die Geschichtswelt*), another on the major ideas (*Die Gedankenwelt*). Millar Burrows was the first American to write a theology of importance, *An Outline of Biblical Theology*, a work of admirable clarity and integrity and independent judgment. Yet one may seriously question the way in which the subjects are proportioned. It is a liberal theology, as is shown by his giving seven pages to sin and over forty to moral and social ideals. Several works show a strong Christological interest, notably Wilhem Vischer's *The Witness to Christ in the Old Testament*. There are other works, such as those of Ludwig Koehler and Otto Baab, but enough has been given to show the wide diversity in conception of what biblical theology is.

Characteristics of Biblical Thought

A major difficulty in the preparation of a biblical theology is that the Bible is a Semitic literature with all the characteristics of the Semitic way of thinking. It is Semitic in its language, in its literary forms and style, and cultural mentality. It is Semitic in its psychology and anthropology as one may see very clearly in Pedersen's two volumes, *Israel: its Life and Culture*. This Semitic heritage perpetuated itself in the Christian community of New Testament times. Both testaments can be understood only against their Semitic background. The transition from the Semitic world to the modern Western world, whose prevailing culture and mentality is Greek, is by no means simple. Is it possible to re-fashion the religious faith of the Old and New Testament in the formal structures of modern thought without doing some violence to it?

A second difficulty in formulating a biblical theology is the character of the literary materials. The Old Testament contains two major lit-

erary forms: narrative and poetry. The significance of narrative, whether story or history of parable or prophetic call, is that it does justice to Israel's sense of the eventfulness of life and of God's activity in human life and history. The narrative portrays a movement in events, from beginning to end, and the listener identifies himself with the action. It becomes for the time being his own story, to the degree that he identifies himself with what is being recounted. Jesus speaks the language of parable and aphorism; it is not philosophical or theological speech. Poetry is the language of imagery, rhythm, and emotion deeply felt. It is subjective to a high degree. The thought here is intuitive rather than speculative or rational; it is concrete rather than abstract. It is all involved in the immediacy of the present moment. It uses many different images and symbols, not least of all in relation to God. While the God of Israel is invisible, the language is alive with vivid imagery. Imagination is in control here rather than rational reflection. To be sure, we may be able to discern a logic in what is said, but the Hebrew manner is to body forth its thought in similes, metaphors, and many other figures. What is more, it is this kind of language which gives to the faith of Israel its carrying power, its extraordinarily living and dynamic quality. To re-state the meaning in literal speech is to rob it of its power for evoking interior response.

This quality of the Hebrew mind is illustrated best by the profuse employment of anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms. God is a Father, and Israel is his son; God is a King, and Israel is his servant; God is a Judge, and Israel's life is under his judgment; God is the Leader in battle, and Israel is called to follow his leading. God speaks and hears, he sees and feels and suffers, he chooses and rejects, he walks and comes and goes away, laughs and weeps, is angry and is patient, forgives, redeems, sends his servants the prophets, and calls men by name to do his bidding. Such language, far from being unintelligible, is precisely the way in which the Bible communicates itself to man's interior being. Any biblical theology which fails to take account of such imaginative speech dissipates the revelation into something which is less evocative. Related to these anthropomorphisms is the first person address of God, the first person 'I' with whom man is confronted: I redeemed you, I call you, I love you with an everlasting love, I am your God, I will help you. It is in the engagement of the 'I' with the second person 'thou' that biblical faith presents the revelation of the personal God. A third person description *about* the revelation is always twice removed from the encounter of the 'I' with the 'thou'.

This manner of thinking and speaking is not so alien to us as we might at first believe. Luther and Calvin were constantly emphasizing the fact that this language is, after all, very clear, that the individual

who reads it and hears it knows only too well what it means, and that its meaning is for him. Moreover, modern poetry and literary criticism is reviving this quality of language in a remarkable way; for that reason it is often the poets who come nearer to understanding not only the nuances and connotations of biblical metaphor but also the profundity of their implications, than the professional theologian. Or one might say that it is the theologians with an imaginative cast of mind, who are not afraid of imagery and symbol, who speak most powerfully to their generations. Witness Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard.

Another area of biblical speech and thought related to the foregoing is the psycho-physical character of its anthropology. For the Hebrew, man is an animated body, not a disincarnate spirit. The body is good, and all its parts are good. The organs are associated with particular functions. Intention and purpose lie within the activity of each bodily organ. Modern psycho-somatic medicine and psychiatry are recovering this understanding of man in an extraordinary way. One has only to examine the manner in which such words as *hand, arm, eye, ear, nose, feet, heart, face* and *bowels* are employed in many Old and New Testament contexts to see how fruitful they are for relating the divine revelation to man. There may be areas where we may be called upon to demytholgize the Old and New Testaments, but to rob them of this psycho-physical imagery is to reduce them to commonplace and abstraction. They produce their effect upon us because they are words which we do understand; they are our words, the best words we have about ourselves, and the best words we have about ourselves are our best instruments for speaking of God. Indeed, a careful and responsible interpretation of these words in their contexts helps to illuminate the doctrine of the Incarnation: "and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us."

Still another characteristic of the biblical manner of thought is its understanding of the life that is lived in speaking and hearing. The word is the central symbol of Israel's deepest reflection. Through the word, God reveals himself, and it is the word which Israel hears. Israel is primarily a hearing people. The Hebrew word *dabar* is created within the self, and the self is in the word. The *dabar* is viewed as an objective reality. It is event as well as speech. It is alive, dynamic, and full of power. God's word enters into history, and events take place (Isa. 9:8). God's word addresses men, and they know their lives are under an ultimate responsibility. God speaks his *Torah* from the mountain, and Israel lives by that revealed will. The heavens and earth are created by his word, and therefore nature has no independent status but exists under his sovereignty. There are perhaps no two words which appear more frequently in the Old and New Testaments than *speak* and

hear (and their synonyms), and the contexts in which they appear reveal the dynamic and powerful connotations which they bear in Israel's thought. The prologue to John's gospel contains nothing that is not consistent with Old Testament and inter-testamental literature. Indeed, the words of the prologue gain their power and significance after one has taken into account the vast range of association they have in the speech of Israel.

There is one more characteristic of biblical faith that is of particular importance for an understanding of its meaning and significance. I refer to the *historical* character of the revelation. It is to liberalism that we owe this recognition. By and large, what the Old Testament has to say is directed to concrete occasion and circumstance. Much of the Old Testament and also of the New is to be understood in the historical setting in which the words were written or spoken. The primary interest is seldom in generalization. What is spoken to Elijah might be completely irrelevant to Isaiah or Ezekiel. What Paul has to say to the Thessalonians in their situation may be meaningless to the Romans or Galatians. Yet this is by no means the end of the matter. The great peril in the recovery of the historical nature of biblical revelation was that it tended to absolutize history and to fall victim to historicism. Professor Kroner has attacked this tendency in modern biblical theology:

> Empirical historicism originates in the ambition of historical science to increase the objectivity of historical knowledge in competing with the natural sciences; it is the naturalistic trend of thought which is still at work in this type. . . . The empirical historicist would like to resign all synthetic attempts, and to restrict his relations to those facts which can be ascertained by absolutely objective and exact methods. The final end of this tendency would reduce historical knowledge to a quasi-photographic reproduction of relics of whatever kind. . . . It is utterly opposed to systematization and synopsis; it is in this sense utterly unphilosophic. Finally it arrives at bits of bits of life.[1]

This criticism is well-taken, and is an eloquent commentary on much modern interpretation of the Bible. But how are we to construct a *philosophia christiana* from the kind of historical materials which the Bible gives us without distorting the uniqueness of the historical event? Is it possible to transmute events in history to merely psychological events? Is not the actual *happenedness* crucial to the biblical understanding of revelation? If we are fated to transform biblical categories into modern equivalents, just what equivalents are there?

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[1] "Journal of the Bible and Religion," Vol. 14, no. 3 (August, 1946).

It is possible that no adequate biblical theology will ever be written, that is, a theology which will reproduce the mentality and thought and faith of the Bible in modern words without distortion. The very fact that we must use English words instead of Hebrew or Aramaic or Greek shows that there must inevitably be some distortion. Moreover, while we may stress the importance of history and of time for the apprehension of Biblical revelation, will not our theological discussion lose sight of the temporal revelation in order to stress the ideas or doctrines? Eichrodt and Procksch go far to overcome these difficulties, but there are several dimensions which require elaboration or preliminary discussion.

Major Categories of Concern

Let me conclude, therefore, by outlining some of the major categories with which biblical theology must be concerned. It goes without saying that each of these requires extended explanation and interpretation. But our discussion may suggest how the difficulties we have encountered may somewhat be met.

1. The biblical understanding of time: time as *chronos* and as *kairos*.
2. The biblical understanding of history: the concreteness of time in historical happenings, the various interpretations of history: Yahwist, Deuteronomic, priestly, eschatological, etc.
3. The biblical understanding of the people of God: election, covenant, the holy people, the Torah, institutions, etc.
4. The biblical understanding of the life lived in speaking and hearing: the Word of God.
5. Biblical symbolism and imagery: anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms, myth, the primordial and eschatolgical myth, *etc.*
6. Yahweh's relationship to Israel: Father-son, Husband-bride, King-servant, the divine self-asseverations; his saving deeds.
7. The relationship of all these categories to an understanding of the meaning of Christ as it is understood in the New Testament.

This last point requires some explanation. I do not find myself in agreement with those theologians who tell us that in order to understand the Old Testament we must first turn to the New, since the New Testament alone witnesses to the fulness of revelation in Jesus Christ. I do not believe that we are asked to bear that kind of

scandal. Rather I believe that it is our task to be seriously historical, without falling victim, to be sure, to the corruptions which Professor Kroner describes. We must do this because the revelation given in the Bible is historical revelation, and event and interpretation cannot be simply separated from each other. Nor is it sufficient to say that we only need a sense of history without any knowledge of the content of the event. I believe we must follow through each of the major streams of biblical faith from beginning to end, always dependent upon the most careful exegesis of the relevant texts, then observe the changes they undergo in the course of Israel's history, and finally turn to the New Testament to see how they are employed and how they are transformed through the faith that the Christ has come. We do not superimpose this faith upon the Old Testament; on the contrary, the history and its interpretation witnesses to the fulfilment in Christ, fulfilment, of course, as faith sees it, which would mean that there is rejection and selection as well as acceptance of the Old Testament. The question, simply put, is now at long last: "What does the word Christ mean when it is understand in the light of God's activity in history?" Peter's confession then becomes the most fateful of all words, but it is our task to clarify, so far as that is possible, what his words mean.

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The Spirit of God and the People of God

Joseph Haroutunian

The doctrine of the Spirit of God is no longer theologically viable. Although the Church continues to invoke the Spirit in its worship and prayer, and although theologians continue to introduce the Spirit into their analyses of the Christian life, it has become all but impossible to make the doctrine of the Spirit integral to the doctrine of God. For the layman in theology, whether a minister or not a minister, the Spirit is a spooky entity which is associated with "spirituality", or a mysterious character related vaguely to "faith and practice".

The explanation of such inanity in our confession of the Spirit of God is a long story. Our failure in this matter has deep roots of long duration in the mind and life of the Church. To mention only a few, it has to do with the identification of God with Being, First Cause, Creativity and the like; with ascetical and mystical constructions of salvation; with Augustinian—Pelagian controversies in which the Spirit has been confused with grace on the one hand and with "moral influence" on the other; and with failure in the realization of *communio sanctorum*. When God is identified with Being or the Power of Being, and the Word or Jesus Christ is made the revelation of Being, what does one do with the Spirit? Or, when one has a "personal God" and the historical Christ, again, what need is there for the Spirit? When the work of the Spirit is identified with variations of "the experience of Pentecost", there is no cogent reason why such phenomena should not be referred simply to "God". The same is true of faith, "union with Christ", "fellowship with God", and other aspects of the Christian life which have been spoken of interchangeably as works of grace or the works of the Spirit. When Divine activity is characterized as "personal",

the doctrine of the Spirit is superfluous (as we see in A. Ritschl and John Oman). And since in the individual's experience of God it is hard to distinguish between Christ and the Spirit, and Christ has the advantage of being a historical figure, the Spirit is again in the shade. In short, in terms of traditional theologies, orthodox or unorthodox, the doctrine of the Spirit is intellectually and practically superfluous. We know we cannot do without God the Father Almighty, and without Jesus Christ, his only son our Lord; but what are we to do with the Spirit, except perhaps use him for Augustinian ends (as in the Reformation and Barth) or confuse him with "spiritual experience" of one sort or another?

Of course neither the writer nor this brief article is in a position to clear up this mess of long standing which goes deep into the history of the Church. We can only make a few suggestions which might lead to fruitful discussion and eventually to clearer and more meaningful confession of our faith in God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. By the way, if the God we worship is a Triad, it is embarrassing to worship One who is lacking any one of "the Persons". It may even be perilous for the Church.

The Spirit in Redemptive History

The doctrine of the Spirit belongs in the Christian faith, and the Christian faith belongs in "the history of redemption". The God we worship is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the God who delivered Israel from bondage in Egypt and the world from bondage to sin and death. He is the God of the Law and the Prophets; the God of the Gospel and Apostles; the God of the Church and the New Age. This God has wrought this work of redemption, throughout its long history, from the day of Abraham to our own, by his Word and his Spirit. This God is as unthinkable without his Word and his Spirit as he is unrecognizable without his "mighty deeds" which make up the history of Israel and the Christian Church. There would be no such history without the Word of God spoken by his servants and without the Spirit of God who came upon them, or entered into them, or enveloped them, to enable them to be the means of his saving works among his people. It is therefore just as impossible to think this God without his Word and Spirit as to think the God of the mythologists and philosophers, with the same Word and Spirit. The Word and the Spirit are known in the context of "Divine" history, first, and in the context of universal history second. And in an

unhistorical religion or philosophy they have no place. Insofar as the Church's mind became unhistorically soteriological, sacramental, mystical, moral, legal, etc., and insofar as the God of a common *sensus divinitatis* was confused with the God of the Bible and the Lord of the Church, the doctrines of *both* the Word and the Spirit became confused and the latter the more so for the lack of an historical and concrete image. We shall not have a viable doctrine of the Spirit until we learn once again that the God of the Christian faith is the God who is the Author of the history of redemption. And the Spirit belongs in this history as does the Word, both being "of God".

The Spirit and Salvation

The Spirit of God has been made synonymous, roundly and commonly, with the power of God, which reminds us of the grace of God as God's power. This equation is readily made because according to Scripture the descent of the Spirit issues in a new effectiveness on the part of God's servants: warrior, ruler, prophet, artisan, and finally Jesus Christ himself followed by the Apostles. So it is easy to infer that the Spirit is the power of God. But the Spirit is not the power of God in general, however conceived. The God in question is the Lord God of Israel and the Christian Church, and the power in question is one manifested in God's saving work. We have no knowledge of God without his work as Savior. The same goes for the Word and the Spirit by whom God saves his people. Therefore, we speak properly of the Spirit when we fix our minds first of all not upon etymology and characterizations of God's working, even in the Bible, but upon the saving work itself. This point is essential to our argument. Unless we consider the purpose of God in exercising his power, we shall be misled as to its nature and therefore as to the Spirit of God.

This raises the question as to what we mean by salvation. If salvation be from some evil like oppression or enemies; if it be from hunger, disease, exposure, or some other physical evil; if it be from individuality, finitude, or involvement with the body and the physical world; finally if it be from death as such,—then God must be supernatural and his power must be supernatural. There is of course a very great deal in the Bible which, when detached from the Law and the Gospel, lends itself to such an interpretation. But when we consider the mission and the cross of Jesus Christ, which is the revelation of the true character of God's wisdom and power, then physical, political, mystical, and even

cosmological soteriologies are inapt. There can be no salvation apart from man's return to God, or the recovery of his original nature in faithfulness to his own humanity and the humanity of his neighbor, in which are comprised his freedom and righteousness in love. God created his "intelligent creation" to be human beings, and the history of redemption can have no other end than the realization of this same humanity which we know in Jesus Christ and by the Spirit, of the living God. What stands between man and his good—that is, his humanity —is sin, and not finitude and death. Man was created as a finite being (How else could he be a human being?), and he has to live and find his proper perfection as a human being. Supernaturalism, with its bid for transcendence of nature, and mysticism, insofar as it is a bid for transcending finitude, are both misunderstandings of the power of God, which we do not know except in our restoration to freedom and love which are definitive of our humanity.

The Spirit and God's Servants

The servants of God who received his Spirit for the salvation of his people were no supernatural beings. Abraham, Moses, Joshua, Gideon, Jephthah, Saul, David; the Prophets Elijah, Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel; the Apostles Peter and Paul—they are all presented to us by Scripture as men who were not sufficient for the work imposed upon them. Whatever wisdom or prowess they might have had, they were no match for sin, the world, the devil and death. There was a chasm between their powers as human beings and the power required by their calling and their duties. The case of Jesus Christ was no different. He was, like the other servants of God, a human being, with the mind and all the limitations of a human being, except that He lived in the freedom and love of one. This is not the place to enter into the mystery of Christology. What is clear is that God saved the world through the obedience and faithfulness of a man who "suffered under Pontius Pilate".

Now all this confronts us with a peculiarity of the work of the living God which contradistinguishes him from all gods, giants, and sundry supernatural beings who exhibit their power not through the weakness of man but by overwhelming it. The latter wield lightnings and thunderbolts; they hurl big things and turn nature upside down. They have no servants because they do all their works by "miracles", and they have neither Word nor Spirit because they are neither creators nor redeemers of the world. It is not so with the living God. Since

He has no other purpose in the creation and redemption of man than the joy He has in his "intelligent creation", He reveals his power by his Spirit, by the miracle, the unique miracle of God's doing, of enabling his servants, in the exercise of their powers as human beings, in all their limitation and insufficiency, to restore his people to himself.

The work of the Spirit of God is characterized by the humanity of his servants, which is only fitting since the end of his work is the realization of humanity, of the people's turning away from idols from sin, from death, to the Lord who is the Creator. Here the wisdom of God is no less manifest than his power, in that the means are appropriate to the end. In what way could sinful man be restored to obedience but in the obedience of God's servants and the victory of the Spirit of God over the tempter which is too subtle and too strong for the sinner? The same Spirit who gives the victory to the servants of God—Moses, Gideon, Jeremiah, Peter—gives the victory, by the warfare of these same servants, to the Church. This is why the Spirit came upon the Son of God, and raised him from the dead to the right hand of God the Father almighty. If the true end of the Gospel were kept in mind, we should have less difficulty in seeing the mission of Jesus Christ and his Kingdom as the work of the Spirit. The same mindfulness would remove all temptation (which is pervaded with idolatry) to confuse the humanity of the Son of God.

The Imagery of the Spirit

The doctrine of the Spirit has suffered and continues to suffer from the embarrassment of the imagination. We imagine the Word in terms of a person who lived upon the earth "full of grace and truth". We imagine God, with proper reservations, as Father, Judge, King, etc., so that He also is to us personal. When we come to the Spirit, we think of a spectre, a dove, fire, a supernatural fluid, the wind, breath,—all of which do not lend themselves to personalization, except the spectre which is quasi-personal and fictional to boot. Even the most determined orthodoxy has confused the social imagery of its tritheism with the image of the Spirit as the relation or the bond between the Father and the Son (Augustine's, "Lover, Beloved and Love"), which empties the Spirit of the personalness attributed to the other "Persons" of the Trinity. With the usual imagery of the Spirit, it is barely possible to think of him as we do of the Father and of the Son. It is not surprising that Christians do not know what to make of the Spirit of God.

Our imagination in this matter is theologically misleading. The

only legitimate object of imagination when we think of God is the historical Jesus. Him alone we can *imagine* as a person, because He was and is a human being. No "Person" of the Godhead is open to an imaginative reconstruction except with a strict and never to be forgotten *proviso* that such a reconstruction is by way of Divine accomodation to the human mind. The Father is "the Creator of the ends of the earth", and the Son is the Word of the Creator; and neither the Creator nor the Word are persons or human beings. We are aware that theologians have speculated on personality so as to detach it from humanity. And God is of course in some sense (as we know Him; and how else can we speak of Him?) personal. But the present point is that when we imagine the "Persons" of the Trinity, we must do so with the understanding that we are in no position to comprehend "the essence" of God.

Nevertheless, it still is true that Biblical and traditional imagery lead us to think of God the Father and the Son as persons, whereas the imagery of the Spirit leave us confused. Unless the imagery used of the Spirit leave us confused. Unless the imagery used of the Spirit, especially of the work of the Spirit, becomes firmly and clearly personalized, there will be no end to the embarrassment of the Church with regard to the third Person of the Godhead. It is not enough to play around with biblical genders. Unless the Spirit is contemplated in relation to human beings, as is the Word contemplated in relation to a historical figure, the Spirit will continue to be a blur. We must take seriously the biblical teaching that the *loci* of the activity of the Spirit of God are before all human beings. We should not know the Spirit as presented to us in the Bible if He did not act as He did, by men behaving as men, as human beings. As we know the Word as personal in that He became a human being, so also we know the Spirit as personal in that He "came upon men" and "entered" men so as to accomplish God's purpose by their actions which were emphatically human.

But this situation becomes established and clear when we turn to the New Testament where the coming of the Spirit issues in the formation of the Church and every Christian in principle becomes a bearer of the Spirit; not in his isolation but as a member of "the Body of Christ" or the community of God's elect. The *indwelling* of the Spirit among Christians must be understood in the primary sense of his *working among* them. The Spirit so indwells the Christians that by their human relatedness one to others, they become the means one to another of restoration both to God and to neighbor in faithfulness. In our judgment, what has perennially queered the doctrine of the Spirit and confused the Christians as to the reality of the Spirit is the failure of the

Churches to exist and live and act as communions of God's people, bound one to another, as forgiven sinners and human beings even while they have acknowledged God and worshipped him. Due to certain soteriological and theological preoccupations indicated at the beginning of this paper, Christians have failed to acknowledge that the saving work of God is done in the context of a living society in which the people of God acknowledge the responsibility to become a "priesthood of believers", doing what *they* must do as human beings who are bearers of the Spirit of God, approaching one another to give and to receive the humanity for which Christ died and was raised from the dead. The bond which binds the Christians together in the Church is unthinkable apart from the work of the Spirit, which reveals to every man his neighbor and establishes the true bond of humanity in a common life, where all the gifts of God for our salvation are received by the exercise of humanity in prayer, and therefore in the repentance and forgiveness, in the love and justice, in the liberating and uniting grace, which men must give one to another and receive one from another if they are to live as God's people and according to their proper destiny.

The work of the Spirit has been traditionally identified with ecstatic experiences, induced by enthusiasts and generated often in mass meetings. People have "spoken with tongues," quaked and ranted, and have otherwise undergone deep emotional upheavals. Today "spirituality" is identified with mild and temporary ecstasies which people expect from worship, prayer and sacraments. Since God is free to influence men's emotions in any way that befits them, it is not for a theologian to pass judgment upon the many varieties of "religious experience" which he finds in the history of the Church. On the other hand, he cannot make ecstasy of any kind normative for the Church, and therefore he cannot identify the work of the Spirit with it. Therefore he also cannot make the language of ecstasy and inebriation decisive for the doctrine of the Spirit. The work of the Spirit, as the work of Christ, is no more and no less than our restoration to the Creator as a society bound to him and one to another in freedom and love proper to creatures. If we find the Word in Christ, we find the Spirit in our neighbor without whom we know neither God nor ourselves, neither Christ nor redemption, neither sin nor salvation. Our neighbor is not the Spirit, but he is the servant of God and as such the bearer of the Spirit. If we are to know the Spirit, we are to know our neighbor; just as if we are to know the Word, we are to know Christ. But we do not know Christ except by the Spirit who reveals him to us in the Church, in the communion of saints as they bring one another before Christ in their common strivings against the devil and all his works *among* them.

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Christianity and Naturalism: An Informal Statement

Daniel Day Williams

In this statement I shall try to do three things: first, say what I mean by naturalism, that is what I take it to be as a philosophy; second, give some reflections about the significance of naturalism for the Christian faith; and third, say something about two problems on which it seems to me naturalistic philosophy throws light; the body-mind problem and the problem of the relation of God and the world. In concluding remarks I shall soften somewhat the extreme character of my first statements. May I emphasize that I am more concerned to reach some clarification of issues than to attack or defend any particular position.

What is Naturalism?

First, what do I mean by naturalism? One can mean various things, and it makes a great difference whether or not you mean pre-twentieth century naturalism or contemporary naturalism. In this discussion, I have in view modern twentieth century naturalism represented by John Dewey, by S. Alexander, by at least the earlier Bergson, by John Herman Randall, Jr., and by Henry Nelson Wieman. Some philosophers reject the classification of Whitehead as a naturalist, and to my knowledge he never applied that term to his own philosophy. I do not believe Professor Hartshorne has used it to describe either his or Whitehead's position. But the ideas that I find significant in naturalism have been developed in part by Whitehead and Hartshorne and I shall include them, without being concerned to prove that they come all together under the heading of naturalism.

This modern naturalism, as we are aware, is not a reductionist philosophy. "Nature" includes human nature; includes the capacities and aspirations of the human spirit. Nature includes everything which is accessible to man as an experiencing being.

Consider John Dewey's statement about "matter" in *Experience and Nature*. "What we call matter is that character of natural events which is so tied up with changes that are sufficiently rapid to be perceptible as to give the latter a characteristic, rhythmic order, the casual sequence. It is no cause or source of events or processes; no absolute monarch; no principle of explanation; no substance behind or underlying changes. The name designates a character in operation, not an entity." (p. 73) Or consider this paragraph in the same volume on the reality of spirit as the quickening, free-moving function of the human soul:

> When the organization called soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is spirit. Qualities are both static, substantial, and transitive. Spirit quickens; it is not only alive, but spirit gives life. Animals are spirited, but man is a living spirit. He lives in his works and his works do follow him. Soul is form, spirit informs. It is the moving function of that of which soul is the substance. Perhaps the words soul and spirit are so heavily laden with traditional mythology and sophisticated doctrine that they must be surrendered; it may be impossible to recover for them in science and philosophy the realities designated in idiomatic speech. But the realities are there, by whatever names they be called. (p. 294)

So the naturalism in view here does not try to explain man in terms of purely material, mechanical, or biological causes.

A remark is necessary about nature and history. Nature is very often defined as a realm prior to history or subordinate to history or over-against history. One may use the term in this sense and mean by nature the physical and biological structures — that is, all the structures which are below the structures peculiar to human history. On this point it is worth remarking that in the light of our knowledge of nature today, it is not correct to say that nature is a purely cyclical process in contradistinction from history, that nature has no direction, that time is only circular in physical nature, whereas in history it is directional. There are some obscurities here, but I doubt that that view which applies to the Greek understanding of nature is very meaningful today. In a book like Weizsäcker's *The History of Nature* you have a considerable modification of the view that nature is a purely cyclical process. In any case, naturalism sees nature-history as one continuous order, with a direction in which time is meaningful both to the "natural" processes, that is the physical and biological processes, and to historical processes.

What then is naturalism as a metaphysical and epistemological doctrine? I take naturalism to be the *one-order theory of the world.* That is, the world is an interrelated web of spatio-temporal processes. Everything that is concrete, everything that has actual power, whatever else it may be, is a structured spatio-temporal process. Thus every process is both activity and structure,—*dynamis* and *logos.*

The second statement about naturalism is that this one interrelated web of processes, insofar as it is knowable at all by us, is knowable through the effects of these processes upon those particular processes which we call mind or body complexes. Therefore, the knowing of nature is itself a natural process. It is an interaction between certain processes and those processes which we call the body-mind, the psychophysical organism, in its knowing function. This is the empiricist assumption of naturalism. It is true that we have knowledge of abstract structures as in mathematics, but we know them only through the function of psycho-physical processes, and every concrete reality to which abstract structures refer must be discoverable in experience as an activity of spatio-temporal process.

One remark is necessary about knowledge here. Dewey and Whitehead agree that when we talk about experience as the sole route to knowledge, we mean, fundamentally, the organic bodily experience at its deepest level, including the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future. We do not mean simply sense experience as the older naturalism or Humeian naturalism meant. We mean the organic, primitive functioning of the total body-mind. Sense experience is a kind of abstraction from this, important, but not the whole of what we mean by experience. Mr. Pollard, for instance, the physicist who has become a theologian, says that every experimental physicist experiences much more when he observes the elementary particle tracts which appear in a Wilson cloud chamber than he can record in his data book. In like manner, every biologist experiences elements of reality when he views elementary living systems through his microscopes which he is unable to reduce to conceptual symbols and transmit in a text or treatise as an integral part of the science. Dewey and Whitehead have tried to identify and describe this depth in experience.

The Significance of Naturalism for Christianity

Now if this is what naturalism is in its modern incarnation, what is its significance for Christian Faith? First, I would acknowledge that modern naturalism with its reverence toward nature, and its conception of a directional process in nature and in history, is in part an inheri-

tance from the Christian Faith in a good creation and in the purposive work of God in history. No philosophy, I believe, stands by itself apart from some original religious apprehension. I do not think that modern naturalism does.

But second, I am impressed by how profoundly and deeply the naturalistic outlook has affected our understanding of the Christian Faith. I am impressed with how very naturalistic practically all of us are when it comes down to saying how we conceive the realities of nature, history, and God. Here I do not think that the development of technology, and technological tools for understanding, is the most important thing to emphasize. Dr. Brunner, for instance, seems to me to miss the point here when he sees technology as the whole key to how modern science has affected our thinking. I would emphasize the fundamental way of thinking itself which we have to adopt when we try to understand the world, ourselves, and God. I mean the fact that we look for concrete and specifiable causes for identifiable structures and processes in human experiences, and that we do not allow anything, no matter how sacrosanct in the religious tradition, no matter how much it comes under the rubrics of revelation,—I say we do not allow anything to prevent us from making a naturalistic analysis of what is involved. Think of what has happened to the interpretation of the Bible in the modern period, and in the understanding of creation, and incarnation, and resurrection. All of these become symbols which transcend the literal facts. Karl Barth's discussion of the resurrection, for example, seems to require no particular theory about the physical event.

Consider that in theology today we do not quite know what to do with a "miracle". The reason we do not is because whatever we do with it, we know we must not set aside our naturalistic understanding of the world. In history we look for concrete structures of explanation which relate to economic interests, psychological interests, political interests, even when we are trying to explain the most spiritual phenomena in the history of the church. We feel we do not understand any religious experience or anything in the history of the faith or its consequences, until we have seen it in its natural setting in the spatio-temporal processes. Without accepting their doctrines, we may say that the analysis of ideology in Marx and Freud has probably altered our thinking about human life as profoundly as anything since the Biblical revelation.

The term "supernaturalism" is now very rarely used in theology. Dr. Ferré uses it, I know, and some others; but we are very hesitant about using the term supernatural, precisely because we do not want to mean by this another realm, another set of causes, another order, to be added on to this one natural order with which we know we have to do.

When we come to evaluative judgments about the good in human his-

tory, when we try to ask what are our moral and spiritual obligations, we never get completely away from an experiential and naturalistic tests. I know that the norm of our ethical behavior is something that transcends any single experience or perhaps all experience, that our vision of the good goes beyond anything which we can immediately document or perhaps completely express in a historical concrete form. But when we ask what we are to do in the light of the norm of love, I am impressed by how much we have to come back to what actually goes on in human history, the consequences of certain kinds of action, how we have to look for proximate structures of justice, why we may have to make concessions to the necessities of human experiences, to the adjustments to a situation as it is. And we are all rightfully hesitant about applying in human affairs a criterion for moral action which is not kept in a very sensitive and fluid relationship to how it actually works in the course of human events.

These have been obvious remarks and quite general ones. Now I would like to say how I think the naturalist outlook is important for two fundamental problems.

Naturalism and the Body-Mind Problem

The first is the body-mind problem. Modern naturalism is not reductionism. It proposes to offer a significant way of understanding man, his personality, his behavior, and the relation of his spiritual being to his organic physical structure. In *Process and Reality* (p. 182), Whitehead describes the way in which the body becomes the sensitive amplifier of the meanings in the human personality. The body is the instrument through which the experiencing person receives from the world and gives back to the world in a constant give and take. I think this is very sensitively described, and it represents a way of looking at the relation of body and spirit which seems to me the most fruitful way that we have. Look at that wonderful definition of Whitehead's in *Modes of Thought*: "the human body is the primary region of human expression." The real mystery of man is not how two separate entities, "spirit" and "body," get together. The real mystery of man is in this commerce, this social interaction, between the personality and its physical instrument of expression. The most significant route to the understanding of man is to push this perspective; and this, it seems to me, is what naturalism does. To put it polemically, I have a conviction, which may be prejudice, that a great deal of talk about the "I-Thou" relationship in understanding man is a convenient shorthand for avoiding the really hard

problems. We are not disincarnate spirits in "I-Thou" relations. We are human beings embedded in organic and physical processes, and the mystery of man is how the "I-Thou" relationship appears in this setting. I do not say that naturalism is an explanation or solution of the mystery of spirit and body, but that it is the most fruitful, suggestive and concrete way of thinking about this relationship that we have. We should stress here a certain return to the Old Testament and what I understand to be the Hebrew-biblical view of man, as spirit and body in one concrete reality, the human being.

Naturalism and the Problem of God's Relation to the World

The second problem is that of God and the world. Many naturalists do not speak about God. If Hartshorne and Whitehead are naturalists, then my remarks here will be relevant to naturalism; if they are not, then I'm talking about "process theology." It is worth pointing out that for Hartshorne and Whitehead the problem of the relation of God and the world is inseparable from the mind-body problem—not because God is mind related to the world in just the same sense in which human mind and body are related, but there are analogies here which are necessary if we are going to think about God in relation to the world at all. Now, what Hartshorne and Whitehead (and Wieman also) see is that a meaningful conception of God's relationship to the world must involve God in the temporal process. If we are to think of God's relationship to the world in any sense as a fundamental community of interaction between God and the creatures, then this means that time must be real for God and that the world must act upon him while he acts upon the world. It seems to me that on this point it is hard to get an unambiguous answer from a good deal of contemporary theology. I am not quite sure of the relation of time to God in Dr. Tillich's view, for example. But if we take the naturalistic one-order view seriously, time must mean something to God. The question is: "how then does God act?" This is a very difficult problem, but my thesis is that Christian theology cannot avoid it. My interest in naturalism at this point arises in part from suspicion that a great deal of Christian theology has not fully faced this issue. We speak about God acting in history, about God revealing himself, about God redeeming the world, about the eschatological community—all these things; but if you ask how, in what particular or specifiable way, can it be meaningful to say that God acts, I find it hard to get illuminating answers. It seems to me that theology must try to give some answers.

What is the naturalistic answer or the answer in Whitehead's and Hartshorne's philosophy? I am not sure it is altogether clear here either, but there is an assertion that God and the world exist in a community of mutual action and passion. ("Passion" in the sense of being acted upon.) We no longer try to think of God as unaffected by what happens among creatures, and perhaps with the mind-body analogy we can meaningfully conceive God's relationship to time and history. Events act upon him as well as he upon them, and this gives us some insight as to how it may be possible to speak of God acting in the world in time and still remaining God. This involves a metaphysical doctrine to be sure, and in order to arrive at metaphysics, reason has to go beyond immediate experience. Naturalism at this point has to become ontological if it is going to deal with the problem at all. I find in Whitehead and Hartshorne a significant attempt to think concretely about God's relationship to the world in a meaningful way.

Conclusion

As a Christian theologian I hold that every philosophy is an abstraction (even though Whitehead says that philosophy is the critic of abstractions). Every ontology is an attempt to see the reality which can never be fully expressed in ontological terms. I believe that the concrete reality of our religious experience cannot be encompassed by, or absorbed into, any metaphysical scheme. We know the Word of God through his personal manifestations, his personal revelation. To interpret this is the first work of theology, but the interpretation involves the metaphysical questions. It is essential that we clarify what we mean when we say God acts, God becomes incarnate, God redeems, and the Holy Spirit is present. I find in the naturalism I have tried to describe, certainly for me, the most significant clues as to how we have an intelligible way of speaking about God's relationship to the world, and an intelligible way of expressing our belief that history is the field of His redemptive activity.

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

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How Firm a Foundation?

Ernest Gordon

During my comparatively brief period of working directly with students, in the role of University Chaplain, I have come across many fine lads who have been superb examples of God's grace mediated through the Christian family and the Church. Whenever I come across such "epistles known and read of all men," I feel like bursting out into the *Te Deum Laudamus.* Taking into account their well balanced personalities, their concern for student comrades, their qualities of leadership, their living witness to the Gospel and their readiness to associate themselves with "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are of good report," I am tempted to point to them and say, "You see, Christianity works, the Church is doing her job," and I would be right. But if I were to do that, there would be someone at hand to remind me of the lads who come from "good" Christian homes having strong church associations who have not made the grade and who are the kind of persons that neither Church nor University would wish to claim as "typical products". In many instances the Church and the "good" Christian home have not been able to give the guidance for life that they professed to possess. Somewhere along the line the channels of the communication of God's grace have been blocked. Something or someone has prevented the light of Eternal Truth shining upon their darkness. For example, sit with me in my study and hear a few illustrations of what I mean.

(1) Here is a lad who says that he would like me to help him because his father has threatened to withhold financial support from him because he has become too "*worldly*" in his thinking and is showing signs of becoming an agnostic. On asking him if he has ever talked

over his religious problems with his father the reply is in the negative. Yet the father is a very religious man, an active worker in the church and a pillar of the community. However excellent he may have been in church work, none of his Christianity seems to have rubbed off on his son, who is now repudiating the religious life of his father.

(2) Here is a lad who complains that his parents have been too dogmatic about their faith and that the minister preaches in a language that is of the last century. "If that is the Christian faith," says he, "I don't want to have anything to do with it."

(3) This student feels that he is on the verge of going insane, that he cannot work or sleep at nights, and that he has failed the University, his parents and his church. To all outward appearances he seems perfectly normal; in fact, one might say better than normal, for he is an excellent student, good athlete and keen churchman. His main trouble seems to be that he has been trying to do too much on his own strength and to live by a rigid set of negative laws. As he attempts to analyze his condition he feels that religion has not really helped him.

(4) This boy wants to leave the University in order to go to a certain denominational college because the ways of the other students are so sinful that he doesn't think he can stand it much longer. His two years at the University have been extremely unhappy ones. His grades have been good but he cannot face the sins of his contemporaries.

And so I could continue.

Dare I tell any of these lads that religion is the answer when obviously they have had too much religion? It is a terrible thing to say, but it is true. And one of my most unhappy experiences as a chaplain was that of picking up the broken pieces that were left behind by a very religious group. Out of the original number of about twelve only two survived to graduate.

The Church cannot say to those who go on to college or university, "Be religious, and you will be all right," because it simply is not true! What then may the Church say to concerned parents and their children about the contemporary university and how one, as a Christian, ought to confront it?

No Gimmicks

To such a question I know of no easy answer; there are no facile formulas or simple gimmicks. Basically, I would say, everything de pends upon the attitude of the Church and the home to the world

and the whole realm of personal relationships during the life of the student prior to his coming to college. From such attitudes he will receive the guidance for good or ill that will determine his relationship to the academic community he is entering during most of his student years, particularly the first. The task of the college is so much easier when it finds itself building the temple of knowledge upon a foundation that has been well and truly laid. So important is this truism that the University I serve takes care to express it carefully in a pamphlet which is sent out to all parents of underclassmen. This is what is written: "If, however, the student is to gain the most from his Princeton education, assistance from parents as well as from Advisers is needed. The general attitude with which the student enters the University and takes up his studies goes a long way toward determining his success or failure, and this attitude will be to a large extent induced by the views and guidance of his family. A parent can often help the student to overcome diffidence or carelessness or overconfidence in his attitude toward University obligations and in his use of the great opportunity for development offered to him during his years at Princeton. For this reason we particularly ask the support of parents and guardians in our efforts to help our students with problems of adjustment that they inevitably face during their first year in college."

It is helpful, I think, to remember that the University is not attempting to introduce something drastically new into the life of the student, but that she is dedicated to the task of supplementing and implementing all that is good in his background. In the Harvard report, *General Education in a Free Society*, this idea is fairly clearly stated: "Our purpose is to cultivate in the largest possible number of our future citizens an appreciation of both the responsibilities and the benefits which come to them because they are Americans and are free." The two words here which "tie in" the society, the University and the Church, as it were, are "responsibilities" and "free."

Church and University

Very often the University is more conscious of its church origin than is the Church. It is conscious that the Church is the mother who brought her into being, who has given her life, who has sustained her in childhood, and who has stood by her during her teething troubles. I need hardly remind you that the University of today had its origin in the monastery and cathedral school of the Middle Ages. Those early universities were often beacons of light in the darkness of their times, and whatever their faults they helped to prepare the way for the Renaissance and the Reformation. Our modern period of history

has its roots in those universities, for it has been made possible by men like John Huss of the University of Prague, John Wycliffe of Oxford, Martin Luther of Wittenberg, John Calvin of Paris, Pico of Florence, von Hutten of Bologna, Grocyn of Oxford, Colet of Oxford, Erasmus of Paris, to mention but a few. When the old church had become so cold that it could hardly move, there were still signs of life in the universities, life that had been inspired by the Church.

Too readily has the Church divorced herself from the university situation as she has applied herself more and more to the saving of souls at the expense of the saving of minds and bodies. Docetism, or the two storey view of life, has led the Church to turn her back on the University with its concern about the sciences and the humanities and has caused her to splurge with heretical fervor in all kinds of other-worldly pursuits. The present revival of nineteenth-century pietism which is afflicting us at the moment will tend to widen the gap irreconcilably between the Church and the University. It may well be that the University and not the Church will become more and more the guardian of Christian truth. While the Church deals with the "pie-in-the-sky," the University may be concentrating on an understanding of God's grace as it is mediated through actual and historical events and situations. The God of the Christian faith is not the *actus purus* of the Greeks, but the working, creating, God of the Bible who is ever active in everyday life and in the whole realm of human relationships.

Religion on the Campus

The University needs the Church, and seldom has she been so conscious of that need as she is today. There is every cause to be encouraged by the conversations that are taking place on the campuses of the nation regarding the need for religious counsel and guidance. Professor John N. Nef, of Chicago University, commenting on the work of The Committee on Social Thought, of which he is Chairman, said recently: "It had seemed to some of us that our country was called upon to create, or renew (if you prefer to call it that) a philosophy built upon man as a whole; that the deeper meaning of the Christian faith needed to be brought into relation to the new industrialised world, that moral philosophy and art should, with religion, resume the central places in the life of our times. These great subjects, central to all our hopes, have been increasingly forsaken for minute specialities and for the natural sciences. We have experts in every field except the supremely important one which encompasses all the others. Is this not after all the knowledge of man? Many of the great

scientists are now the first to emphasize that their work tells us nothing really helpful about these strange, mysterious creatures that we are. It does not help us to recognise the beautiful, the good, to know the truth (save about the material universe and mathematics), if it tells us nothing about God." This, I would say, is fairly typical of the current university attitude towards religion. There is generally a feeling of repentance, a recognition that the old concept of reality as a closed system of law, and the scientific method as the only means of knowledge, are hopelessly inadequate for the deep needs of contemporary man. Sir Walter Moberly has done such an excellent piece of work in exposing the sins and weaknesses of the University in his book, *The Crisis in the University*, that I need not enumerate the long list of failings which university representatives are admitting in a variety of ways.

Just off the press has come to me a Harvard Student Council Committee report on *Religion at Harvard*. Dealing with religious attitudes in Harvard College, the report presents its findings as follows: "The facts are these. When asked if they required some form of religious orientation or belief in order to achieve a fully mature philosophy of life, 60% of the students answering said yes, and 23% said no. In answer to the question, 'At the present time, do you find yourself deeply concerned with questions as to the ultimate meaning of your life?', 56% said such questions were a 'pressing concern' or that they were 'quite concerned', and 9% were 'not at all' concerned. Questions about the nature and existence of God were of 'very great' or of 'considerable' importance to 79% of the students answering and of 'little or no' importance to 19%. Religious experiences were of 'very great' or of 'considerable' importance to 50% and of 'little or no' importance to 45%.

"From the viewpoint of our committee, these figures revealed a surprisingly large amount of interest at Harvard. Admittedly, in the question which asks if the student feels a need for religious orientation in his philosophy of life, the word 'religion' becomes very slippery and could fit a wide range of outlooks. But the fact remains that a large proportion of students want something they call religion in their philosophies of life."

From a report such as this, plus the almost spectacular growth of departments of religion and the sympathetic attitude of university administrators, one would be inclined towards a hopeful view of the future of religion on American campuses. The need for religion is recognized, but is the Church prepared to meet that need? Every indication points to the fact that the Church has the ball at her feet, but having it there does not necessarily mean she can do very much with

it if she does not know how to play in a game that is particularly twentieth-century.

As the Church prepares to take her place alongside the University, and not against her, she would do well to remember that this academic community we call the University is ever increasingly willing to be confronted by Eternal Truth. To whom can she go but to the Church of Jesus Christ? "Thou hast the words of eternal life." The student who has learned of the vital and essential partnership necessary between the Church and the University has gone a long way towards adjusting himself to college life.

The Quest for Truth Beyond Knowledge

One of the tasks of the Church, therefore, as she prepares her youth for college, is to bear a constant and vital witness to the Ultimate Truth she serves. The student who realises that the distant frontiers of reality have been set before him will have received a sense of direction, a purpose for being, that will inspire and strengthen him. In the words of Charles Osgood, Professor Emeritus of Belles Lettres at Princeton, "He should at all times be conscious of the convergence of his own little rushlight upon the white radiance of Eternity." The University is increasingly recognising that she can never claim to possess Truth, and that the only adjective to describe Truth is not "mathematical" or "biological" or "philosophical," but "Ultimate" or "Eternal." The Church can do a great deal to remind her young people as well as others that there is a difference between truth and knowledge. We may legitimately seek the latter but we can only be confronted by the former. Truth is a matter of dialectical meeting, God to man, and man to man. It is because the Church and the University are challenged by truth that they are concerned about knowledge. For knowledge, there must be a conscious relationship to truth, otherwise knowledge is apt to become nothing but a compilation of facts regardless of how well those facts may be analysed and classified. That is why it is difficult to better the Biblical admonition, "Reverence for God is the beginning of knowledge."

The Reformed branch of the Church has given special emphasis to the quest for knowledge because of her consciousness that knowledge must be as wide as life itself. Such a quest, therefore, must have a true religious motivation. Woodrow Wilson was suggesting this when he said, "Everything should enter into a man's religion." As members and ministers of the Church we can never know too much: that is why in humility we must admit that we do not know all the answers, and that we are for ever journeying and never arriving. This quest is part

of man's responsibility to God as a free being created in His image and likeness. It is part of his worship and part of his life at its deepest levels. We do not believe that the Christian Faith gives us the scientific answers to scientific problems, but we do believe that this faith gives the scientist as well as every other man the context of being in which he exists as a participant and not simply as a spectator. The scientist, as he knows so well, and his methods, are within this context and not above or beyond it. That is why a great scientist like Schrödinger is able to say: "[Science] is ghastly silent about all and sundry that is really near to our heart, that really matters to us . . . It knows nothing of God and Eternity, good or bad, beautiful or ugly. Science sometimes pretends to answer questions in these domains, but the answers are very often so silly that we are not inclined to take them seriously."

By the honesty of her own searching, and her openness to receive all knowledge, the Church is able to demonstrate by example that her emphasis upon faith does not produce a kind of creeping paralytic conservatism, but a frank, open, liberal and progressive outlook upon life as a whole. The Bible, thus, is not looked upon as a book of magic, but the history of God's encounter with the children of His creation—man's experience of the Living Word.

The Common Task

The Church and the University are surely also united in the common task of providing the kind of atmosphere in which young people will be helped to reach mental, moral and spiritual maturity. The aim of the University is similar to that of the Church: it is ever conscious of its need to express itself as a community and not as an atomistic society of self-centered individuals dedicated to the goal of going to Hell in their own particular way. Only the love of God expressed through the lives of His children can make such a community possible. Thus the duty of Christians within the academic society is that of expressing the reality of the loving community of which they are part. This can be done by faculty and students alike as they witness by their lives and their worship to the glory of Christ's Lordship over all life. When a student has been indoctrinated at church and home with all kinds of religious ideas pertaining exclusively to the supreme importance of his own particular salvation, but unrelated in any way to the concept of community, then he tends to become involved in an "I-Me" rather than an "I-Thou" relationship. Thus, instead of working for a fuller expression of the Christian community he is but adding

to the all-too-prevailing environment of individualistic isolationism. Recently one of our students, who happens to be of another religious persuasion, wrote in his column in the student newspaper of the tragic loneliness of the contemporary man, and by way of a conclusion he said: "In facing with honesty the ultimate aloneness of each one of us, these men (*i.e.*, those who are conscious of their aloneness) would unearth in this very loneliness the only real communion." This is a student's appraisal of the contemporary situation and at the same time his longing to be not just an individual but a person in a community.

I do not think one is being too idealistic in stressing the sense of community as a goal of the University. Surely Christ has claimed it as part of His Temple; therefore the campus is just as much holy ground as any great cathedral. The experience of community in church and home will have given the student the realisation that he is a person of significance because he is loved—loved by his parents, loved by his church, loved by God. As he takes his place on the campus, he will do so as one who has found himself as a person capable of achieving communion with others. One of our seniors related recently his most vital experience while a member of the academic community by saying: "An astounding feature of God's love is its particularity. Not only does it apply to all men, universally; it first must involve each of us, specifically . . . . Intellectually we may have understood the idea (*i.e.*, the meaning of God's love) before, but now we are involved with our whole being. And when we have met this challenge of love and entered into it, we enter with our particular selves, still individuals of different characters and abilities but now with the strength to know and be ourselves in a co-operative venture." It is this knowledge of the particularity of God's love which assures the individual of his place in the universe and therefore as a leader in the society that is yearning to be a community.

Some Practical Considerations

By this time the reader will probably be feeling that I have been concentrating too much on highly idealistic generalities and saying nothing which would be helpful to the minister on the job who is interested in helping is *teknia* prepare for "the best four years of their life." What about the students who lose their faith at college, for instance? When Dr. William S. Carlson, President of the State University of New York, addressed the state's annual mental health forum at Rochester on October 22nd of last year, he implied an affirmative answer to such a question by saying that "the very atmo-

sphere of the university tends to corrode the average student's traditional moral and religious beliefs." He further suggested that this was a contributing factor in the breakdown of mental health: "And to the extent that colleges take no steps to fill the vacuum of belief which they create, they are contributing to the sum total of mental instability." While this may be true where a "vacuum of belief" does exist, I am convinced that it is not true of all or even of most colleges. In any case, would it not be the duty of those concerned to guide their children away from such institutions? From my own experience I know of no one who has "lost his faith." A growth away from a childhood faith into a more mature one I do not count as a loss but as a gain. Frequently I have seen lads, who claimed to be agnostics or atheists, come to an experience of God's love because of the freedom they enjoyed while at college. In fact, they were not atheists at all but persons who were rebelling against the authoritarian legalism of home or church. For four years, a professor of psychology conducted what was called an Advisee Project here at Princeton. This project consisted of an attempt to make an evaluation of students' attitudes during their time at college. The advisor came to know a group of thirty-six boys intimately and met regularly with them to listen to their views. Of the thirty-six, twenty-eight went on to graduate. As far as their religious attitudes were concerned only two reported any deepening of their sense of religious involvement; eight professed that they had remained emotionally indifferent; while the remaining eighteen claimed that their personal interest in religion had remained at the same level. "In other words," to quote from the report, "*If a student arrived on the campus involved in religion he left involved; if he arrived indifferent to religion, he left indifferent.*" It is also interesting to note that those who were religiously involved expressed a distrust of the organized churches as being too much part of the provincial world. *Religion at Harvard* supports this Princeton report: "The type of men who remain strong in their faith are those who go to church. . . . On the other hand, those who remain skeptical do not usually go to church. . . . Frequent and infrequent church-goers reshape their beliefs equally often. This data supports once more the idea that fundamental beliefs whether skeptical or religious are not the product of Harvard experience. They arise from development received before coming to college." In conclusion it is very wisely stated that, "Our report is just the opposite of those angry protests so common today against the skeptical and corrosive influences of university education. We have been highly rewarded by our own educations, and our study has confirmed the opinion that Harvard is good for the faith of students. If beliefs are challenged, thought is also

stimulated. The end result, in most cases, is a firmer and more tenable faith." With this conclusion I would agree wholeheartedly.

As far as mental breakdowns are concerned, I am told by our university psychiatrist, Dr. Louis Reik, that much the same rule holds true here. Students who have mental problems invariably bring them with them to college, and such problems are not the result of a "loss of faith." Naturally, there are going to be problems. That is inevitable—it is part of the price that has to be paid for growing up. Problems, however, that were serious enough to cause students to withdraw are tabulated as follows to cover a period of three academic years:

	'55-'56	'54-'55	'53-'54
a) Psychosomatic handicap			
e.g., Fatigue, headaches, tension	6	14	5
b) Social handicap			
e.g., "Princeton rubs me the wrong way"	4	3	10
c) Academic handicap			
e.g., Lack of concentration	5	13	10
d) Emotional handicap			
e.g., Exaggrated self blame	7	1	1
Totals	22	31	26

From figures such as these we could hardly conclude that the atmosphere of the university had a damaging effect upon its students. Were we to make an analysis of the particular age-group in industry or business we would probably find that the above figures are well below the average. And as an examination of case histories invariably shows tendencies towards mental instability prior to coming to college, it would be anything but fair to attribute blame to the university. What is true of Princeton is, I am sure, also true of elsewhere.

But what, we may ask, about the moral situation? Is not college the place where students fall victims to all kinds of vice? It is true that students often begin to drink and to "neck" while at college (What about high school?), but is that the sin, if it be a sin, of the college, or of the customs of our times? If drinking and sex are wrong, why are they wrong? Surely the responsibility for providing an answer is primarily that of the home and the church. It is not enough to say, "A good Christian never drinks or kisses the lassies." The average teen-ager, whether or not he is a student, is hardly likely to accept such a dictum. For one thing it may cause him to think that all that being a Christian means is not doing anything, and for another it may seem highly unreasonable. The wise example of Christian

parents will prove to be of infinitely more value than a myriad of negative pronouncements. Usually a student starts taking alcohol in order to show his manliness and prove that he is one of the boys. In many cases it is an indication of his desire to btlong to, and to be accepted by, the society in which he lives. If he has the assurance of faith that he already "belongs," he has been equipped with the best means of facing and overcoming temptation. Similarly, sexual adventures are another attempt to prove one's maleness. Hollywood and Madison Avenue have so successfully abstracted sex from personality that it is hardly to be wondered at why students, as well as others, look upon sex as something that is purely mechanical or biological, and in no way related to their personalities as a whole. The church may well have erred by her silence in failing to show that sex comes within the province of grace, and that marriage is more than a legal contract: it is the giving of two persons to each other body, mind and spirit. I mention marriage because I believe that an understanding of what Christian marriage means is the most reasonable argument I know for chastity. Morality, however, must always be thought of, not in terms of sex or liquor, but in terms of the absolute demands made by the Holy God upon His children. These demands have been made clear enough in the life of Jesus Christ His Son, who has demonstrated to us all that only love can meet such demands, that love which "is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us."

Conclusion

From what I have written it should be apparent that the attitudes developed by students before coming to college are extremely important. It is quite humiliating for university chaplains and professors of religion to realise this: despite all our efforts we seem to achieve so little. We may help to deepen a lad's faith or introduce another to a more meaningful understanding of Christianity, but that is about all. The important work has already been done by parents, ministers, Church School teachers, friends and others. For instance, as a result of our recent Bryan Green mission to the campus, I had the privilege of interviewing at least twenty boys who had made some kind of acknowledgment of their experience of confrontation with God. In every case those lads had been prepared for such an experience by their training in the home and church before coming to college. One boy said, "In my seeking I was aided by the evidence of the faith of my parents." We can only begin where they have left off. Thus, when the Christian Faith has been presented as a challenge, and not as a soporific; when God is recognised as the begining and end of

life instead of Mammon; when Christ is cheerfully acknowledged as Lord of all life and not merely as an other-wordly figure in stained glass; when the Church is known as the reconciling fellowship of love, and not merely as a social club or as a memorial to a departed deity; when the University is claimed for the Father, Son and Holy Spirit instead of being surrendered to Marx, Darwin and Freud—then a task will have been well done and the foundations laid which will endure to eternity.

Communication

As from the wooden frame dumb paint is speaking
In velvet words whose beauty goes unheard,
As through the shuddering leaves the breeze goes seeking
To speak to listening oak unspoken word,
As underneath creation's groans lies dreaming,
And God in awful wisdom thus ordains
That in loud clamour quiet's voice is screaming
And death-like silence spoken word contains;
That eyes which often meet though never seeing
And listening ear which never truly hears,
Can of a sudden thrust the bonds of being
And in that minute reach across the years
And time invoke;
So the sequined sea of flippant conversation
Rolls its shallow tinsel waves across the shore,
Beneath in depths of quiet meditation
The soul waits locked behinds self's guarded door,
And underneath the mind's more safe expression,
The intellect's insensitivity,
The singer longs for song to find confession,
The restless poet cries out to be free;
The heart that cares lies fettered fast to fearing,
And cannot bear to let itself be shown,
And gaity rolls loudly on, not hearing
The silent voice of loneliness its own
Sad cry evoke.
The moment goes as swift as it is known,
Love never woke.

MARYHELEN ELLIS

The Resurgence of Nationalism and Old Religions in Japan

Sakae Kobayashi

For a while after World War II Christianity was regarded by the majority of the Japanese people as *the* religion which could bring peace to the world. Unfortunately, however, they would now no longer regard Christianity as such. It was constantly emphasized by leading Christians of the world that in Japan there was a wide open door for Christianity such as had not existed at any time or in any country in human history. How has this wide open door been so easily closed in Japan? It may be fair to say that Japanese feel that the Christian Church in Japan is still alien to the Japanese soil and lacks the vitality for solving the real problems in which they are now so greatly involved. To understand why this is so, we must analyze the causes of the surprising resurgence of nationalism and the old religions in Japan. Before we enter into an analysis of the causes, it may be helpful to know what the Japanese people generally used to think of Christianity.

The general opinion of the Japanese people on Christianity may be summed up in four categories: 1. Christianity is a western and white man's religion. 2. Christianity is a capitalistic and imperialistic religion. 3. Christianity is an anti-communistic religion. 4. Christianity is a religion which calls a man a sinner. Needless to say, those who know more about Christianity have different ideas about it. For our present analysis I would like to deal with the first three categories I have just mentioned.

Right after World War II the Christian churches in Japan were crowded with Japanese young and old who seriously wanted to learn something from the victor's religion. But, if we look back over the history of Japan in connection with Christian activity, we shall see that this religion has not always been a welcome religion. The reason why the Tokugawa Shogunate decided in 1639 to close off Japan from the rest of the world was largely to ban Christianity from Japan. Even after the restoration of Imperial rule in 1868, Christianity was the target of bitter criticism by Buddhism and Shinto. The defeat of Japan in World War II, however, seemed to bring about a complete reverse of the situation.

Doubtless because of the defeat of Japan, everything regarded as old or traditional lost its attraction for the people, and Christianity was regarded as the only hope which might save the country from moral and economic catastrophe. For a while it seemed to the Japanese people that the occupation forces were really working toward the establishment of a new Japan based upon a high ideology of freedom and democracy.

American Policy and Anti-Christian Feeling in Japan

It has often been said that preachers should not participate in political matters. Theoretically speaking, this may be reasonable. We have recently seen, however, how closely religion and politics can be related in the complete withdrawal of the British and French missions from Egypt which followed the Suez crisis. In Japan, too, we can see how a series of American policies has changed the feeling of the Japanese people toward Christianity. As typical examples of such policies I would like to mention five.

(1)

For the first five years after the war the United States carried out a drastic destruction of Japan's war potential both materially and spiritually. In August of 1945 when the blasts of two atomic bombs terminated hostilities in unconditional surrender by Japan, the White House issued a directive on American policy for Japan. The directive said: "The ultimate objective of the American policy is to insure that Japan will never again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."

However, the Japanese government is now being forced by Washington to adopt a strong rearmament policy. This sudden shift from disarmament to rearmament, though quite logical from the American standpoint, has created considerable confusion and disappointment in

Japan. Russia also announced quite an extensive program to aid Japan's rearmament and expressed her willingness to help Japan in this direction. We Japanese realized, therefore, that we are in danger of being exploited by both of the great nations of the present world. It is quite natural that the dominant opinion of the Japanese is now a stronger desire for independence and neutrality.

The American government repeatedly emphasized the importance of Japan's disarmament, saying that if Japan was to be a truly peace-loving nation, the first thing to do was to abolish its armed forces completely. The idea of disarmament was implanted by the Americans, and ordinary Japanese are firmly convinced that this idea was not a mistake. The reluctance to rearm, therefore, is not communist-inspired at all.

(2)

In February of 1946 the Shidehara government received from the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers a draft of the new constitution expressly forbidding the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential." As a matter of fact, the original new constitution was written in English!!

In August of 1950, *Mainichi,* one of the two greatest newspapers in Japan, reported a statement by Gordon Walker, Far East Editor of the *Christian Science Monitor,* telling how one of the personnel at General Headquarters had been sent home, because he had disclosed the secret that the new constitution was a product of G. H. Q. and not a reflection of Japanese public opinion. Following this statement, a Japanese statesman wrote to the newspaper that the Japanese government had submitted proposed revisions to the draft, none of which was accepted by the authority of G.H.Q.

At this point in 1950 it became clear, therefore, to the Japanese people why General MacArthur had extoled the new constitution when it was first promulgated. He himself was its maker.

By the summer of 1950 the world situation was greatly changed: now General MacArthur announced that "no sophistry could interpret the new constitution as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense!" Six months later General MacArthur ordered the Yoshida government to establish "Police Reserves". To the eyes of the Japanese it was obvious that he had ordered this Police Reserve because he thought the time was coming when America would need the help of a Japanese Army to beat Russia. This change of policy was clearly motivated as much by the self-interest of America as by a desire for world peace.

(3)

The blow that professional military officers received after the war was indeed a hard one. All were purged and prohibited from participating in any responsible work whether or not it was connected with the government. Famous generals and veterans who had been expecting to receive a pension and life annuity received nothing but the label "Purged". After the Korean Incident broke out, however, they were "unpurged" and later even invited to join the Police Reserves. The re-establishment of pensions and life annuities was clearly a gesture to attract them. Most Japanese viewed these changes in American policy with a rather cynical eye.

In 1945 immediately after the war, Prime Minister Higashikuni tried to release all political prisoners in Japan, such as communists and liberals, who had opposed the war. This program was stopped by order of the occupation; then these prisoners were soon released in the name of the occupation. It was no wonder, therefore, that the communist leaders who were released visited G.H.Q. and hailed General MacArthur as the hero of the century. When meetings of labor unions were held, we used to see representatives from G.H.Q. speaking at the meetings and encouraging this kind of movement. It also seemed ironical to us, therefore, that four years later communist leaders were purged and strikes by labor unions were banned.

(4)

The greatest concern of the Japanese people at this moment is without doubt the base expansion project of the American Air Forces. We have had serious problems concerning this project at several places where American air forces are located. In order to enable American jet bombers to take off from these bases, the Pentagon is strongly urging the need of base expansion. Needless to say, such a project cannot be achieved without considerable sacrifice on the part of the ordinary people of Japan.

Last year we had riots and terrible problems in Okinawa and in Sunagawa-cho. Most Americans have heard little or nothing about this struggle. Quite a number of people were killed or badly injured in fights that occurred between policemen trying to clear areas condemned for American runways and the inhabitants of these areas. One policeman committed suicide, saying he could not participate in such inhumane fighting against his own countrymen. Strangely enough, communists and nationalists are fighting side by side at Sunagawa-cho, along with socialists, journalists, workers, and university students, all strongly opposing this base expansion project with actual physical resistance. This is no longer a problem of the farmers

who are losing their own land, but certainly has become a nation-wide resistance against American capitalism.

The majority of the Japanese are firmly convinced that the peace of the world cannot be achieved by an "either or" policy: American capitalism or Russian communism. According to *Time* magazine, the fuss over taking more land in Okinawa for American military installations is only being stirred up by communists. But it is not true at all. It is rather a common tendency of Americans to think that any movement which is anti-American is communistic, which is a serious mistake.

(5)

The testing of nuclear bombs has been another great concern of the Japanese people. When some fishermen were affected by radioactivity and one of them died, anti-American feeling among the Japanese reached a climax. In spite of a strong appeal from the Japanese government to suspend the tests, the attitude of Washington was cold. The girls in the Hiroshima High School who had lost their parents in the first atomic blast sent their prayer to Washington, saying that we want you to listen to our prayer which we are shouting from the bottom of our hearts. But Washington did not seem to be in a listening mood.

Among the Japanese intelligentsia there has developed a strong feeling that if America wants to continue testing hydrogen bombs, she should do so in Nevada and at the sacrifice of her own people, not those of her Asian neighbors.

Neutralism and the Revival of Nationalism

I have mentioned above the causes for some of the strong anti-American feeling which has become firmly rooted as a result of American policies to Japan. Unless Washington changes its attitude and tries seriously to understand what we Japanese are thinking, I am convinced that anti-American feeling will get worse and that if the world is thrown into another war, America will not be able to expect any assistance from the Japanese at all. Washington should not underestimate the strong anti-American feeling in the Japanese and the hidden feelings of oriental people.

On the other hand, anti-Russian feeling in Japan is also strong. It used to be much stronger than anti-American feeling. But the writer would hesitate at this point to say which is stronger. The communist party is well aware that an appeal to the national feeling of a people

is the most effective way to gain supporters. For example, in the struggle of Sunagawa-cho, they are shouting that we, the Japanese people, must protect our own inherited land from the poison-fangs of American capitalism. In fact, however, most Japanese are not foolish enough to become blind to the real situation of communism, although the communist party in a hopelessly upset society is certainly a great attraction to the common people.

In the present situation the only path that Japan can take is a neutral position such as India is taking. And yet this neutral position happens to be the ground in which nationalism can easily be rooted.

In January of 1946 about 180 ultra-nationalist political organizations were officially disorganized. Some of them, however, changed their slogans and structures and kept their underground movements. Since the final peace treaty was concluded in 1951, all the great ultra-nationalistic organizations which used to have influential power have completely been re-established. Famous ultra-nationalists who actively participated in war, *coups d'état*, and assassinations are again leading this movement. The most important slogan of these organizations is the complete eradication of communism from Japanese society. Several assassinations of communist leaders, though they failed, have been attempted by the members of these organizations since the end of war. Quite a number of members in these organizations have now entered the new Japanese military units.

It must be noted, however, that these organizations, though they are strongly anti-communistic, are not always in favor of American policy. They strongly emphasize the importance of self-defense. They oppose any program of base expansion by the occupation forces, as well as any communist movement. They claim that to be an independent country means that Japan can have the right to choose its own future. To them, self-defense does not necessarily mean only defense against communism.

Especially for war veterans there are two nation-wide organizations. One is the Organization of Disabled Soldiers, while the other is the Time-Expired Soldiers' League. The former is well developed and is trying to get social security from the government. The disabled soldiers have been neglected in the post-war society, for the government was not able to give enough money to these unfortunate veterans. Therefore, they have had to make a terrible effort even to get along at all. At present the members of this organization are not in favor of rearmament. This, however, does not mean that they will always continue to fight against any attempt toward rearmament. If they are assured of receiving reasonable financial support, they may change their principles. The attitude of the Time-Expired Soldiers' League toward rearmament is, at this moment, not clear, but doubtless they

will support and positively participate in rearmament in the near future.

In addition to these organizations there have been organized two other influential bodies. One is called "Kaiko-sha", which is composed of graduates of the old Military Academy. The present writer's name might be found listed as a member of this organization, though he has not applied for membership at all. This group was originally established as a fraternal organization, but gradually turned its attention to social and political problems. Undoubtedly the majority of members are strongly in favor of rearmament, and it is calculated that more than sixty-five percent of the former graduates have now joined the new Japan Defense Army. The other organization is called "Suiko-Kai", whose members consist of graduates of the Naval Academy. Their principles are almost the same as those of Kaiko-sha, and there is a movement toward more co-operation between the two organizations.

At present Kaiko-sha and Suiko-kai are not so extreme, though there is certainly a danger that these organizations may again tie in with the ultra-nationalist organizations. It would be fair to say that before World War II, fascism in Japan was firmly established when the military officers and cadets together with the nationalists initiated their direct programs of assassination based upon an ideology of ultra-nationalism. There are still strong and direct connections between some former military officers and ultra-nationalists. The writer is afraid of the possibility that ultra-nationalism could come back to Japan quite easily if and when these organizations get into close relationship with non-Christian religions, especially the former State Shinto, and certain sects of Buddhism and Sectarian Shinto. It is with these religions that I shall deal in the next section.

Non-Christian Religions as a Soil for Nationalism

It will not be necessary to mention here how enthusiastically non-Christian religions in Japan participated in World War II. During the occupation they had to keep quiet, but since the peace treaty was concluded in 1951 there have been some strong tendencies in these religions toward nationalism.

State Shinto. State Shinto, though terribly stricken by the defeat of Japan, is certainly regaining its prestige among the masses. It is not surprising that the former State Shinto is still closely connected with nationalist organizations.Already there is a movement to make State Shinto a method by which national cohesion can be maintained.

Some people claim that State Shinto is not a religion in the sense of Buddhism or Christianity. This idea used to be a familiar interpretation of State Shinto.

It may be unfair to see in the surprising revival of pilgrimages only a symbol of rising nationalism. I am ashamed to say that the railroad companies are advertising and encouraging these pilgrimages, by which they themselves are of course benefited! We cannot deny, however, that through this kind of pilgrimage nationalism is, consciously or unconsciously, getting stronger.

Let us take some statistics from the Meiji Shrine where the Emperor Meiji is entombed. Before and during World War II, the average number of pilgrimages on New Year's Day was 1,400,000. On New Year's Day in 1946, however, the number of pilgrimages was reduced to only 13,600. Again, on New Year's Day in 1953 the number increased to 850,000, in 1954 to 1,000,000, in 1955 to 2,760,000, and in 1956 the number reached 3,000,000. This figure is supposed to be the largest one since the Shrine was founded. These statistics clearly indicate the surprising revival of State Shinto.

During the war State Shinto was a forced religion. Now, on the contrary, the separation of Shinto from the government has brought about quite unexpected benefits to Shinto. It is not a mistake to say that Shinto has now succeeded in gaining a stronger and more enthusiastic support from the masses than it ever got from the government.

As the tide of nationalism becomes stronger, people are forgetting the renunciation of divinity announced by the Emperor early in 1946. Some religious organizations have openly maintained the urgent need for re-establishment of the Emperor system following the rising tide of nationalism. Shinto shrines are emphasizing this, and even among the newer sects we hear this kind of opinion, Seichono-Ie is a good example.

Nichirenism. The most striking feature in the ultra-nationalist movement before World War II was the fact that the principles of the movement were taken from the doctrine of Shinto on one hand and from those of the fanatic Nichiren Sect on the other. The latter is, however, often overlooked. Almost all of the active ultra-nationalists who executed *coups d'état* or attempted assassinations were devout adherents of Nichirenism. It is extremely important that the greatest new sects in Japan, such as Rissho-kosei-kai, Soka-gakkai, Rei-yu-kai, and the World Messianic Church all belong to Nichirenism, which may be said to be another name for nationalism.

In the fighting at Sunagawa-cho, amazing activity by several Nichiren priests was reported. One of the priests was seriously injured by policemen and his white robe dyed red by blood. This event gave

to the masses a strong impression that Nichirenism is certainly sharing the hardships of the people.

The Christian Church in the Stream of Nationalism

Above, I have tried to clarify fairly extensively the causes of the rapid resurgence of nationalism in Japan. Now I would like to mention briefly how these changes, as a result of American policies and the recovery of society from war destruction, have affected the Christian Church in Japan.

It is questionable, at best, how far the Christian Church in Japan has participated in these grave social problems from which the majority of the Japanese people have been suffering. The Church was not ready to take the initiative for reforming the Japanese society, for the church itself had been most terribly affected by war destruction. The period of the occupation, therefore, was a time in which the Church itself was recovering from the ravages of war.

However, the expectation of the Japanese from Christianity was very great. Quite a number of young people who expected Christianity to be a vital force for reforming the old Japanese society were disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese church and thereby converted to communism. It was no wonder that even among theological students there was quite a strong feeling of dissatisfaction over the impotence of the Japanese church in the face of complete economic and social catastrophe. When a minister announced his decision to join the communist party, young Christians and theological students were deeply impressed and rather sympathetic to his drastic decision, though this was followed by a series of disputes among the Christian leaders.

In connection with the peace movement, the Japanese Christians were as active as non-Christians. The movement was strongly supported by young ministers and laymen. A stand in opposition to rearmament, to revision of the new constitution, to the testing of nuclear bombs, and to the expansion of military bases was also taken up by Christians. Finally the National Council of Churches of Japan sent an official statement to N.C.C.C.U.S.A. and strongly appealed to American Christians to do something to cease the testing of hydrogen bombs.

The most remarkable thing was the fact that quite a number of ministers and Christian scholars, who were not satisfied with the conservative attitude of N.C.C., established "Kirisutosha Heiwa no Kai"—Christian Peace Movement Organization—and started a very active peace movement as an independent body.

It was rather surprising, however, that at the Seventh General Assembly of the Kyodan, held in 1952, a resolution supporting the new constitution, which had been carried at the Sixth General Assembly, was rejected. The N.C.C. also decided to remain silent about the terrible land problem in Okinawa which was being created by American policies. Immediately, strong criticism by non-Christian religions and journalists was heard as a reaction to these decisions. A *Mainichi* newspaperman covered this strange decision and commented that this position was due to the fact that the Japanese Church had been benefited by financial aid from the American Churches and that the American Churches did not like to be involved in such political matters. The reporter bitterly criticized the attitude of the Japanese church and added that Christianity in Japan is, after all, a foreign religion which is the humble servant of American policy and therefore can not participate in solving any of the real problems in which the majority of the Japanese people are greatly involved.

Needless to say that strong distrust of Western imperialism, in 1951 as in 1639, has produced a distrust of Christianity in the mind of the Japanese people. Christianity is again on trial in Japan.

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Review Articles

Studies in Biblical Theology:

The Old Testament Volumes

Edwin M. Good [1]

Series of books are all too often either so miscellaneous that one wonders why they are called series at all or so homogeneous that one can predict the viewpoints before reading the books. One of the great strengths of *Studies in Biblical Theology* is that it presents both a wide latitude of subject matter and diversified points of view without being purely miscellaneous. The volumes all treat important subjects. They are uniformly well written. They are all by widely known and competent scholars. (The sole exception to the epithet "widely known," is Norman K. Gottwald, a Union Seminary Th.D. who is the author of *Studies in the Book of Lamentations.*) In short, *Studies in Biblical Theology* presents the student, the pastor, and the well-prepared general reader with an unparalleled opportunity to keep up with what is going on in Biblical studies.

But since my task is the very pleasant one of giving a conspectus of the volumes dealing with the Old Testament, I will pass to that, leaving general paeans of praise for specific ones. It may be most useful to take the books in groups. Three of them deal with specific books or groups of books; four are on Old Testament theology or subjects within it; two are representative of the very significant work being done by Scandinavian scholars.

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[1] *Edwin M. Good* is a recent graduate of Union who is now Assistant Professor of Religion in Stanford University.

I. Problems of Single Books

GERHARD VON RAD, *Studies in Deuteronomy* (*No. 9*)
NORMAN K. GOTTWALD, *Studies in the Book of Lamentations* (*No. 14*)
JOHN BRIGHT, *Early Israel in Recent Historical Writing* (*No. 19*)

Von Rad's treatment of Deuteronomy will surely rank as a classic of its kind. In a very few pages he presents a brilliant and well-documented argument on the origin and purpose of Deuteronomy, as well as briefer treatments of the Holiness Code, the theology of the Priestly Document, and that of the books of Kings. Deuteronomy, von Rad argues, is not to be assigned either to southern provenance or to the immediate influence of the eighth century prophets. It represents rather the legal traditions and the homiletical interpretations of Israelite country Levites. The demand for centralization of the sanctuary is to be found only in Deut. 12, and it probably represents a Judean refinement for reform purposes. In its essence, therefore, Deuteronomy is preached and hortatory law, building upon ancient traditions and precedents and introducing the Levitical interpretations. Its purpose is the apprehension of Yahweh's saving election of Israel: "It is the tremendous 'here and now' in the divine election that lies at the back of Deuteronomy's attempt to re-comprehend the Israel that was now in the grip of an inner disintegration as the holy people of God." (p. 70f.) To be sure, this has its relationships with the prophetic message, but von Rad would contend that the prophetic element "is merely a form of expression, and a means of making the book's claim to be Mosaic real." (p. 69) Deuteronomy may well stem from the cultic traditions associated with a covenant-renewal festival at Shechem. It is often argued that von Rad unduly minimizes the prophetic influence on Deuteronomy. And he has not answered the vexing question of the composition of the book. He has, nevertheless, laid us in heavy debt.

The pressing interest of Norman Gottwald's book on Lamentations is that it treats a book which so seldom receives its due attention. We are usually content to say that Lamentations is not by Jeremiah and to let it go at that. Gottwald shows the crucial character of the book for our understanding of the decisive problem for Israel's faith at the time of the Exile. After preliminary studies of the acrostic form and literary type (showing, with regard to the latter, a close connection with and perhaps influence upon Second Isaiah), Gottwald proceeds to its theology. The key here is the historical situation, the problem of suffering raised to its most intense pitch by the reversal of Deuteronomy's retributive doctrine. How is it possible, so soon after the glory and piety of Josiah, that the nation should find itself so far in the depths? This theme of "tragic reversal" dominates the whole book and determines the two great elements of the theology of Lamentations, doom and hope. The doom is the result of Israel's sin against Yahweh, the punishment she deserves for her theological rebellion. But it is from this very comprehension that Yahweh brought on the doom that the possibility of a "theology of hope" arises. While this element is less noticeable than that of doom, Gottwald thinks that the retention of faith in Yahweh manifest in Lamentations indicates that the outlook is not one of total despair. Despair there is, but it is the despair of faith, the despair which knows only one direction to turn, toward the God in whose hands history lies. One might wish that Gottwald had paid more attention to the relationships between Lamentations and Job, where the same problem comes to the fore, where de-

spair and self-righteousness are so prominent, and where the sole solution lies in the embracing of guilt in the face of a God who answers no questions but only asks them.

Of a very different kind is John Bright's critique of the conclusions on the conquest narratives reached by Martin Noth and Yehezkel Kaufmann. Noth and Kaufmann present precisely divergent views, Noth (principally in his *Geschichte Israels*, the *Überlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuchs*, and the commentary on Joshua) feeling that little if any accurate historical information is contained in these accounts, Kaufmann (in *The Biblical Account of the Conquest of Palestine*) affirming the basic validity of the book of Joshua. Bright steers a course between the two extremes. He criticizes the Alt-Noth school for its *a priori* skepticism regarding the historical traditions (Noth's contention that Josh. 1-12 is totally aetiological is a primary target) and its nihilism with regard to the witness of archaeology. Kaufmann is criticized for his curious ideas of literary criticism and his invalid use of internal evidence, issuing in a blanket acceptance of Joshua as the accurate and very early narrative history of the conquest. Neither viewpoint will do. The "approved methods and assured results of literary criticism" must be carried on, and archaeology must be utilized, both for its light on any particular tradition and for its picture of the whole ancient milieu. But preconceptions are to be eschewed—both those of the Alt-Noth school and those of Kaufmann—and sober historical study will probably show the broad accuracy of the Biblical accounts of the conquest.

This is a very important book, though it presents no original conclusions and attempts to present none. Bright has learned more from Alt and Noth than from Kaufmann, as he himself says, but this does not lessen the impact of his criticisms (often a satiric impact and an admirable example of wit in scholarly conflict). My own feeling is that perhaps Bright protests too much. Certainly skepticism should not be the precondition for study of ancient narratives, but it seems from time to time that Bright is, in effect, saying that the Alt-Noth school has stolen his marbles and won't let him play the game. "The traditions of Israel are swung in the air and deprived of effective objective control, while the history of Israel before the settlement is robbed of all content and rendered virtually a blank." (p. 55) While Bright's mind is disposed to take Alt and Noth seriously, his heart's desire is the possibility of writing history. But he is too good a scholar to rejoice in Kaufmann.

II. Subjects of Old Testament Theology

G. Ernest Wright, *The Old Testament Against its Environment* (*No. 2*)
Walther Eichrodt, *Man in the Old Testament* (*No. 4*)
G. Ernest Wright, *God Who Acts* (*No. 8*)
W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias *The Servant of God* (*No. 20*)

George Ernest Wright's two volumes need no introduction to recent graduates and present students of Union Seminary. They are staple fare, and very nourishing too. *The Old Testament against its Environment*, like its companion volume on the New Testament by Floyd V. Filson, seeks to ex-

plore those elements of Biblical faith which are inexplicable by "environmental and geographical conditioning." The Old Testament understanding of God, of history, and of religion is at such violent variance with its surrounding theologies that developmental and syncretistic explanations lose all weight. Biblical faith is unique, and Wright makes an exceedingly powerful vindication of the uniqueness. This is not to say, of course, that Israel remained untouched by her environment. But that which touched Israel was transformed by the faith which held Israel to her uniqueness. This is as good a book as any to hand to your comfortable adherent of the "everybody-worships-the-same-God" school.

God Who Acts has the sub-title *Biblical Theology as Recital.* By this means, Wright points up the dual nature of Biblical theology. It is to be understood primarily as the apprehension of the deeds of God instead of the words of God, but the word is always the accompaniment of the act, not "a substantive, dissociated from history and dealt with as an abstraction." (p. 12) Biblical theology, Wright contends, is "*the confessional recital of the redemptive acts of God* in a particular history." (p. 13; the italics are Wright's) This is true both of Old Testament confessions of faith, such as Deut. 26:5-10 and Josh. 24:2-13, and of New Testament confessions, such as Acts 13:16ff. Biblical theology is therefore *kerygma,* the proclamation of objective events of history in which God is revealed. But it also involves the understanding of the acts of man which, in some sense, force God's hand in history. Israel is both sinful and elect, *simul justus et peccator.* For this reason God acts, and for this reason Israel perceives God's action and listens to His words. Though Wright spends most of his time on the Old Testament, considerable light is shed on the New Testament, for throughout he has in mind the unity of the Testaments. It would be difficult to find a better synthesis of Old Testament faith than these two books by Wright. Indeed, I am almost prepared to assert that, taken together, they constitute the most important contribution to Old Testament theology of our century. I say this rather blandly and with the full realization that I have not read all the contributions to Old Testament theology either of this century or of any other. Nonetheless, it is hard to maintain proper restraint about these volumes.

Restraint is equally difficult with regard to Eichrodt's *Man in the Old Testament.* In 72 pages Eichrodt sketches virtually an outline of Old Testament theology, viewed from the standpoint of the doctrine of man. The basic fact about man is his unconditional responsibility to God. This is expressed both in the concept of Law and in the prophetic insistence on Israel's direct relationship with God. Man is the creature of God, and hence is both dependent on Him and possessed of a special dignity, a dignity which makes possible the salvation of man. But "hindrances" to man's fulfilment of his obligation arise from his relationship with nature and its goods and from the evil and wickedness of man himself. In the last analysis man's life, for the Old Testament, is seen to be a life worthy of judgment but upheld at every point by divine grace. It is "life under the promise." (Ch. 4) Such an outline cannot do justice to the rich variety and profound scope of Eichrodt's volume. One can only appreciate his total viewpoint and his refusal to be eclectic in the sources of his understanding. The Law receives here the most sympathetic treatment which I, for one, have seen, a treatment which ranges far beyond the kind of philippic against Jewish legalism which most recent scholarship has seen fit to produce. The prophets are viewed in proper perspective as representatives of one phenomenon among many of Old

Testament religion and not as the only people who understood what God was up to.

The Servant of God is a translation of the article "*pais theou*" from Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, including, therefore, the treatment of the servant in the New Testament. Suffice it to indicate a few particular points from this encyclopedic discussion. Servant (*'ebed*) in the Old Testament bears the connotation of "the worker who belongs to a master." It is used in the religious sense as the humble self-designation of the pious, as a description of Israel, and of particularly important individuals such as Moses, some kings, and prophets. The servant of Deutero-Isaiah is interpreted to be a prophetic figure and probably Deutero-Isaiah himself. The New Testament uses the servant motif almost exclusively of Jesus, and Jesus receives this interpretation in the earliest stages of the Palestinian Church. The servant Christology is thus an extremely important element at all levels of New Testament theology. But Jesus probably identified himself as the servant only in his esoteric teaching and not in public preaching. Zimmerli treats the servant motif in the Septuagint, concentrating on the translations of the Servant Songs, and Jeremias deals with the use of the idea in post-Biblical Judaism, also with special attention to the interpretations of the Servant Songs. Like all the articles of the Kittel *Wörterbuch*, this one is packed with information and interpretation.

III. Scandinavian Works

EDUARD NIELSEN, *Oral Tradition* (*No. 11*)
HELMER RINGGREN, *The Messiah in the Old Testament* (*No. 18*)

Although Ringgren's treatment of the Messiah properly belongs in the preceding section, it is included here because it is one of all too few works readily available to the English reader representative of the very significant and provocative work being done in Scandinavia.

Much of this work is based on the assumption that Old Testament scholarship must take more cognizance of the tenacity of oral tradition in opposition to the implicit tendency of the Wellhausen school of criticism to view the Old Testament as a purely literary phenomenon. Nielsen's volume is a brief introduction to the methodology of this school of thought with several examples of its use in specific Old Testament passages. The foundation of the theory is the clear evidence that the prevailing mode of literary transmission in the ancient world was an oral one and the less unambiguous but fairly widely accepted premise that religious traditions were passed down orally at cultic centers. The pressure for written literature comes only at a time when the whole culture is threatened, as Israel was at the Exile. Nielsen quotes with approval the remark of Nyberg in his *Studien zum Hoseabuche*: "The written Old Testament is a creation of the post-exilic Jewish community; of what existed earlier undoubtedly only a small part was in fixed written form." (p. 39) This is a very radical departure from the literary-critical approach, which finds J to be a written document in the 10th or 9th century B. C. But the Oral Traditionists hold that tradition was developing in oral form, and that

none of the Pentateuchal documents existed in written form, except perhaps legal portions, before the Exile. Likewise, the pre-exilic prophets were preachers whose sermons were memorized and handed down by the schools of their disciples. To use the term "literary prophet" for Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, *et al.*, is to misunderstand the whole process. Nielsen illustrates the method on Jer. 36, Mic. 4-5, and Gen. 6-9. For myself, I find a strong attraction in some of these conclusions, for reasons of my own on which I am at work. Yet some of the scathing comments of these scholars may suggest that they have gone too far in their rejection of literary criticism. Unfortunately their works are not generally available. A very few are in English, more in German, but Engnell's *magnum opus*, his *Gamla Testamentet*, is in Swedish, to which most of us do not have access. Until either the books are translated or the English-speaking scholarly world learns Swedish *en masse*, we will have to struggle along without the—in my opinion—considerable light these scholars have to shed on our problems.

Ringgren's treatment of the Messiah brings out another aspect of the Scandinavian studies: the interest in the royal motif and its relationship to the ancient Near Eastern ideas of kingship. One usually hears of this research under the rubric "divine kingship," and Ringgren puts a strong case for the divine authority of the Israelite kings by reference to New Testament Christology. The New Testament can assert the divinity of Christ precisely because he is really the fulfilment of the Old Testament messianic hope, which was centered on a king who was at least provisionally and by adoption divine. I must confess that I have been rather ardently opposed to the divine kingship theory, but when confronted by this interpretation I was taken aback—for a moment at least.

The explanation of the Messiah by Ringgren can be rather simply stated. The king was the central figure in the pre-exilic New Year's (or Enthronement or Covenant) Festival. As such the king was viewed, like the Mesopotamian and Egyptian kings, as the adopted "son of God," hence sacral and/or divine. But when kingship was no more, the place of the king in the central yearly festival became an eschatological one. At this point the messianic hope of the Old Testament came into being. Ringgren illustrates this by reference to the so-called "Royal Psalms" (principally Ps. 2, 21, 45, 72, 110, 132), to messianic prophecies (Isa. 7, 9, 11; Mic. 5; Jer. 23, 33; Zech. 9), to the royal motifs in the Servant Songs of Deutero-Isaiah, and to the so-called "Servant Psalms" (Ps. 18, 22, 69, 71, 86, 88, 116, 118). In opposition to Zimmerli (cf. above), Ringgren finds the Suffering Servant to be messianic in the royal sense, though a number of details have been borrowed from the Tammuz liturgies. All of this is of extreme interest, but it is not without its somewhat egregious assumptions. In the first place, we cannot be absolutely certain that there was a pre-exilic New Year's (or Enthronement or Covenant) Festival. Secondly, the presumption that the Israelite concept of kingship was the same as that of Mesopotamia and Egypt can be shown from several passages to be at least questionable (e.g. Deut. 17:14-20; Hosea 3:4; 8:4, etc.). Still, if it has done nothing else, this interest in kingship has raised most acutely the issue of the Old Testament background to the Christian affirmation.

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The New Testament Volumes

Theodore R. Rosche [1]

The general excellence of scholarship noted by the reviewer of the Old Testament volumes in this series is evident again in the New Testament studies. These are all serious works based on solid historical study by well-known authors. When particular views are espoused, they are maintained in most cases with ample reference to different interpretations. These facts alone ought to recommend the series.

I. Problems of Single Books

C. A. Pierce, *Conscience in the New Testament* (*No. 15*)

L. E. Elliott-Binns, *Galilean Christianity* (*No. 16*)

G. W. H. Lampe and K. L. Woollcoombe, *Essays in Typology* (*No. 22*)

The thesis of C. A. Pierce's word study on "conscience" is that the source for its use in the New Testament is the popular language of the time. When used in a moral sense it means "remorse" for wrong past actions. The author suggests that Paul took over the word from the Corinthians who were trying to justify their antinomian tendencies in eating meat sacrificed to idols on the plea that such practices caused no remorse. In I Corinthians 8:10 Paul is asking the Corinthians not to bring pangs of remorse on the weaker brethren. Thus, for Pierce, remorse is present in the Christian only when previously made choices have been wrong. How different is this recovered usage in the New Testament from the modern understanding of conscience as a common sense guide to choice! Pierce sees no basis in the New Testament for such a "perversion."

L. E. Elliott-Binns is certain that there existed in early Christianity a group of Galilean Christians "representing the first followers of Jesus, proud of their spiritual past and jealous of the position of Jerusalem" (p. 62), not part either of Jerusalem Christianity or of Gentile Christianity under Paul. Evidence is marshalled from the "primitive" elements in Mark, "Q" and "M" where Elliott-Binns believes he

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[1] *Theodore R. Rosché* is Tutor in New Testament.

sees no christological concern, no special doctrinal significance attached to the death of Jesus, and a close "approximation to Judaism." The letter of James is addressed to Jesus' followers in Galilee soon after his death. But at this point the danger of special pleading seems to appear, for important questions are left unanswered. Could not the "primitive simplicity" of James be based rather on a later presupposed understanding of the person of Jesus as Christ? Is there any *evidence* for a pre-Pauline primitive moralism of the James type (for the *Didache* and *Barnabas* show such a stage much later in Christian development)? Can the absence in James of the typical Gentilean concerns toward Judaism in matters of Law, Sabbath, circumcision, etc., be understood on grounds other than that these struggles have been settled already? Certainly, the line of inquiry is valuable and not new, but it ought to be pursued in more detail.

From within the typology camp come two welcomed statements explaining the reasonableness (G. W. Lampe's essay) and the historical precedents (K. J. Woollcoombe's essay) for typology. Both place typology within the movement reacting against the excessive diversity of the Bible emphasized by much critical scholarship. Both authors feel typology recovers the essential biblical unity which the New Testament writers themselves felt when they treated the Old Testament as a book about Christ in which every part contributed harmoniously to the pattern of typology and prophecy. Both plead for a middle ground between those who deny the importance of typology and those (like Drs. Thornton and Farrer) who expand it to include much that is allegory. G. W. Lampe attempts to limit typology "only to those types which were unmistakably present in the minds of the New Testament writers." (p. 39) But the difficulty with such a position is tacitly admitted when K. J. Woollcoombe acknowledges that the New Testament writers themselves often indulged in allegory which was not true typology. (p. 40) "*Historical*" typology is the only valid typology, by which is meant discerning "historical patterns within the historical framework of revelation." (K. J. Woollcoombe, p. 75) If the delimitations of typology remain somewhat vague from such definitions, its methods have become more clear through copious illustrations in the New Testament and patristics of what both authors consider valid "historical typology." For this we are grateful.

II. The Sacraments and Worship

O. Cullmann, *Baptism in the New Testament* (*No. 1*)
A. J. B. Higgins, *The Lord's Supper in the New Testament* (*No. 6*)
O. Cullmann, *Early Christian Worship* (*No. 10*)
N. Clark, *An Approach to the Theology of the Sacraments* (*No. 17*)

Since O. Cullmann's essay on baptism (No. 1) depends upon material developed in *Early Christian Worship* (No. 10), let us look at the latter first. This study (No. 10) is made up of two translated essays. The first ("Basic Characteristics of the Early Christian Service of Worship") demonstrates that the early Church understood all elements of its worship service to be connected with the Easter appearances of Christ at a meal time. The Day of

the Lord (as contrasted with the Jewish Sabbath), the Lord's Supper, the liturgy and prayer all derived from the Risen Lord. The purpose of the service was to "build up" the Body of Christ. (See Study No. 5) Christ was understood to be present with them in the common meal; speaking with tongues was a manifestation of His future Coming. Only baptism, because of its "once-for-all" significance, was separated from this service. Dr. Cullmann's second essay in *Early Christian Worship* ("The Gospel According to St. John and Early Christian Worship") seeks to demonstrate that John can be understood only from a sacramental point of view. John is tracing the sacramental significance of Jesus' life from his "post-paschal present" viewpoint, which viewpoint provides Cullmann with the exegetical key to passages as John 1:6-8, 19-34; 2:1-11, 12-22; 3:1-21, 22-36, etc. through to 19:34. It cannot be disputed that, for John, the sacraments are rooted in the incarnation and sacrificial death of Jesus. But is this the *only* concern of John? Certainly those who may choose to disagree can not all be "anti-sacramental" Bultmannites as the footnotes seem to indicate. Would John give so much miscellaneous information about these sacraments in such an indirect way without including any specific point of institution for the Lord's Supper or the command to practice baptism? But again we are in Cullmann's debt for rewarding and illuminating exegesis.

O. Cullmann's work on baptism (Study No. 1) develops the above-mentioned thesis that baptism (in contradistinction to the eucharist) was a "once-for-all" sacrament by which the individual inside the community of Christ is related to His death and resurrection. Cullmann concedes that adult baptism was practiced in New Testament times, but sees infant baptism as not incongruous with the essential *doctrine* of baptism. Both forms are biblical insofar as God permits the person baptized, through his "incorporation into the fellowship of the Body of Christ" (p. 70), to take part in the saving event at a specific place. Cullmann's treatment of key passages as I Corinthians 10:1ff; 12:13; Galatians 3:27-28; Romans 6:3ff; and above all Acts 8:36-37 is brilliant.

A. J. B. Higgins interprets the Lord's Supper as a Passover meal at which time Jesus introduced a special explanation of the Cup before the Passover lamb and of the Bread which followed the lamb, relating them to his blood and body, and thereby founding a new Messianic Community. He feels that Jesus intended the disciples annually to perpetuate this rite in order that they remember their salvation brought through Him and anticipate the coming Messianic Meal. However, the resurrection (somehow *not* anticipated by Jesus or his disciples) made the commemoration become a weekly observance. The thesis is well-documented and often convincing. However, this reviewer had great difficulty in finding within Higgins' arguments adequate bases for some positions taken. Where is evidence that the rite was originally intended to be celebrated annually? Why is "for you" in I Corinthians 11:24 "a secondary Hellenization?" (p. 29) What are the "difficulties [of] both language and content" in the mention of "covenent" in Mark 14:24? (p. 32) What *specifically* does the obviously key statement on p. 89 mean: "The 'real presence' was therefore not found in the eucharistic elements, whose role rather was to recall the sacrificial death of Christ as *event?*" (italics are Higgins') The value of this volume lies in opening up rather than in settling crucial debate on the Lord's Supper.

N. Clark seeks an historically based theological meaning for the sacraments deeper than the traditional bifurcated understanding of baptism (as the presence and gift of the Spirit) and the

eucharist (as the presence and gift of the Risen Lord). He pleads very effectively that an excessive and one-sided pneumatological interpretation of baptism often leads on the one hand to a severing of the sacrament from the full redemptive meaning properly attached to it, and on the other hand to a weakening of its personal significance. Similarly, an excessive and one-sided christological interpretation of the eucharist allows "static sacramentalism." One cannot ignore either the Lord or the Spirit in the significance of both sacraments. Separate treatments in chapters entitled "The Significance of Baptism" and "The Significance of the Eucharist" show clearly the common underlying sacramental theology in both. Through baptism the individual lives within the Body of Christ "in fulfillment and unfulfillment" (p. 35); through the eucharist the Church lives between the "*regnum gratiae* [and] . . . the *regnum gloriae*." (p. 70) Such a sacramental theology deserves deep thought.

III. New Testament Theology

F. V. Filson, *The New Testament Against its Environment* (*No. 3*)
J. A. T. Robinson, *The Body* (*No. 5*)
I. Henderson, *Myth in the New Testament* (*No. 7*)
T. Preiss, *Life in Christ* (*No. 13*)

Dr. Filson's volume is well-known already. It is an attempt to assert "the freshness, vitality and originality" of the "Gospel of Christ, the Risen Lord" over against Hellenism and Judaism in three chapter areas. Chapter One ("The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ") argues that the primitive church saw the life, death and resurrection of Jesus as the decisive revelation of God in an unprecedented manner. Chapter Two ("The Fullness of Time") views Christianity as an "historical religion" which sets forth an interpretation of its past and future from the central Christ-event, thereby presenting a new view of history itself which is "time-charged" and "Christ-centered." Chapter Three ("Led by the Spirit") sets forth the uniqueness of the Spirit-filled Community. The total effect of these chapters is overwhelming. Yet a very real problem exists when one tries to unify the multiplicity of religious expressions in the New Testament and to minimize the necessity of the Church to use contemporary religious forms. Often what can result is short shrift to such as C. H. Dodd and R. Bultmann which, though not bad in itself, seems in this case to be based simply on their desire to make "a Greek God . . . a so-to-speak 'docetic God." (p. 53) Certainly this overlooks the careful examination by these scholars of the same New Testament documents as historical records. Such an attempt also can result in the need for constant qualification of generalizations through such phrases as "but on occasion" (p. 95) and "by and large." (p. 91) But by and large this volume shows clearly why Dr. Filson is eminently qualified to be American editor for the New Testament volumes of this library in biblical theology.

J. A. T. Robinson's study is a substantial contribution to Pauline theology in general and Paul's concept of

Soma in particular. It is from the *body* of sin and death that we are delivered; it is through the *body* of Christ on the Cross that we are saved; it is into His *body* the Church that we are incorporated; it is by His *body* in the eucharist that this Community is sustained; it is in our *body* that its new life has been manifested; and it is to a resurrection of this *body* to the likeness of His glorious body that we are destined. (p. 9) For Dr. Robinson Paul's conviction is that the one body of Christ consists of a number of persons. Instead of starting with a plurality and saying that the many are one (as most interpreters do), Paul starts from the unity in Christ and declares that the One is many. Such an emphasis addresses itself directly to the urgent problem of finding oneself within the Community rather than *as an individual* apart from (or even within) the Community. The modern day value of such a treatment is obvious. Certain misgivings arise, however, from Robinson's understanding that Paul's *Soma* has the same unitative meaning as *Basar* in the Old Testament, thus excluding the contemporary Greek distinction between *Sarx* (flesh) and *Soma* (body). It is difficult to believe that if such a distinction did exist Paul did not make use of it and that it should be called a "post-Cartesian" distinction. (p. 12; n. 1)

Ian Henderson has made an important contribution to our understanding of the "demythologizing" controversy in New Testament theology. He has not written a critique of R. Bultmann but rather a fair-minded and sympathetic summary of Bultmann's original essay, *Neues Testament und Mythologie* (since available in H. Bartsch, *Kerygma and Myth*) and the existentialist background from which Bultmann emerged. What impresses one most is that Henderson carefully defines the difficult terminology and presents opposing criticisms by such European theologians as Thielicke and Schniewind (also available in the Bartsch volume in translation). Henderson stresses that Bultmann wishes to eliminate the mythological aspect of the fact of Christ—or rather to reinterpret it in eschatological terms—for the most evangelical of reasons. To do so removes the "stumbling block" which keeps modern man from understanding the Gospel. Such an undertaking, Bultmann feels, requires a distinction between historical (*historisch*) and eschatological (*geschichtlich*) statements about Jesus. But, for Bultmann, *both* types of statements are essential to understand the element of "once-for-allness" (*Einmaligkeit*) in Christianity. One can not help feel that much criticism of demythologization in America is based on a lack of adequate guides of the calibre of Henderson to Bultmann's thought. "There is no point in criticising Bultmann unless we recognize that if he rejects the mythological as it stands, he does not do so because there is no place for the supernatural in his thought. Rather does he reject the mythological because, as he sees it, it does not do justice to the supernatural, that is, to the eschatological fact of Jesus Christ." (p. 56)

T. Preiss' volume is a collection of five essays entitled "Justification in Johannine Thought," "Life in Christ and Social Ethics in the Epistle to Philemon," "The Mystery of the Son of Man," "The Vision of History in the New Testament," and "Was the Last Supper a Paschal Meal?" All are tied together by an overarching concern to preserve the essential eschatological structure of the New Testament in each of these areas. Naturally he is very unhappy about C. H. Dodd and R. Bultmann for the former "dissolves eschatology in a sort of Platonizing idealism" while the latter allows "a sort of existentialist gnosis where history loses meaning." (p. 65) This eschatological concern is developed into a concept of "juridical mysticism" by which the New Testament writers pic-

tured Jesus as obtaining justification for man before God through His act of identification with men. This is "cosmic" rather than individualistic justification; the Church believed it stood between D-Day and V-Day. [Preiss (p. 78) appropriates Cullman's terms here.] The powers of evil have been dealt the decisive blow so that what remains is the return of Christ. Most notable for this reviewer is Preiss' treatment of the Johannine meaning of "Son of Man" which is seen, in spite of all differences in style and expression, to have the very same significance as that of the synoptics. (p. 30) The lucid and often lyrical devotional style of Preiss makes this volume unique.

With the considerations of some of Preiss' essays, we have passed into the last group of volumes: Jesus and the Gospels.

IV. Jesus and the Gospels

R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus* (*No. 12*)
J. Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark* (*No. 21*)
W. G. Kummel, *Promise and Fulfillment* (*No. 23*)

Once again in this series Bultmann and Dodd are the foils against which a significant study is produced. The first main division of R. Fuller's inquiry deals with the tenuous part the life and teachings of Jesus play in the creation of the apostolic message as Bultmann interprets it. For Bultmann the preaching itself is the *datum* rather than the life of Jesus. Fuller sees his task as restoring the balance in favor of "historical inquiry." But in so doing, he recognizes that Bultmann has correctly represented Jesus as the prophet of a kingdom yet to come, thereby pointing up an aspect in the gospels too widely neglected under the influence of Dodd and his "realized eschatology." Fuller, too, rejects Dodd and states his thesis that the *death* of Christ was decisive for the realization of the kingdom. Until the death had taken place the kingdom could be spoken of only in anticipatory terms. Not until the *post*-resurrection Church could one speak of the kingdom as "realized." Thus the "wedge" (p. 120) which Bultmann drives between the proclamation of Jesus and the proclamation of the Church need not be maintained; for Jesus anticipated the kingdom which the Church knew. After an examination of the main titles attributed to Jesus ("the raw material of christology"), Fuller concludes that, if Christ did not make explicit messianic claims for himself, nevertheless he must have viewed his ministry in such a way that the Church's messianic understandings of Jesus were not alien constructions but entirely legitimate; Jesus spoke in anticipatory terms of the messianic significance of his impending death. The wedge has been removed and apostolic preaching is shown as the *inevitable sequel* to the teachings of Jesus from a vantage point after his death. Although one may feel special exegetical pleading in some sections of this volume, the cumulative weight of the argument is indeed impressively gathered.

The volume by J. Robinson could not have been written before (or without) Bultmann but, in this case, the indebtedness to him is more evident than in the previously discussed volume. To Robinson, Mark saw the life of Jesus (*Historie*) from an eschatological perspective (*Geschichte*). The driving force in history for Mark was the divine power of "the end of time,"

operative already in the life of Jesus. Thus Mark presented the life of Jesus as a continuous eschatological action of God (p. 52), prepared by John the Baptist, inaugurated at the Temptation and Baptism, carried through various struggles with Satan until at his death Jesus experienced "the ultimate of historical involvement." The resurrection was a continuation of the same cosmic struggle which began with Jesus. What results is a three-staged view of history in Mark—the time of the prophets, the time of Jesus, and the time of the Church (called "history since 30 A.D."). The former two have in common a prophetic significance (John the Baptist belongs here) but are separated from the last by the resurrection where fulfillment begins; the latter two have in common the struggle of the Spirit against Satan but are separated from the first stage by the decisive victory over Satan which has taken place. (p. 66) However, although the emphasis upon Mark as eschatologically understood history is developed, there are important qualifications put upon Bultmann and the form critics throughout this work. Special attention is rightly paid to the danger of these critics who reduce the end yet to come (the apocalyptic drama) to the Markan understanding of the present. Robinson notes that for Mark the believer was still within history (*Historie*) in a significant sense. The "non-historical life" of Mark 9:43-45 (against Bultmann) is not therefore a description of present historical life, as a comparison with Mark 10:29 clearly shows. We are all indebted to Robinson for a study filled with such incisive treatments.

The final volume by W. Kümmel defies any reviewmanship for it is in a class by itself as far as scope, comprehensive annotation (over forty books in the first seven pages) and detailed exegesis are concerned. It is the third edition (the first in English) of an already significant German work. Kummel is concerned to establish systematically and completely the historical reality of the eschatological message of Jesus. The Kingdom of God is in the "imminent future," but the particular relationship of the coming Day of judgment of the Son of Man with which the Kingdom is to be identified (p. 43) is not specifically equated with Jesus. Rather, the eschatological Day will judge a man according to the attitude he has taken towards Jesus in his present guise, for "it is the same Jesus with whom a man has to establish a relationship *in the present* [italics not Kümmel's] before whom he will have to justify himself in the future." (p. 39) The parables all urge preparedness for this eschatological coming of the Son of Man. Thus Mark 13 speaks to definite events *previous* to the end, limited to "this generation." The passion predictions are not *vaticinium ex eventu* for Jesus saw his suffering as the "sign to this generation, although, on the other hand, "no evidence can be found in Jesus' sayings" (p. 73) which would link his death and the atoning death of the Suffering Servant. His suffering and resurrection are not to be placed side by side in point of time with the parousia for Jesus expected an interval between his death and the parousia. (p. 64) Although he used apocalyptic concepts, Jesus did not offer apocalyptic teaching but an eschatological message—"that in [him] the Kingdom of God came into being and in him it will be consumated." (p. 155) Enough has now been said to indicate the particular hobby horses he has rocked and the careful examination which this volume ought to (and probably will) receive. In this reviewer's opinion, the best has been saved for the last.

It is obvious at once that some of these volumes are more significant than others for "biblical theology" in the strict sense. Some will make more substantial contributions to the New Testament area than others. But they are *all* first-rate studies. In the concluding words of the Old Testament reviewer, "What more do you want?"

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He That Cometh[1]

Walter Harrelson[2]

This is the most thorough study of Israelite Messianism and related conceptions since the publication of Hugo Gressmann's *Der Messias.*[3] It is a very significant and helpful book for the student of Bible and of theology. Few new ideas or theories are developed in it (an exception is the author's latest interpretation of the figure of the Suffering Servant in II Isaiah). It is not, therefore, a highly original contribution to biblical scholarship. Professor Mowinckel has already indicated in earlier publications his views on the origin of Israelite Messianism and its relationship to kingship in the ancient Near East and in Israel. Here, however, he has set forth these views in detail and in a masterful way. Thus the book may be as important for biblical scholars and theologians as some "new" interpretation of Messianism might have been, since in a single volume the entire subject has received such a thorough reassessment and has been presented with such attractiveness and lucidity. Mowinckel has brought clarity into a rather confused situation and has paved the way for more fruitful investigations which might, as a result of his work, be addressed to the correct problems and to the most promising areas of study.

The author's thesis is adumbrated in the twofold division of the book. The first part is entitled "The Future King in Early Jewish Eschatology." (pp. 1-257) The second part deals with "The Messiah in Later Judaism." (pp. 261-450) The reader is therefore prepared to find a discussion of the place of kingship in the eschatology of early Judaism and to discover that the Messiah, while related to the royal figures of the early period, is a product of late Judaism. The reader will not be disappointed in this expectation.

Certain of Mowinckel's definitions are of critical importance for the understanding and assessment of his work. Eschatology is defined as follows:

> Eschatology is a doctrine or a complex of ideas about 'the last things,' which is more or less organically coherent and developed. Every eschatology includes in some form or other

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[1] Sigmund Mowinckel, Tr. G. W. Anderson. *Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1956. xvi-528 pp., $6.50.*

Originally published in Norwegian under the title *Hans som kommer* (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1951).

[2] *Walter Harrelson* is Associate Professor of Old Testament, Federated Theological Faculty, and Dean, Divinity School, University of Chicago.

[3] Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1929.

> a dualistic conception of the course of history, and implies that the present state of things and the present world order will suddenly come to an end and be superceded by another of an essentially different kind. (p. 125)

Normally eschatology also thinks of this new order as a return to the original state of things. It views the movement of history as a drama of a universal and cosmic sort. At the end, supernatural powers, divine or demonic, intervene in a catastrophic way to effect the transformation of existence which is depicted in eschatological documents. (pp. 125-126)

Such a view of eschatology enables the author to argue that there is *no* eschatology in Israel or in the surrounding cultures (apart from Persia) until the period following the Exile. The "day of the Lord" in the prophets is simply a reference to the day of Yahweh's epiphany in the festival of the New Year. II Isaiah does not contain an eschatology, although he has prepared the way for one by the manner in which he has loosed the future hope of Israel from historical reality and has given to this hope an absolute character. (p. 154) Nor do Haggai and Zechariah present an eschatology. Rather, they speak of the restoration of the line of David in history. The so-called Royal Psalms are not eschatological. They refer to the ideal king who is to come to restore the fortunes of Israel. The coronation of the new king is always an auspicious time just because this particular king may be the true, the ideal king of Israel.

The above conclusions are drawn as a summary presentation of the place of the king in the ancient Near Eastern cultures and a fresh analysis of the major Old Testament texts. The author is dependent upon Henri Frankfort and René Labat, whose views he finds particularly helpful. He also deals with the views on Engnell and Widengren appreciatively, but is critical in particular of the rather rigid pattern drawn by these scholars from quite diverse cultures and documents. Following the lead of Frankfort he insists that kingship in Egypt is sharply to be distinguished from kingship in Babylonia and Assyria. The king in the latter countries is a man, but not a mere man. His designation as king carries with it the role of a special agent of the god. In fact, he may be designated as divine in certain instances. Mowinckel supposes that it was the occasional king who was considered the bridegroom of the goddess who in particular claimed to be divine and had the divine ideogram placed before his name. (p. 43)

In Israel kingship is introduced under the influence of Canaanite conceptions, which are in turn adaptations of the notions prevailing especially in the Mesopotamiam area. But the old nomadic ideal serves to give to Israelite kingship a quite distinctive character and meaning. The anointed king of Israel indeed has holy or even divine characteristics. But he is a man among other men none the less. The king is endowed with Yahweh's spirit, which makes him a true representative of God to the people. He is the one charged with providing peace, righteousness, blessing, strength in warfare, and wisdom. But in the course of time the king's role of representing the people before God comes to be of more significance than that of representing the divine powers to the people.

Mowinckel summarizes the evidence which points to the place of the king in the Israelite cultus. Here he finds the background for later Jewish Messianism. So long as there is a king on the throne of Judah performing those actions by which the relationship between God and man is maintained, there is no occasion, no need for a Messiah. In this connection another of his definitions which is of fundamental significance for a comprehension of his study is presented:

The Messiah is the future, eschatological realization of the ideal of king ship. (p. 156)

In the pre-Exilic period the author finds that the historical aspect of Israelite faith which grew out of the early notions of election and covenant has led to the development of an ideal view of kingship. Each king was judged in light of this ideal, and there developed the hope in a future king who would conform in all respects with this ideal. But so long as the king continued to function in the cult of Judah in Jerusalem there was always the possibility that this ideal king might arise.

Before the ideal kingship could become the expectation of a future Messiah, it had to be separated from those possibilities which were associated with the next festival and the next king, yet never realized. (p. 157)

Only two of the so-called eschatological passages in the prophetic literature are considered by the author to be pre-Exilic: Isaiah 7:10-14 and Isaiah 9:1-6. Both of these refer, however, not to the Messiah but to the future ideal king. The other passages in the prophets and the psalms which are generally treated as eschatological are later depictions of the future king who is to come. They provide the soil out of which Messianism has developed but they are not Messianic. Messianism presupposes eschatology. Eschatology presupposes a dualistic world-view. The prophets, however, and Israelite faith in general had a this-worldly orientation. Israel had been called out to live as the children of God in this age and to be God's instrument in his blessing of all the families of the earth.

Yet the conviction with which the Israelite community held on to the notions of election and covenant led it to develop a picture of kingship out of which Messianism, under the influence of a dualistic world-view appeared.

Mowinckel presents his most distinctive contribution in this volume in the chapter entitled "The Servant of the Lord." (pp. 187-257) After a detailed re-examination of the problems connected with the interpretation of the Servant Songs, he proposes the following solution: the Suffering Servant of the Songs is a second or third generation disciple of II Isaiah. This man, who probably lived in Palestine, took up the message of his master and deepened it. Through his own life, marked by suffering, disease, and ignominy, he discerned the work of God. God was bringing all these upon him for His own purposes. His suffering was vicarious and redemptive and would be the means by which Israel and the nations would turn to Yahweh in true conversion. After this disciple of II Isaiah had died, his own circle (perhaps one member of it in particular) came to see the significance of their master's life and death. This circle (and perhaps in part the Servant himself) then set forth the meaning of the Servant's life and death and came to expect his return from the grave, his exaltation among the nations, and the conversion of all peoples through the atoning work of the God through the Servant. (see especially pp. 248-257)

In later Judaism the author finds the appearance of the dualistic world-view, no doubt under Persian influences. This world-view provides a different setting for the future hope. The ideal king now becomes the king of the last day, when this age comes to its close and the new age dawns. The Messiah is an earthly figure, supernaturally endowed by God for the accomplishment of his task. This task consists in the restoration of Israel and the provision for just those blessings formerly associated with the Israelite king. The Messiah does not forgive sins. In some documents, as is well known, he accomplishes his work and then dies. There is no identification between the Messiah and God, and even the term

"Son of God" does not seem to have been widely employed in late Judaism, if at all. If the term were employed in pre-Christian sources it was no doubt understood in light of certain psalms (especially Psalm 2) as adoption, in line with the notion of the king as the adopted son of God. There is no connection, Mowinckel maintains, between the Messiah and the Suffering Servant in Jewish sources.

Under the same dualistic influence, and under the influence of the "primeval man" mythology, there develops the figure of the Son of Man. While the Son of Man in Daniel 7 clearly refers to Israel, the author of Daniel in various ways reveals his dependence for this conception on the notion of an eschatological figure who will appear at the end-time, destroy the wicked, and restore the righteous to their rightful place in the new age. The Son of Man is also described in other texts as having been present with God from the beginning. He has been held in readiness for his work at the last day.

Judaism quite naturally identified the Son of Man with the Messiah in some instances. But the two were originally entirely distinct conceptions. The eschatology associated with the Son of Man is of a much more cosmic, transcendental sort than that first associated with the Messiah. In Judaism, the nationalistic, political features of the Messiah were frequently conferred upon the Son of Man. Closely associated with the view of the Son of Man in Judaism was the notion of the resurrection. The resurrection is sometimes spoken of as the direct work of God, and no doubt this is the most commonly held view; however, the Son of Man is also an agent in the resurrection of the dead.

Yet it is clear that there is no suggestion that the Son of Man was to suffer and die to atone for man's sins. Mowinckel argues that there is no more than a use of certain phraseology from the Servant Songs in the descriptions of the Son of Man. (p. 411)

Mowinckel presents a full catalogue of the respective features of the Anthropos myths and the Son of Man (pp. 427-431), on the basis of which he concludes that the figures of Anthropos and Son of Man must both have arisen under the influence of the ancient conceptions of the "primordial man." But the Son of Man in Judaism has taken on quite distinctive features as well. Just as the king-ideology of the surrounding cultures has been modified and transformed by the notions of election and covenant, so also has the figure of the Son of Man. This is particularly true in his identification with the Messiah in some texts. He is also historicized all the more completely by his identification with the first man, Adam.

Mowinckel's work concludes with a summary statement of Jesus' relation to the Messiah, the Son of Man, and the Suffering Servant. The term Messiah is almost always rejected by Jesus. He rather prefers the term Son of Man. This term takes on its radically new meaning in the fusion of the two figures, Son of Man and Suffering Servant. The pre-existent, heavenly one will be humiliated, will suffer and die. Here the paradox of the Christian faith is stated with all its force—and Mowinckel sees the paradox as having its place "in the soul and consciousness of Jesus Himself." (p. 450)

The above sketch of this significant book by no means provides an adequate picture of its actual worth. From beginning to end it is a sober and searching treatment of the history and development of the major conceptions by which the New Testament writers have sought to depict the person and work of Jesus the Christ. The volume also contains fourteen Additional Notes, a lengthy bibliography, and three sets of indexes. The translator has done a superb job of rendering the volume into English. His accuracy is assured by the tribute of the author,

who has dedicated the volume to him. The American publisher also deserves the highest commendation for the way in which the work has been produced. The reviewer has found only one error in the entire volume: the omission of "we" on page 251, line six from the bottom.

On one point the reviewer is in basic disagreement with the author. While the author has over and again pointed out the influence of the old covenant faith of early Israel upon the ideas of kingship and the like which are borrowed from the surrounding cultures, he has not, in the reviewer's judgment, adequately assessed the significance of the historical dimension of Israelite faith for the notion of the future king. On pp. 151-152 the author points out the decisive character of the Israelite view that God had come to save in the event of the Exodus; that here he had disclosed his purpose for Israel and for the nations in such a way that this purpose stood sure. History had a goal, and this goal was to be realized, even despite the faithlessness of God's people.

Now it is precisely because of this notion of purpose in history that the Israelite traced back the work of God to the creation, and also looked forward to the coming fulfillment of the promise of God. Just as there was a beginning, so also was there to be an end. The end was to be effected through the designated agent of God, the king from the line of David. It consisted of much more than the restoration of the fortunes of Israel. It meant more than the fulfillment of the earthly, human ideals of the Israelite people. It involved the transformation of life, the restoration of harmony within history and in nature—at the end. Thus I cannot accept the view that there was no eschatology until the appearance of a fully-developed dualistic world-view. The definition of eschatology is too narrow to accommodate the forward-moving purpose of God to complete, in a definitive way, the work among men which has its center in God's entrance into the historical life of Israel and is traced both backward and forward to encompass the totality of historical existence.

The author has pointed out convincingly the weaknesses in those theories of a common oriental eschatology which were presented, among others, by Gressmann. He has very properly corrected the tendency to find a common ideology of kingship which was only slightly modified in its Israelite setting. But he has not given due place to the impulse to a total fulfillment of the work of God among men and within nature which is documented in just those Old Testament passages which have traditionally been designated as "messianic." It is not sufficient, in the reviewer's judgment, to see more than the background for an eschatological world-view in the pictures drawn of the ideal king. In fact, the author's new solution to the problem of the Servant Songs actually demonstrates that the disciple of II Isaiah (according to his view) is described in royal terms. It is not defensible, therefore, to see in this new picture of God's fulfillment of his purpose in history a connection with the images of the future king who is in fact the King of the End-Time? In short, if Israel believed in the Creator, so also did she believe in the Redeemer, the one who fulfilled the purpose of creation. But fulfillment, in any adequate meaning of the term, means a total fulfillment. Israel did not have to await the appearing of the doctrine of the two ages in order to affirm the definitive character of God's completion of his work among men.

The Complaint Against the Gods [1]

Robert McAfee Brown [2]

That C. S. Lewis is one of the most prolific writers of our generation need not be argued. Over the past fifteen years he has turned out a variety of books, some good, some bad, some brilliant. In addition to solid pieces of research in his field of professional competence, English literature, he has written a number of small books of Christian apologetics, a couple of avowedly "theological" works, a trilogy of science-fiction for adults, seven books of fairy stories for children that are absolutely tops, and now a novel, one of the most creative of the whole lot.

Lewis is at his best when, as here, he is getting at theological material indirectly. He is least effective, I feel, when he is trying to play the part of the overt theologian, as he does, for example, in *Miracles*, a highly unsatisfactory book in which Lewis wins his argument only by demolishing a straw man naturalist who exists nowhere save in Lewis' imagination, and whose overthrow is not therefore a matter of particular moment for the rest of us. However, when Lewis turns loose his undoubted gifts of fantasy, imagination and ingenuity, he writes in a way which catches the reader unawares, and suddenly brings him up short with the realization that something important has been happening to him during the reading of the book.

A Myth Revised

There are, for example, legitimate (and illegitimate) complaints against the gods, which have been a part of the human protest as long as men have recognized their less than totally autonomous status in the universe. In *Till We Have Faces*, Lewis voices a good many of these complaints, through a retelling of the ancient myth of Psyche (borrowed with a few changes from Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*). Part I, which is at least four times as long as Part II, tells the story and recites the complaints. Part II, which is at least four times as important as Part I,

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[1] **TILL WE HAVE FACES,** BY C. S. LEWIS. *New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957. 313 pp., $4.50.*

[2] *Robert McAfee Brown* is Auburn Associate Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion and is giving a course in Christian Faith and Contemporary Literature.

revises the complaints and gives some indication of the answer of the gods to the charges. The significant thing about reading Part II is that the reader does not feel that he has been "had"; Part II is not just a moral tacked on to the end to make things properly "religious." Rather, as the increasing self-awareness of the narrator becomes apparent, the increasing depth of the whole book, as a recital of human character in process of formation, likewise becomes apparent. Lewis does not try to "sneak in" Christianity (the entire tale is in a pagan setting), but what he writes about the human situation of all men everywhere helps the Christian to a greater understanding of his own faith, and of his own particular perversions of it.

The best way to indicate the communicative power of the book will be to recall the story, and see what Lewis does with it.

The purpose of the writer, Orual, queen of Glome, through whose eyes we see the action, is to accuse the gods. Why she feels entitled to accuse the gods gradually becomes clear. At the start of the tale her father is king, angry because he has two daughters but no son to succeed him. He takes another wife and propitiates the local deity, Ungit, in the hope of having a son. Ungit fails him, for a daughter is born, Istra, or Psyche. Psyche grows up in the palace with Orual and the other sister, Redival, and the three of them are taught by a Greek slave, called the Fox, who represents Greek culture at its rational and urbane best. Psyche is beautiful. The ugly Orual loves Psyche and is almost a mother to her. Psyche's mother having died in childbirth.

There comes a famine in the land. Psyche walks abroad, and appears to the people to have the gift of healing; they look upon her as Ungit in mortal shape. But the plague gets worse, Psyche is blamed, and instead of being called a goddess, she is now called "the Accursed." The priest of Ungit claims her as a sacrifice for Ungit, for when mortals ape the gods and steal the worship due to the gods, then the gods are angered.

No Escape from the Gods

So Psyche is taken to a holy place on the mountain, shackled to a sacred tree and left to die. And here arises part of Orual's bitterness against the gods: first, that they took Psyche from her; second, that they did not let her have a final reconciliation with Psyche before the latter's death; and third, that Psyche was carried off gilded and painted for sacrifice in a procession in which Orual could not take part. Orual decides that the gods are cruel and that there is no escape from them.

> There is no escape from them into sleep or madness, for they can pursue you into them with dreams. Indeed you are then most at their mercy. The nearest thing we have to a defence against them (but there is no real defence) is to be very wide awake and sober and hard at work, to hear no music, never to look at earth or sky, and (above all) to love no one.

Anything in life that is good, makes one vulnerable, and exposes one to sorrow. Truly, the gods are cruel.

Later, Orual determines that at the very least she can go up the mountain and bury whatever remains of Psyche's body. She goes first with Bardia, a trusted soldier, a matter-of-fact man of great common sense, who is very important to Orual's later story. They find nothing at the sacrificial spot. Nothing. Finally a ruby along the ground leads them to a valley, and there, on the other side of a tiny stream . . . stands Psyche.

Orual, recovered from her shock crosses over the stream and hears Psyche's story. Psyche had been rescused by a god, taken to the beautiful palace in which they are now sitting,

ministered to by many servants, and is now the bride of a god, who visits her each night under cover of darkness, but upon whose face she may not gaze.

There is a total misunderstanding. For Orual sees no palace. (This is one of Lewis' changes in the original story.) She is sure that Psyche is being tricked by someone who has built a legend of fantasy in which Psyche has believed. She determines to resuce Psyche and bring her back to reality. But Psyche will not go. She prefers her world (which to her is obviously not make-believe) and she loves her lover. She will not leave him even for Orual. Orual leaves, dazed, not sure what to do, and goes back to Glome to think further. Just before leaving she turns around, and for a moment she too sees the palace in all of its splendor. But in a moment the picture disappears, and there is just forest again. Did she really see it, or was she deceived? She cannot tell.

And this is another strand in the complaint against the gods. Why did they not make it clear one way or the other? Was Psyche deceived, or was Orual deceived? Why do the gods hint, rather than telling us outright? Why don't they guide us plainly?

Orual, the vision notwithstanding, determines that Psyche must be rescued. Bardia's opinion in the matter is that Psyche has been captured by a Shadowbrute, and is thus in the power of an evil spirit. But Bardia doesn't want to get involved: "I think the less Bardia meddles with the gods, the less they'll meddle with me." The Fox has another answer. He, of course, does not believe "the poets' lies about the gods," and says that Psyche has been deluded by a vagabond who is keeping her captive with the fantasy, coming under cover of darkness so that his plot will not be betrayed. In either case, Orual decides—Shadowbrute or vagabond—Psyche must be rescued. She goes back to the mountain, and on threat of killing herself, persuades Psyche to put her lover to the test, by lighting a lamp that night and looking at his face. In sadness, Psyche agrees, though as she says, "Whatever comes after, something that was between us dies here."

The Judgment of the Gods

Psyche does the deed and thereby brings catastrophe upon herself. The god (for such it was) must now put her out of the palace, and condemn her to a life of wandering across the earth, fulfilling well-nigh impossible tasks in penance for her lack of trust. The god appears to Orual, not in anger, but with "passionless and measureless rejection . . . He rejected, denied, answered, and (worst of all) he knew, all I had thought, done or been." He tells her that Psyche must now go into exile, to hunger and thirst and tread hard roads, and concludes, "You also shall be Psyche." And Orual hears the weeping of Psyche, weeping she has caused and is powerless to comfort. There is nothing for her to do but return home and await her own destruction.

But the destruction does not come. Orual returns to Glome, and decides that she will go veiled, as a kind of treaty with her ugliness (and also, one suspects, as a kind of penance enacted by one upon whose face a god has looked in judgment). She realizes that rather than being doomed to die, she is doomed to live. Soon she becomes queen. She is a good queen, she is an efficient queen, she is a masculine queen. She drives out whatever femininity she had, and becomes an expert swordsman. Legends grow up about her, particularly after she defeats Prince Argan in mortal combat. She has a reign of peace, prosperity and progress.

After the death of the Fox, Orual decides to go on a journey. And this opens up a wound she had almost healed by years of busyness. For in a distant land she discovers a temple to a new goddess, Istra. The priest of Istra

tells her Psyche's story, and he tells it all wrong. He tells about a sister who saw the palace of Psyche, who was jealous, and who brought about Psyche's downfall, condemning her to wander the face of the world, treading hard roads.

This is the last straw. Orual determines to write down her charges against the gods. For in this charge that she was jealous of Psyche is the proof that the gods have not only laughed at her, but have spat in her face. She must expose them. For if the gods had revealed themselves clearly, and not ambiguously, there would have been no need for a sad tale about Psyche. Orual demands "a different world, a world in which the gods show themselves clearly and don't torment men with glimpses, nor unveil to one what they hide from another, nor ask you to believe what contradicts your eyes and ears and nose and tongue and fingers."

So here, then, is the final culminating charge against the gods, with which the first part of the book ends, a stirring, human and natural indictment:

> They gave me nothing in the world to love but Psyche and then took her away from me. But that was not enough. They then brought me to her at such a place and time that it hung on my word whether she should continue in bliss or be cast out into misery. They would not tell me whether she was the bride of god, or mad, or a brute's or villain's spoil. They would give no clear sign, thought I begged for it. I had to guess. And because I gussed wrong they punished me; what's worse, punished me through her . . . I say the gods deal very unrightly with us. For they will neither (which would be best of all) go away and leave us to live our own short days to ourselves, nor will they show themselves openly to us and tell us what they would have us do. For that too would be endurable. But to hint and hover, to draw near us in dreams and oracles, or in a waking vision that vanishes as soon as seen, to be dead silent when we question them and then glide back and whisper (words we cannot understand) in our ears when we most wish to be free of them, and to show to one what they hide from another; what is all this but cat-and-mouse play, blindman's bluff, and mere jugglery? Why must holy places be dark places?
>
> I say, therefore, that there is no creature (toad, scorpion, or serpent) so noxious to man as the gods. Let them answer my charge if they can. It may well be that instead of answering, they'll strike me mad or leprous or turn me into beast, bird, or tree. But will not all the world then know (and the gods will know it knows) that this is because they have no answer?

End of Part I. End, presumably, of the complaint against the gods.

And a powerful complaint it is. Compressed into these two paragraphs, Orual has voiced not only her own complaint, but the timeless complaint of all ages against the gods. Why do they give no clear sign? Why do they hint and hover? Why can't they simply leave us alone? (That we could easily endure.) Why can't they show themselves openly? (That, too, we could endure, for with all its concomitant terror, it would at least show us clearly what was demanded of us.)

The Force of the Complaint

At this point, the non-Christian reader will applaud the fulness of the Charge. The Christian reader must feel within himself the force of the charge. For the charge is not easily disposed of. We cannot say, "The complaints have been answered, and it's all clear, now that Christ has come." This is too cheap an answer. For in one sense, the

fact of the Incarnation only heightens the intensity of the complaint. Christ does *not* make it "a sure thing." His revelation does not reveal fully, totally, transparently. It too can be rejected, denied, dismissed as illusion, just as Orual dismissed Psyche's palace. He gives us no "sure" sign. Why should we believe that God has become incarnate in a carpenter's son? Why should we look for him, of all places, among the Jews? Why should we expect to find divine love in the midst of the shame, the filth, and (as Charles Williams has said) the obscenity of a first-century crucifixion? Orual's complaint is not a complaint that we can dispose of by pointing to the God of Christian faith. From one point of view, the God of Christian faith is a God who forces us to rewrite the complaint in italics.

There is, however, an answer given to Orual. Part of the answer involves a redrafting of the complaint. The answer is described by Lewis in much more compressed form, and it cannot have the same tightly knit and matter-of-fact treatment as the statement of the complaint. The answer comes in visions and hints, but it *is* an answer.

No sooner has Orual set down her full story, than she realizes that it is not, in fact, her full story. She has been very selective. She has written in a way that will show her in the most favorable light. But other interpretations of her story, which she thought she had successfully smothered, now come crowding to the surface. The writing of the book (i.e. Part I) was "only to prepare me for the gods' surgery. They used my own pen to probe my wound." She discovers, for example, that she sinned against Redival, her sister whom she disliked, by disregarding her. In giving herself so totally to Psyche's upbringing, Orual created a terrible and twisted knot in the heart of Redival. For years she had "used" Bardia, drawing too heavily on his time and energy, so that Bardia's home life had been ruined. She wore him out with the demands of state, and thus caused his premature death. It is no wonder that Bardia's wife has little but contempt for Orual.

This reassessment of her life forces her to reassess the gods. Ungit, for example. In a dream, it becomes clear to her that in a real sense she is Ungit, "gorged with men's stolen lives." The discovery is overpowering. She determines to drown herself. She goes to the river, straps her ankles together, and is about to hop in, when a voice, the voice of a god, says, "Do not do it." There is no rebellion left in her and she hops out.

Very well, being Ungit, and thus ugly in soul, she must change her ugly soul into a fair one. This she will do, the gods being her helpers. But how can one, by the mere willing of it, change an ugly soul into a fair one? It can't be done, not even thirty minutes at a stretch—as she bitterly discovers: "I could mend my soul no more than my face. Unless the gods helped. And why did the gods not help?"

In this impasse, Orual has some more visions. She is in a field. The gods' rams are running through the field, and a single golden fleck from their sides will make her beautiful in soul. But as she approaches them they force her back and trample her down. She sees a woman in another part of the field, picking up flecks of gold that the rams have left in the thorns during their charge on Orual. "She won without effort what utmost effort would not win for me." So Orual cannot win her way by effort into a satisfactory relationship with the gods.

The Real Complaint

In another vision, significantly a vision of the desert, she is finally led to a judgment hall where she can once more voice her complaint. She stands

absolutely naked before the court. There will be no pretences here. And at this point the *real* complaint against the gods comes out, with devastating clarity. The earlier complaint, the one we all make, is not the true complaint. We use it as a device to hide from ourselves the *real* nature of our complaint against the gods. For the real complaint is one of jealousy. The gods are our rivals. They take the ones we love best.

> It would be far better for us if you were foul and ravening. We'd rather you drank their blood than stole their hearts. We'd rather they were ours and dead than yours and made immortal. But to steal her love from me, to make her see things I couldn't see . . .
>
> There's no room for you and us in the same world. You're a tree in whose shadow we can't thrive. We want to be our own . . . What should I care for some horrible, new happiness which I hadn't given her and which separated her from me? Do you think I wanted her to be happy that way? . . . Do you ever remember whose the girl was? She was mine. *Mine;* do you not know what the word means? Mine! You're thieves, seducers. . . .

Now this is a very different matter. This is the real complaint. And where we found it easy to identify with Orual's earlier complaint, we are much more reluctant to do so in this case. We are quite prepared to be sophisticated about our doubts, but to concede that they might come from a bitterness at the extent to which the divine interferes with life—that is something else again. It sounds uncomfortably like something we would prefer to examine no further.

But Orual has examined further and voiced her own bitterest objections. She who was "faceless" for so many years with the wearing of the veil, has now been stripped naked in body and in soul, the veil across her life removed. And as she herself can confess, "The complaint was the answer. To hear myself making it was to be answered." She has finally been forced to utter the speech which had lain at the center of her soul for years. She discovers that what we *really are* must be "dug out of us" before we can face the gods.

> I saw well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can be dug out of us [the word which is really ourselves], why should they hear the babble that we think we mean? How can they meet us face to face till we have faces?

The gods will give answers only to honest, naked charges. Not while we are faceless, superficial, hypocritical or sophisticated, will they deal with us. Our words can form a barrier to our understanding. Even the Fox, dead but present at the judgment, understands this, and sees that this has been his sin—to substitute words for reality, maxims for truth, philosophy for transforming power.

Beyond Justice

But Orual's judgment is not yet over, although her insight has considerably increased. The Fox takes her further on, consoling her with the thought that at least she "will not get justice." The gods (thank God) are not just, for "what would become of us if they were?" So there must be a salvation beyond justice. And there is.

The Fox takes her to a place where she has a re-vision of her previous visions. (Interestingly enough, the Greek, while he cannot bring about her salvation, is at least a tutor unto salvation.) Orual sees someone by a river, strapping her ankles, about to hop in and drown. It is Psyche. "Don't do it," Orual calls to the picture, and Psyche unties her ankles and goes away. She sees Psyche approaching a field to get some golden wool from the god's rams. Psyche cannot get near them, but suddenly the rams turn upon another in-

truder and trample her down. As they charge, flecks of fleece come off on the thorns, and Psyche gleans them without effort.

So it goes. Psyche, Orual. The one helping the other. The other helping the one. At times, in her travellings, Psyche seems almost happy. The Fox explains that it is because "Another bore nearly all the anguish." The other was Orual. Orual bore the anguish, Psyche achieved the tasks. The Fox asks almost mockingly, "Would you rather have had justice?"

Here is a theme writ large across human history, but perhaps visible in all of its splendid clarity only to those who have seen it writ largest of all at one particular place in human history —the theme of substituted love, of men and women, and gods, taking upon one another the bearing of burdens too great to be borne alone. Psyche bore much for Orual, through her wandering and toil and anguish, but Orual, without knowing it, bore much for Psyche. "She bore much for you then," the Fox tells Orual, "You have borne something for her since." And with this comes the glad news, the only truly redeeming and transforming news, "the Divine Nature can change the past."

Psyche and Orual finally meet face to face. The pictures and images and vision are over now. There need be no more deception, so Orual can now say in utter honesty, "I never wished you well, never had one selfless thought of you. I was a craver." But since the bearing of burdens can work both ways, and must be reciprocal, more happens than merely the recognition of the past. As Orual has borne part of the pain for Psyche, so that Psyche can accomplish the tasks set before her, now Orual is made beautiful as a result of the tasks Psyche has accomplished. Psyche's journeys have led her to that which will remake Orual into a thing of beauty. Orual looks into the pool and sees two Psyches, both beautiful (though that really doesn't matter so much now). The great voice which had once said the dreadful word to her, "You also are Psyche," now says the blessed word to her, "You also are Psyche." She is in the presence of the god, and now the presence is one not of judgment, but of mercy.

The Answer

Part I had ended with the words "No answer." The gods can give no answer to the charges we bring against them. But when the true nature of the charges has been exposed, and we see ourselves as we truly are (and thus begin to see the gods as they truly are), then the entire situation has been changed.

> I know now, Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer. Before your face questions die away. What other answer would suffice?

"How can the gods meet us face to face till we have faces?" Orual asked earlier in her judgment. She sees now that they cannot. But when the veil is stripped away, God himself is the answer. "I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear," said another Orual, making complaint against the gods, "But now mine eyes seeth thee." And that is enough.

The complaint against the gods sounds eminently reasonable, until we recognize that it is not our real complaint, but an evasion of our real complaint. And for those who enter vicariously with Orual into the complaint which is made without a veil, it may be that there can be granted vicariously the salvation which came to her.

Book Reviews

WE WITNESS TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF COOPERATIVE HOME MISSIONS, BY ROBERT T. HANDY. *New York, Friendship Press, 1956. xiv-273 pp., $4.00.*

Dr. Handy's volume has an importance which is at least threefold. It is difficult to imagine an alert and responsible churchman who will not discover his interest claimed by one or more of these three aspects.

Its major purpose is indicated in the sub-title. It tells the story of Protestant collaboration in a phase of American church life of which many of us are woefully ignorant: "home missions." But, as Dr. Hermann Morse points out in his *Introduction,* it is more than that. "It is a valuable contribution to understanding of the whole cooperative movement that has been such a significant feature of Protestant church history in this century." However, it is more than even that. Here is a vivid, informative and arresting account of the movement of Christianity across the continent and among the neediest and most neglected segments of the national population. "The home mission movement . . . was largely directed toward the evangelization and churching of the frontier . . . an aspect of national expansion westward . . . the religious version of the geographical occupancy of the continent . . . the effort to make America more Christian." It is estimated that four-fifths of the congregations of the evangelical churches are of home missionary origin. In following this development, the reader is drawn into a new understanding of his own Christian origins and inheritance.

To be sure, as the national scene changed, the focus alters. With the influx of immigrant tides, and the onset of urbanization and industrialization, the "frontier" shifted to the city slums and to special groups—Indians, Negroes, Eskimos, Orientals, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Mormons, Jews. Home missions continued to represent American Christianity in pioneering and prophetic outreach.

Dr. Handy reminds us that three strands were inwoven into the chronicle he relates. The "evangelical motif" was earliest and always predominant; home missions were an expression of the revivalism which was such a prominent feature of Nineteenth Century America. The "cooperative impulse" is the particular object of his attention. But the "social emphasis" was always present. One of the most interesting and illuminating aspects of the history is the interplay of the first and third emphases. Home missions attempted and succeeded in holding together in mutual enrichment and correction evangelism and the social gospel.

A word must be said in praise of the competence and craftsmanship of the author. A vast mass of complicated historical data has been sifted, organized and set forth in balanced perspective. And the whole complex development is presented with notable clarity and engaging charm.

Inevitably, the major purpose to furnish American church history with a comprehensive and authoritative conspectus of home missionary cooperation dominates. Events and persons are described which are indispensable for

the record but of secondary interest to the casual reader. But attention to detail is never permitted to obscure the main outlines or clog the sweep of the narrative.

Here is, at once, an invaluable addition to the still short shelf of the history of ecumenical Christianity and a fascinating and challenging introduction to the seedplot of American Protestantism.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

THE INTEGRITY OF PREACHING, BY JOHN KNOX. *Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1957. 96 pp., $1.75.*

Those who, like this reviewer, are convinced that Protestantism minus a strong Biblical proclamation from its pulpits deserves no future are encouraged by the current trend in our seminaries. The renewal of the doctrines of Church and Bible has come in time to deliver us from suicide in a swamp of sentiment and shallow topicality. We have now reached the point, however, when it is no longer enough to hear the exhortation to "preach Biblically." We want to know what this means.

The value of Dr. Knox's book is that he has explored the meaning of this injunction. He shows in a penetrating analysis the difference between preaching that merely *sounds* Biblical and that which is truly a proclamation of the Word. He stresses throughout his book the need for the Biblical event to become *actual*, and we are offered some thought-provoking criteria for judging how this can be done. He speaks of the importance of the characteristic Biblical ideas in "the concrete context of the Church's tradition and life," and especially of the central Biblical event—the life, death and resurrection of Christ. It is along this line of thought that preachers will be helped to avoid the deadness of historicism on the one hand and the shallowness of contemporary comment on the other. Dr. Knox has a health-giving conception of how the Biblical events can become contemporary by the power of the Spirit in the fellowship of the Church.

The book has excellent things to say on the personal nature of preaching and on its setting in worship. One crucial problem for the preacher is brought out again in these pages although no real solution is (or can be) offered. This is the dilemma involving the integrity of the preacher, who knows that he must speak out of genuine personal conviction and yet must be faithful to the message committed to the Church. Those who wrestle with this problem will, however, find much that is stimulating and helpful in the chapters on "Preaching is Personal" and "Preaching is Worship." "Preaching," says Dr. Knox, "is a personal, living confession of the ancient faith of the Church."

Books on preaching are inclined to neglect the factor of the active participation of the congregation. Too often they leave the impression that a Christian congregation consists of passive material to be moulded by the preacher. Dr. Knox has a vivid sense of the participation of the worshipper in the sermon—his "inward Amen" to what is being confessed. "The peacher, no less truly than the gospel, must not be hedged in; he must be free to present the meaning of the gospel as that meaning has come home to him. But unless his preaching elicits some such response in the church because it is itself a response to realities in the church's life and a proclamation of the event which gave rise to it and determined its character—unless this is true, his preaching has ceased to be authentic Christian preaching."

Dr. Knox does not unnecessarily add to the plethora of technical "how-to-do-

it" books but has some shrewd suggestions in passing on sermon preparation and construction. The real stimulus of the book, however, will be found to be its intimation of the meaning of Biblical preaching and the author's deep understanding of preaching as a sacrament.

DAVID H. C. READ

CHURCH DOGMATICS, VOL. I THE DOCTRINE OF THE WORD OF GOD PART 2, BY KARL BARTH, TR. G. T. THOMSON AND HAROLD KNIGHT. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. xiv-905 pp., $12.50.*

VOL. IV THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION PART I, BY KARL BARTH, TR. G. W. BROMILEY. *New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. xi-802 pp., $12.50.*

[Ed. Note: *This is the last in a series of three reviews which discuss the newly translated volumes of* Church Dogmatics *as well as Barth's place in contemporary thought more generally. Reviews by Professors Bennett and Muilenburg appeared, respectively, in the January and March issues of the* Quarterly Review.]

In the summer of 1938, Peter Barth, the editor of the *Opera Selecta* of Calvin, told some of us who were his colleagues on the faculty of Adolph Keller's Ecumenical Seminar in Geneva the following story about his brother Karl: "Our family used to spend the summer vacations in the country. One day after breakfast, our father decided that we should all go on a hike or a picnic. All members of the family were rounded up, but Karl, who was then nine or ten years old, was nowhere to be found. We finally went off without him. When we came back in the late afternoon, there was still no sign of him. At last, we located him in a barn. He was seated on a three-legged stool in front of a barrel the top of which served him as a desk. He had been writing all day. When we asked him what he was up to, he replied: 'I am writing my Collected Works.'"

What he thus began, Karl Barth has apparently been continuing to do to this day. His "Collected Works" now fill large book-shelves. Now past seventy years of age, he is still busy and preoccupied with writing. And what a skillful writer he is! Words flow incessantly from his pen. He must do his thinking while he is writing. He is as productive as a journalist who must finish a story every day and as creative as a novelist with great imagination who cannot but give form to his ideas in words. Indeed, in his pronouncements on the church-and world-situation, Barth appears to be a theological journalist. And in his dogmatic works, he writes, if I may say so, like a theological novelist. He resembles a Thomas Mann or a Thomas Wolfe. Like them, he draws upon an inexhaustible font of imagination and, like them, he is a master, nay, a wizard of the written word.

The volumes of his *Church Dogmatics* are written in a sober, didactic but flourishing style that flows steadily along like a broad swift river. (The English translators have reproduced it with admirable competence.) Its sentences are long and involved and repetitive. An idea which can be captured in a few words is expressed in an ever new series of sentences. Different words and varying phrases articulate it over and over again. It imprints itself upon the mind of the reader in the same way as a musical theme, when it is developed in the movement of a sonata or symphony, lays hold of the mind of the listener.

Of course, Barth's basic ideas are of such a sort that they cannot be communicated by any other method. For example, his doctrine of the knowledge of God is grounded on the thesis that

"God is known by God and by God alone." (II, 1, p. 47.) In order to explain what he means by this, Barth fills dozens of pages. But when he is done, he has stated and re-stated only this one idea.

Only this one idea, I say. What a strange idea it is, what a disturbing idea to be entertained and explained by a human mind! One can deal with it only in one of two ways of explanation: either state it and then say no more about it (for, if only God can know God, a man can not possibly say anything about knowing him!) or state it and then deal with it laboriously and in many twists and contortions of thought in terms of an impossible human possibility (for if, when God is knowable only to God, a man nevertheless finds that he is capable of this knowledge of God, he has indeed a lot of explaining to do!).

Barth is this kind of a man! He can and dares speak of God's communion with man and of man's communion with God on the basis of the thesis that God can be known only by himself. And he has found it necessary to fill not dozens but thousands of pages in order to explain how this can be. He can do this because he knows what God's counsels are. If I may be allowed to say so, he has, in my opinion, looked into God's cards.

This doctrine of the knowledge of God has been his theme from the beginning of his career as a theological author. His commentary on the Epistle to the Romans was a turbulent exposition of the idea that God is in heaven and man on earth; and that man deceives himself if he thinks that he can reach heaven from earth; indeed, that men, particularly Christian men, have been deceiving themselves throughout the ages, but never more thoroughly than in modern times when they believed that by religion and religiousness they could obtain a relation with God. Barth still thinks so. In Volume I, 2 of the *Church Dogmatics* (now available in English translation), he presents a long chapter on religion as unbelief and superstition. Throughout the whole work, down to Volume IV, 2, he declares himself a sworn enemy of all so-called natural knowledge of God, all "natural theology," all paths toward God *"von unten nach oben."* Like the Roman Catholic conception of the *analogia entis*, all this appears to him as the invention of Antichrist.

However, he has never been only a critic. He was and is (and now more fully than ever) a constructive, or rather, an expository thinker. From the beginning he has pointed to the availability of an access to God: by the way that leads *"von oben nach unten,"* in God's revelation of himself in Jesus Christ to which the Bible bears witness. In the Word in which God knows himself he can be known also by man, not in the sense that human godlessness and atheism are transformed into godliness and faith or in the sense that man's incapacity for God is replaced by an openness for the divine, but in the sense that God draws man into his own divine life and makes him a participant of his own divine self-knowledge. In this way, Barth has stated the matter from the beginning and he finds ever new ways of saying it again. Only he speaks now of the objective factuality of this event in unparadoxical terms. He has banished from his thought the Kierkegaardian existential dialectics that he employed in his earlier works and the vocabulary by means of which he expressed it.

In Volume IV, 2 of the *Dogmatics*, the last one published and not yet available in English, one can read sentences (p. 136) that I translate as follows: "The Incarnation is in itself a fact produced by an act of God's majesty and as such it has not only the character of an actual happening but also that of revelation. Because it has this character, it reveals, opens and discloses itself and makes itself knowable by creating the possibility of being seen,

heard and understood, or rather: it creates the eyes that see it, the ears that hear it, the thoughts that understand it. Because it has this character, it is a light that can be and is actually seen—'in thy light we shall see light' (Ps. 36, 10), *i.e.*, it renders itself knowable as a fact. It removes the bar and opens the door toward its givenness (objectivity); it enlarges itself in the direction of a subject; it comprehends and embraces this subject; it becomes the known object of this subject. By the action of the object the subject that is not capable of knowing it thus is enabled to know it." In other words, revelation produces its own possibility of being known, or: by disclosing himself, God creates the possibility of being known. (This is one of those long involved statements that represents one of the aforementioned variations of Barth's theological-symphonic themes.)

Along these lines Barth's thought has remained steady and identical. But, as the work on the *Dogmatics* progressed, he has seen fit to modify his basic theme. In connection with the extremely elaborate development of the doctrines of Creation and Reconciliation, he was led to put an ever increasing weight upon Christology. His theology is now "concentrated upon Christ" to such an extent that all doctrines on the nature and life of God and on the nature and destiny of man are explained on the basis of the second article of the Creed: the faith in Jesus Christ, very God of very God and very man of very man. The man Christ Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, born of the Virgin, crucified under Pontius Pilate, raised from the dead and (after forty days) ascended into heaven, is the Alpha and the Omega, God in action as Saviour and Creator. Christ, the Reconciler, is the actual ground of all being and of all knowing. From, in and to him are all things. He is the *summum esse* and the *summum bonum*. In him, all reality is disclosed as upheld and surrounded by the triumphant grace of God. God is love.

The doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian dogma of the two natures of Christ, regarded as implicit in the Biblical Kerygma of Christ, serve Barth as the basis of a grand speculation on God, Man and Nature. The Bible as well as the cosmological, soteriological and anthropological doctrines of historical theology furnish him the individual parts of his system of a Christological metaphysics. It is amazing to see how he handles these parts as his thought ranges over the whole Bible and the entire tradition of Christian theology down to its remote and obscure corners. (Here one can learn much!)

Barth's theology has thus become a system of speculative Biblical metaphysics. It has been characterized, not ineptly, as "Christomonism." He is not far removed from the world of German Idealism. Indeed, we must rank Barth next to the great speculative theologians of Christian history: Origen, Thomas Aquinas, Schleiermacher. In the light of the faith of the prophets and apostles and the Protestant Reformers, particularly Luther but also Calvin, he is as great a seducer as they were. If they are heretical because of their service to the harlot Reason, he is too. If Schelling has made a Plotinian gnostic of Tillich, Plato has tempted Barth to develop a Biblical-Christological theosophy or gnosis.

All who love dogmatic thinking will be fascinated, thrilled and enriched by the reading of the volumes of the *Church Dogmatics*—in company with the Roman Catholic Thomists who, despite Barth's strictures on the *analogia entis*, seem to be able to appropriate his system best of all. But anyone who likes to have his imagination excited by the thrill of theological metaphysics will have a rousing experience by reading Barth.

What influence will this *Church Dogmatics* have upon the churches? Will it profoundly affect the course of Pro-

testantism? I am so bold as to believe that it will not change the course of thought and action either of Old or New Protestantism. Despite its great depth and range, Barth's thinking is too willful and unrealistic. A theology which is based on the principle that man cannot know God but which, in dependence on a revelation in which God knows himself, presumes to explain what God is in himself, what his inner life is, and even what his purposes are for time and eternity, must prove in the end to be irrelevant to the human situation.

Today, the human situation, including that of the churches, must be handled by critical anthropological thinking and by means of decisions derived from clear, critical historical thinking. Barth says that church history is merely an auxiliary theological discipline, because he believes that the church must be guided by dogmatic theology oriented to the Bible. But dogmatic speculation, even if it is based on the Bible, cannot help us. What we need most is historical understanding and not theosophy. The churches have more need of a Harnack than of a Barth.

In the volume *Antwort*, which a number of Barth's friends published in honor of his seventieth birthday, Eduard Thurneysen, his old time friend, presents (under the title "The Beginnings") a series of letters he received from Barth during the time when they were neighboring pastors in the Swiss Aargau. One of the letters (written on April 20, 1920) reads as follows: "In Basel, I went boldly to Eberhard Vischer and inquired for Harnack. I burst into an important party, where (as I later heard in a round about way) they had been talking mostly about me. Harnack sat enthroned on a sofa; they addressed him as 'Excellency,' and he distributed *bon mots* ('two things are international,' he said, 'money and intellect.'). Afterwards, I had a private conversation with him and Eberhard Vischer, for an hour or so. I asked him what he meant by 'profane' and was told that he had in mind the onesidedness of my thinking . . . because it intruded upon God's mystery. He could not reply quite so readily to my question whether he would not admit that I was at least historically correct in my understanding of the N. T. In answering this, the two gentlemen became very much involved and it finally amounted to this, that the forgiveness of sins is something very simple and a part of the love of the neighbor, and Harnack said that he practised it constantly. They were willing to concede that a little disturbance of the church might be desirable, but insisted that I should keep my conception of God to myself and not turn it into an 'article of export.' Finally they called me a Calvinist and an intellectualist and then dismissed me with the prediction that according to all the evidence of church history, I would probably found a sect and become the recipient of inspirations."

This is a very nice story, very characteristic of all persons concerned. And the judgments expressed in it are all correct, I think, that of Barth on Harnack as well as that of Harnack on Barth.

WILHELM PAUCK

THE PROPHETS IN THE KING JAMES VERSION WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY, BY JULIUS A. BEWER. *New York, Harper and Brothers, 1956. vii-663 pp., $5.95.*

Before his death, Prof. Bewer channelled much of his fine scholarship and learning into a series of *Annotated Bible* booklets, of which those on the Prophets are now gathered for the first time into a more permanent cloth-bound library edition.

The present volume appears well designed for those who are unable to use the customary critical tools for treating the Hebrew text, and who therefore would welcome a concise critically annotated edition of the Prophets in English. At the outset, the retaining of the more or less obsolete text of the King James Version might seem unfortunate, but Prof. Bewer's detailed textual notes, many of which benefit from the recent tremendous strides made in Semitic philology, history, and archaeology, compensate for this weakness not only by correcting errors in the KJV translation, but also by suggesting many new readings and further illumination on a number of puzzling words, phrases, and passages.

In general, the traditional order of the prophetic books has been changed to meet the demand of a chronological arrangement. Strangely, this has not been followed consistently throughout, for in the first section of the book containing the eighth century prophets, such obviously non-eighth century prophets as Deutero and Trito Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel are also included.

By way of preface to each major chronological section of prophetic writings, Professor Bewer has written a brief yet concise historical introduction. A description of the specific context in which each prophet spoke (with arrangement and dating of oracles in chronological sequence, where possible), together with a short discussion of the prophet's religious message and contribution to religious thought, precedes the main body of text and critical notes.

As a very handy, scholarly, compact, and readable volume, "Bewer on the Prophets" should find great use among both ministers and lay Bible students, and where greater detail is not wanted, even among professional biblical scholars.

GEORGE M. LANDES

DYNAMICS OF FAITH, BY PAUL TILLICH. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957. xxiv-127 pp., $2.75.*

THE ART OF LOVING, BY ERICH FROMM. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. xxiv-133 pp., $2.75.*

These two valuable little books really have nothing in common except their dust jackets, which advertise that they are books in a series entitled "World Perspectives," edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. This means that they also carry an introduction by Miss Anshen. Each is a classic of irrelevance and obscure yearning for a new world civilisation. Miss Anshen introduces Tillich's thoughtful little study with the remark that, "world perspectives is dedicated to the concept of man, born out of a universe perceived through a fresh vision of reality." The reader may ponder the meaning of this and similarly obscure reflections for some time without gaining any glimmer of what the author means. The succeeding sentences fail to throw any light upon the enigma of meaning. Miss Anshen declares that, "the series is committed to a re-examination of all those sides of human endeavor, which the specialist was taught to believe, he could safely leave aside." An amusing bit of irrelevance is that part of the introduction which inveighs against "positivistic" thought in an introduction to Fromm's work. He, of course, is a distinguished psychologist who prides himself on his naturalistic humanism.

Paul Tillich's volume on the *Dynamics of Faith* again reveals the astounding virtuosity of the man and thinker. It is a brief resume of what has been said in other volumes, particularly in his *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*. But the book is fresh and illuminating for all of that. It expounds Tillich's well known thesis that, "Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned." He makes some very enlightening distinctions between faith as commitment and faith as "belief"

in certain dogmatic propositions. He also refutes all purely emotional and volitional interpretations of faith, particularly those which describe religion as purely "emotive" and deny faith any cognitive significance. He asserts, "Every act of faith is a cognitive affirmation, not as a result of an independent process of inquiry but as inseparable from the total act of acceptance and surrender." His analyses of the purely intellectual, emotional and volitional interpretations of the dynamics of faith are superbly subtle in distinguishing what is true from what is false in each position.

Tillich thoroughly refutes the criticisms of his position, which accuse him of having only subjective but no objective criteria of ultimacy. The chief objective criterion of ultimacy is, of course, that the God of our devotion must be, not a being among other beings, but the very ground of being. But this insistence, which comes to terms with all idolatrous distortions of faith, in which men are ultimately concerned with nation, success or some other ephemeral end or value, naturally places mystic religions, with their rigorous rejection of all the relative ends of history, and Biblical faith, with its hazardous but creative dealing with the stuff of historical responsibilities, on a par. It may also fail to do justice to the particular meaning and purpose of the divine assigned to the divine in the Christian revelation, particularly in the assertion that "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." This is to say that the Christian faith is ultimately concerned, not with worshipping the mystery if it is but the mystery of the reconciliation between the divine purpose and the fragmentary and idolatrous human purpose. In other words it is concerned, not in evading idolatry, but in accepting historic responsibilities with an easy and yet uneasy conscience, since every form of human striving is bound to be idolatrous in the ultimate court. One might say that ideally the Christian faith enables men, not to escape idolatry absolutely, but to accept responsibilities, knowing that those responsibilities will involve us in idolatries from which no form of human perfection will redeem us. This is the meaning of Luther's admonition, "Sin bravely if also you have brave faith." This is also the meaning of the Reformation's rejection of the ascetic effort to bridge the chasm between the divine and the human by strenuous human effort. The insistence on divine mercy as the final answer to the human predicament does not absolve us of responsibility but frees us for performing tasks in a world which never confronts us with clear choices of good and evil.

Yet it is a pity to quarrel with Tillich on a single point, particularly when the quarrel exhausts the time and space which should be devoted to an exposition of all the facets of thought in this little classic.

Erich Fromm in his *Art of Loving* significantly devotes an opening chapter to the "Love of God" in which he adopts Meister Eckhardt's definition of God as the "negation of negation" and as "absolutely nothing." He arrives at the conclusion, that whether this religious love is idolatrous or as rigorously non-idolatrous as the religion of Meister Eckhardt or Taoism, depends upon the nature of society in which religion flourishes. In any case the chief interest is in analysing the art of love on the human plane. On this plane Fromm rejects Freud's too biological definition of love and proves that Neo-Freudianism, though given to an optimism which makes one prefer Freud's realism, nevertheless makes positive contributions to a genuinely humane analysis of the human situation. Fromm may put too much emphasis on the conditioning factors, such as a competitive society, in analysing the art of loving. Thereby he makes the art of lov-

ing dependent upon the establishment of what he has defined in another rather utopian book as the *Sane Society*. But the little book is nevertheless a valuable treatise, revealing the insights of a scientific humanist in his effort to counter the purely biological naturalism from which he distinguishes his type of naturalistic humanism. Fromm has moved perceptibly since he wrote *Man for Himself*. He does not now define love as a "phenomenon of abundance" which is possible only when man has been made secure by his own self-seeking. Influenced by Sandor Ferenczi, the Italian contemporary of Freud, and possibly by Harry Stack Sullivan, he now feels that the security which makes it possible for us to love others is established by the love which others give us, particularly in childhood.

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ENTRUSTED WITH THE GOSPEL, BY DAVID A. MACLENNAN. *Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1956. 128 pp., $2.00.*

THE MAKING OF THE SERMON, ROBERT J. MCCRACKEN. *New York Harper & Brothers, 1956. 104 pp, $2.00.*

PERSUASIVE PREACHING, BY RONALD E. SLEETH. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. 96 pp., $175.*

Dr. MacLennan begins his book (given as the Warrack Lectures, 1955) with the question, "Is preaching as a means of taking men for [Christ] not outmoded?" We are, he says, "entrusted with a commission"—and because it is a commission from *God*, MacLennan "hurls a ringing 'No!'" at the question he has posed. If we take this commission seriously, we shall "recover . . . a true perspective on our task," and "shall be delivered from taking our task either too lightly or too seriously." Another question is raised (implicitly) in Chapter II: Has the 'great news', which Christ brings, not grown old? Again a 'No!': "the gospel is timely because it is a message telling of the effects of what has happened upon what is now happening." Therefore we preachers have "a great gospel to preach," "to the needs of our people in this volcanic era." This Gospel has been outlined by the historic creeds of the Church; the preacher, however, "like other Christian individuals, will 'theologize' in terms of his own experience as this is illumined, corrected, and enlarged by the experience of the total Christian community." If we would "spell out" the Good News to our congregations, MacLennan suggests we should say to them: 1) "Look at the sky," 2) "Look at people and the moral and spiritual heights to which they climb as well as the depths to which they fall," 3) "Look within yourself," 4) "Look at Jesus Christ." Consequences of faith in God, he says, are belief in "a world of moral law," "endless possibilities of spiritual growth

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ahead of us," and "obligation to live like the sons and daughters of the Highest." The (explicit) question of the third chapter is, "To whom do we preach?" His answers to that question extend throughout the remaining chapters of the book. These titles indicate the content of Dr. Maclennan's answers: "Only Like Souls I See the Folk," "Seek Him in the Kingdom of Anxiety," "The Human Being Is a Lonely Creature." He seems to be greatly influenced by Tillich, whom he quotes often in these chapters. We are living in an age of despair, of guilt, of fear and impending doom (the atom bomb), an age of apparent futility and loneliness —all this beneath the complacency of middle-class America with its middle-class congregations. As preachers of the love of God in Christ, we should and must "know and speak intelligibly to the deep needs" of those who live in such an age. Below these needs is the question of forgiveness; "we must be as specific as possible in indicating the answer" to that question—"God's remedy for sin."

The title of Dr. McCracken's book indicates purpose: it is not so much a theological discourse on Christian proclamation as it is a practical treatment of the business of sermon-writing. (Its contents were delivered as the Stone Lectures at Princeton Seminary.) However, as the chapter-headings suggest, it is far from being a 'technical manual' for preachers. In the first chapter ("The Long-range Preparation of the Sermon"), Dr. McCracken expresses what he considers to be the principle requisites of the preacher himself: 1) " 'Take heed unto thyself;' " 2) " 'and to the flock over which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers.' " "Most of all," he says, "we need men of character and principle in the pulpit. Personal quality is the major factor in producing spiritual power." In Chapters II and III (both entitled, "The Varied Character of the Sermon"), the author advises the preacher to "set himself to traverse the entire ground of Christian truth . . . systematically . . . periodically . . . comprehensively." Of the various patterns of preaching which he outlines, he gives preëminence to expository preaching. Chapter IV treats "Preaching As an Art," and Dr. McCracken suggests that if the preacher *thinks* of preaching as an art, "half the battle is fought." Given "some semblance" of "the preaching instinct," the minister should not, however, *rely* upon this "native gift," but should continue to concentrate upon his 'style;' he should write his sermon in full, he should avoid "the fatuities of commonplace speech," etc. In the last chapter, "The Construction of the Sermon," the author further suggests that effective style in preaching may be acquired by intensive reading and industry in writing: Nevertheless he warns that this may be overdone: "never forget that the school of experience is a fruitful, long-term source for the preacher." This warning is balanced by another, to the effect that the preacher should not draw upon his own *personal* experience overmuch. Finally, the au-, thor gives us a (day-by-day) glimpse of the method he himself employs in preparing sermons.

Dr. Sleeth has been impressed by the "relatively new field" of 'persuasion,' which, thought it "can be used for bad ends as well as good," should nevertheless engage the thought of the preacher—despite the fact that persuasive 'techniques' frighten many ministers. For the preacher must consider that he has to *communicate* the "urgent idea" of the Gospel to his people. In order to be persuasive, he must "adapt" his preaching to the needs of his parishoners and must address himself to their life-situations. The preacher must be cognizant of real problems when he approaches the task of sermon-writing. Church "audiences" vary, Sleeth says, but normally "congregations fall into three groups according to their predisposition toward speaker, subject material, and response sought:" 1) "the believing audience," 2) "the doubting

audience," and 3) "the disbelieving or hostile audience." If the preacher is aware of the dominant attitude of his particular congregation, he will accomodate himself to it in his preaching. In the instance of the third classification, for example, he should remember that "people tend to believe through their experiences . . . In religion, the individual's Christian experience is considered basic. The preacher's witness to the experience of the Gospel in his own life, and in the lives of others, is an important aspect of both belief and persuasion." In Chapter II ("Persuasion by Character") we are told that, since the preacher's 'audience' has a certain attitude toward *him* (as well as his message) he should not neglect the development of his *personal* 'persuasiveness:' in fact, the preacher's character is the greatest factor in persuasion." This means the establishment of "good rapport" with his people. Being 'persuasive' as a preacher, however, also depends upon his ability to 'arouse interest' (Chapter III). The choice of vital themes, interesting introductions and illustrations, an order of service which sustains attention but does not make the sermon 'anticlimatic,' etc., are concrete means to this end. One method of persuasion is an appeal to 'reason' (Chapter IV): "Christianity is a reasonable religion and if the Christian faith is to compete in the market place of ideas with other ideologies, then men of the pulpit must be able to articulate meaningfully the faith that is within them." Another method is "Emotion as persuasion" (Chapter V)—not "emotional preaching [that] is crude and crass," but which "takes man as he is—a dynamic being with emotions *and* intellect." Again, "the preacher is to make the essentials of the Christian faith—God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, prayer—'come alive' to his people" by "dramatizing the idea" (Chapter VI). Dr. Sleeth concludes by stressing the importance of language and delivery.

These books are written imaginatively; they are interspersed throughout with interesting and helpful suggestions, many of them drawn from the personal experiences and labours of the authors themselves. And as Dr. McCracken suggests, we should all be willing to listen to great men.

May we perceive in these books a somewhat representative 'picture' of the way in which America's Protestant ministry understands its office of preaching? Three aspects of this 'picture' are significant. Each 'aspect' appears in all

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three books although they are not equally represented in the views of each author which are expressed in the respective publications.

1) *A Concern for the 'Relevance' of the Gospel.* We live in an 'age of anxiety,' of competing ideals, of impending catastrophe, of complacency, of indecision, of 'techniques,' etc., while the Gospel which we have to proclaim is 'bound up' (in Scripture) with a 'world-view' in many respects different from our own and particularly with an Event which happened 'long ago and far away.' This 'double realization' has, apparently filled the hearts of preachers with alarm and their minds with busy thoughts: How to remedy the situation? How to communicate the Gospel? How to make it 'relevant' in spite of everything? We *should* ask ourselves such questions! It indicates that at least we have begun to take the scriptures seriously. But we need to take them *more* seriously! We still have to learn from them: a) that in *our* terms the Gospel can't be *communicated*—it was as 'irrelevant' ("foolish!") in Paul's 'age of anxiety' as it is in ours; and, b) that *nevertheless* (*God's* 'nevertheless') it is *communicated* and it *does* make itself relevant —both because of us and in spite of us.

2) *A Concentration upon 'The Human Situation'* This concern has driven us to a kind of 'Needs Theology.' It is high time that the Church began to consider the tragedy, meaninglessness, anxiety, etc. of 'the human situation.' But that 'situation' is not nearly so tragic as we preachers make it out to be. Most of our 'middle-class-congregations' live normal, happy lives. For the most part they find their own solutions for their own troubles. But we have magnified their 'needs,' and have made our primary *appeal* to the 'sickness' and the 'abnormality' which is said to lurk beneath the surface of their apparently happy lives. We know from our standpoint that they are in *great* need! Yet in our haste and our concern have we *identified* their 'needs' with Need, their 'sins' with Sin, their 'anxieties' with Anxiety? That Need, which is Sin which is Anxiety, is not known apart from the Cross! Shouldn't we, with Paul, begin to preach "Jesus Christ and Him Crucified?"

3) *A Theological 'Uncertainty'* Perhaps it is the preacher's privilege to be theologically . . . inconsistent. Perhaps, too, it might better be termed 'theological uncertainty'—probably a result of living 'in between' two theological worlds (those of 'liberalism' and 'neo-orthodoxy!'). Are we not on shaky ground when we confess on the one hand that "God, the eternal Creator and Redeemer of all life, has made himself known to men supremely in the life and death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ,' and then on the other hand advise men first to "consider the mysterious universe," and only subsequently to 'behold' Jesus Christ? Is the adjective "Christocentric" directly applicable to "a series [of sermons] on the teaching of Jesus about God, man, sin, forgiveness?" Perhaps the reviewer is wrong, or it may be only a matter of terminology. Nevertheless, it seems to him that the American Pulpit must broadly examine its theological presuppositions.

DOUGLAS J. HALL

THE PARISH COMES ALIVE, BY ERNEST W. SOUTHCOTT. *New York, Morehouse-Gorham, 1957. xxiv-143 pp., $2.75.*

THE STUDY GUIDE, BY J. STUART WETMORE. *New York, Morehouse-Gorham, 1957. 37 pp., $.75.*

All who are concerned with the Church's relevance to the human situation in our day will find in this volume provocative rubrics for the involvement of laity and clergy in the life of the parish. The author, who is both the Vicar of St. Wilfred's Church, Holton, in Leeds, and Canon of Ripon Cathedral, catches up the theology of worship

and witness in the Holton parish, and sets these forth in terms of living faith and commitment.

The Church, for Canon Southcott, is "the revolutionary community," which exultantly brings the wholeness of Christ "to the whole of creation, to the whole of mankind, and to the whole man." (p.2) The Church must, in relating itself to people, "take the Eucharist back into life" (p. 30) connecting Baptism and Communion, as well as "the two communities, the congregation and the parish." The parish comes alive when the Church makes "the things of God local and real through the house-church." (p. 143)

In the house-church, the congregation "gets alongside of" those to whom the Church has had little or no relevance, thus fulfilling the Church's missionary task. The Church's teaching in the house-church is the congregation's responsibility from font to confirmation to communion. The congregation as the "Eucharistic" fellowship has corporate responsibility for healing the sick, meeting social issues, and confronting nonbelievers with the sacramental nature of their common vocations.

The Anglican thrust of Canon Southcott's major motifs makes it evident why Bishop Donegan has chosen this work as the sixth in his annual "Bishop of New York" books. This fact does not preclude its value for non-Anglicans. Most of the basic issues ring true for all Christian groups. Here is material to be read, pondered, discussed and possibly emulated. The hearts of some non-Anglicans will be strangely warmed when the author mentions "ruling elders" and "Methodist leaders" as potential "regular leaders in charge of the house-church." (p. 93)

In many ways *The Parish Comes Alive* takes its place alongside *The Face of My Parish* by Tom Allan and *Only One Way Left* by George F. McLeod as the setting down on paper of the personal pilgrimage of a devoted servant of God endeavoring to discover God's way for the Church to meet the deep needs of the people in the community. It deserves careful reading and earnest discussion. Some readers may wish to modify or change Canon Southcott's dictum that "the house-church is *the* way in which we are going to train adults to be the Church." (p. 92) There may be additional ways, but the critics of Southcott had better back up their claims with the same qualitative reality of years of experimentation and experience.

A study guide of *The Parish Comes Alive* is available for use with discussion groups. Written by J. Stuart Wetmore, Chairman of the Department of Christian Education, Diocese of New York, the paper booklet presents suggestions for six study sessions.

CHARLES E. MATHEWS

CRISIS IN COMMUNICATION, BY MALCOLM BOYD. *Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1957. 123 pp., $2.95.*

This is the most significant publication now available in the growing body of material attempting to relate Christain faith to radio, television, films and the press. If prospective readers note only Mr. Boyd's background in the advertising and motion picture field and expect the book to be just another naive appeal for the Church to awaken to the potential missionary power of the mass media, they will be utterly mistaken. The author hacks away with a sharp theological axe at some of the assumptions underlying present ecclesiastical attitudes and policies concerning the media.

The central thesis of the book is clearly stated in an early sentence, "It is the difficult task of the Church both to employ the implements and techniques of public relations and publicity in doing the missionary work—and as

a part of its mission in the world, to stand in judgment upon these implements and techniques." In succeeding pages Mr. Boyd has much to say about judgment but little to suggest concerning valid employment of implements and techniques.

In examining the media in the light of Christian theology and Christian involvement Mr. Boyd is more prophetic than systematic. The book is a somewhat loosely organized collection of striking insights illustrated by a profusion of diverse but fascinating quotations. Quotations from Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, Tillich and Kraemer are interspersed with statements by Arthur Godfrey, Cecil B. DeMille and Victor Mature. The author scatters ideas like a circuitous trail of stepping stones and then hops from one to another with an agility which may be both a delight and a despair. In two pages, for example, he moves from public relations to reconciliation to evangelism to dichotomization. In eight lines he deals with "bigness," "sincerity," the Evanston plea to "gossip the Gospel" and Canon Wedels advocacy of "Christian dinner parties." He has sentences which could well be paragraphs and paragraphs which could be chapters. Other paragraphs, however, are simply repetitious and were apparently included to make room for quotations. The style has a sort of headlong intensity which is both its strength and weakness. The reader has the disturbing feeling that he could begin almost anywhere in the book and go backward or forward without affecting the organization of the material being presented.

The best and clearest section deals with "implicit Christian communication" through "the vast majority of mass media offerings that are consciously trying only to entertain—but that are, in fact, decisively moulding the thought and action patterns of men and women within our society." Pointing to the implicit Christian significance which needs to be excavated from these art-forms which mirror the human condition, Mr. Boyd observes that "for such a task we need the tools of Christian discrimination," and that "this is a most challenging way of bringing large number of laymen to the door of theology."

On the other hand, the reader is reminded that "an explicitly 'religious' medium of mass communication may carry within itself an implicit refutation of its own claim;" the films *Samson and Delilah* and *David and Bathsheba* are cited as examples.

In pursuing the fundamental problems of communication the author explores various experiments in "Point of Contact," including "house-churches" in England, the Iona Community, the priest-worker movement in France, the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey and editing of children's comic books by the

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Rev. Marcus Morris in Britain. He relates these to his central theme by advocating "mass-media missioners" and by concluding "that mass communication, while it exerts a tremendous influence upon individuals, yet can never achieve the kind or degree of impact that is the result of personal communication representing a relationship of persons."

Since this exceedingly provocative book leaves a trail of unresolved questions and dilemmas, it ends appropriately with "A Litany for Christian Communication," which raises to the level of worship many of the concerns expressed in earlier pages.

JOHN W. BACHMAN

Book Notes

THE EPISTLE TO HEBREWS, EDITED BY FREDERICK C. GRANT. *New York, Harper & Brothers, 1956. 61 pp., $.95.*

This is the fifteenth issue of Harper's Annotated Bible Series and the sixth by Dr. Grant who is editor for the New Testament section. As one would expect from so thorough a scholar, the commentary provides full and wide-ranging insights, drawn from the contemporary religious and secular scene. In addition to the verse-by-verse commentary, there is provided both a comprehensive and illuminating Introduction and a helpful Outline of the Epistle's content development. Here are "endless riches in a little room," and for a very modest cost. One could not secure a wiser guide to this enigmatic and influential writing.

R.F.B.

GUILT AND REDEMPTION, BY LEWIS J. SHERRILL. *Revised Edition, Richmond, Virginia, John Knox Press, 1957. 255 pp., $3.50.*

This is a second edition of the 1945 Sprunt Lectures which Dr. Sherrill delivered at Union Seminary in Richmond, Virginia. Two chapters carry the burden of his revisions. Chapter II ("Individual and Environment") indicates the separate thrusts of academic psychology and the 'new' psychology. In this edition he prefers to term the latter 'depth' rather than 'clinical' psychology. Chapter IV ("The Outcroppings of Guilt") is chiefly modified through brief comments on more recent analyses of anxiety. Dr. Sherrill recognizes notable contributions by depth psychologists and theologians alike. Otherwise the text remains substantially unchanged.

Guilt and Redemption represents Dr. Sherrill's thought more generally as it sought to relate secular and Christian insights with sympathy and without polemic. These characteristics are evident in his discussion of anxiety, hostility and guilt. Finally it is a Christian knowledge of man, however, which truly comprehends redemption and an *agape* love which makes it a reality.

J.F.W.

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